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Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting
the Adversarial Balance
Robert P. Mostellert
"Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold."
-William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming.
Beginning early in the 1970's, revolutionary expansion occurred in
criminal discovery by the prosecution against the defense. Where the
defendant previously enjoyed apparently permanent constitutional pro-
tection from state incursions, extensive pretrial disclosures by the defend-
ant are now routinely required.' Discovery against the criminal
defendant as a right of the prosecution, independent of any "triggering"
request by the defendant for discovery,2 is both widespread-available in
t Associate Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1970, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill; J.D. 1975, Yale University; M.P.P. 1975, Harvard University. I would like to thank
Katharine Bartlett, Donald Horowitz, Kenneth Pye, Thomas Rowe, Christopher Schroeder, and
Peter Westen for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this Article, and Bart Patterson,
Robert Danforth, Joseph McHugh, Ellen Fishbein Mills, and Francis J. Mootz III for their
assistance with the research. I would also like to thank the Duke Law School for providing
assistance for my research by awarding me an Eugene T. Bost Research Professorship. I would
particularly like to thank my colleague Sara Sun Beale for her insightful comments and careful
criticism and for the generous gift of her time.
1. A number of commentators have noted some of these changes, but their scope has been
largely ignored. One reason for this may be that these changes have occurred primarily in the states,
where they are not easily mapped, rather than in the federal system, where most legal researchers
concentrate their efforts. See, eg., Allis, Limitations on Prosecutorial Discovery of the Defense Case in
Federal Courts: The Shield of Confidentiality, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 461 (1977); Feldman, The Work
Product Rule in Criminal Practice and Procedure, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 495, 496 n.8 (1981) ("Because
most jurisdictions follow the federal work product version, this Article will focus on rule 16 and
federal case law.").
In the federal system, discovery against the defendant remains very limited; the federal rules are
not representative of rules in many states. Moreover, since the vast bulk of criminal prosecutions
occur in the states, discovery in the federal system is of less significance.
2. I use the term independent to describe such discovery by the prosecution and conditional to
describe discovery that is available to the prosecution only upon request for discovery by the defense.
For example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit discovery against the criminal
defendant only when he "triggers" the prosecutor's right to discovery by requesting disclosure of
certain types of information from the government. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1). In this Article, I
concentrate on those rules that grant independent discovery rights to the prosecution. For a
discussion of the constitutionality of conditional discovery rules see infra note 141.
Also, I do not attempt to discuss under what circumstances a "preclusion" sanction against the
defense might be constitutional for violation of discovery rules. Compare Alicea v. Gagnon, 675
F.2d 913, 923 (7th Cir. 1982) (absent exceptional circumstances, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth
amendments prohibit preclusion of defendant's testimony for violation of notice of alibi rule) with
People v. Taylor, 491 N.E.2d 3, 6-7 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (trial court properly exercised discretion to
exclude testimony of defense witnesses as sanction for violation of discovery rule), cert. granted, 107
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half the states-and wide-ranging in terms of the scope of information
available through authorized disclosures. In several states, the prosecu-
tion may obtain:
1. A specification of all defenses that the defendant will raise;
2. The names and addresses of all witnesses that the defendant intends
to call at trial; and
3. All statements of defense witnesses, including memoranda of
unsigned oral statements.
In most of these states, neither the rules nor the case law explicitly pro-
hibits the prosecutor from using the information so obtained in the state's
case-in-chief.3 Two states even require the defense to create statements
of defense witnesses for the purpose of discovery if the statements were
not otherwise taken. Others require the defense to provide the prosecu-
tion with any statements obtained from government witnesses, whether
or not the defense intends to use the statements for impeachment
purposes.4
Discovery of unsuccessful efforts to prepare a defense, even when
that defense will not be presented at trial, is also widely available. Devel-
opments here have chiefly concerned discovery of the defense's expert
witness; his identity and any report he may have prepared are often ruled
discoverable. If the expert's report does not involve a communication
from the defendant to the expert, courts frequently find it unprotected by
any constitutional right or other privilege.5 When the expert has
obtained statements from the defendant, they are generally recognized as
protected at least by attorney-client privilege. Many courts, however,
hold the privilege waived if the defense introduces any other evidence
relating to the examination.6 One court has further held that when the
defendant testifies in his own behalf he waives all protections; thus, the
defendant's statement obtained by the expert may be used to impeach his
testimony.
The steady erosion of traditional defense protections has been sped
along in part by two major errors in legal analysis that have evolved into
virtually unchallenged doctrines. Together, these developments largely
S. Ct. 947 (1987). Rather than focus on the permissible remedies for violation of rules that allow
prosecutorial discovery, I will examine when such rules themselves are constitutional.
3. Indeed, the courts in at least two states have refused to limit prosecutorial use of
discovered information to rebuttal of the defendant's case. State ex rel Keller v. Criminal Court of
Marion County, 262 Ind. 420, 426-29, 317 N.E.2d 433, 436-38 (1974) (discovery of defenses and
defense witnesses is constitutional, even if incriminating, so long as discovery is fairly balanced);
Commonwealth v. Donovan, 610 S.W.2d 601, 601-02 (Ky. 1980) (discovery of names and addresses
of witnesses whom the defense intends to call at trial for any defense constitutionally valid).
4. See infra note 42.
5. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 357.
7. See infra notes 390-93 and accompanying text.
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explain why many courts have remained oblivious to the constitutional
objections to state discovery rules. First, the courts have all but written
off the fifth amendment as providing any restriction upon discovery of
information that the defendant may ultimately want to introduce at trial.
The principal source of this development is the Supreme Court's decision
in Williams v. Florida,' which upheld the constitutionality of Florida's
notice of alibi rule. This decision has been interpreted as granting the
states carte blanche to develop discovery rules that give the prosecutor an
independent right to obtain even potentially incriminating information
free from the strictures of the fifth amendment.
Second, courts increasingly emphasize the concept of "litigative fair-
ness" in determining the scope of constitutional as well as common law
and statutory privileges.9 This development has produced further
inroads into the privilege against self-incrimination and has also weak-
ened the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The
fifth amendment diminution in the wake of Williams left a void into
which these other privileges could have expanded in order to shield the
defendant from demands of prosecutorial discovery. Instead, these privi-
leges have been weakened due to the courts' concern with enhancing the
truth-seeking process and fear that these privileges may provide a shield
for perjury by the defendant. As a result, court decisions have eroded the
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
The process of erosion has been incremental. Courts have examined
each new intrusion into the defendant's privileges independently, almost
8. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
9. Concerns for fairness have helped shape the development of criminal discovery throughout
its history. Initially the defense was perceived as possessing enormous advantages in criminal
litigation. This perception fed the traditional reluctance to expand discovery for the defendant. See
United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); see also Louisell, Criminal Discovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 56, 57 & n.3 (1961).
This argument against discovery was countered by a series of articles denying the defense had
any advantage over the prosecution in criminal litigation. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused:
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172-92 (1960); see also Brennan,
The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 285-87
(1963); Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HASTrINGs L.J. 865, 878-79 (1968). In fact, the state possesses
resources and investigative tools vastly superior to those of even the wealthiest defendant. See
Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Developing Constitutional
Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437, 439-42 (1972). In addition, those favoring broadened discovery
for the defense argued that the fundamental goal of the trial process-to determine the validity of the
charges-required the granting of a measure of discovery irrespective of the relative advantages of
the two parties. See, e.g., People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 586, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 930 (1957); State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 228-29, 98 A.2d 881, 894-95 (1953) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1960); see also Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal
Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 42, 83 (1963).
Those favoring expanded discovery for the defense carried the day and "liberalized" criminal
discovery available to it. Opponents believed, however, that the appropriate balance between the
prosecution and the defense had been distorted in the defense's favor. As a result, pressures to
redress that perceived imbalance grew.
1986] 1571
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in isolation, and have approved each in part because it had but a limited
impact upon the total range of protections available to the defendant.
The cumulative effect, however, has been profound. Through a series of
small steps, each arguably justified, the traditional balance between the
prosecution and the defense has been fundamentally altered.10 In some
jurisdictions granting expansive discovery, the defendant retains full pro-
tection under the privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
effective assistance of counsel only when he remains truly silent at trial
and when his lawyer's case preparation generates no information poten-
tially helpful to the government.
My thesis is that the fifth and sixth amendments require more pro-
tections for the criminal defendant. My position is a fundamentally con-
servative one; such protections are necessary to preserve the essential
elements of our adversary system. Indeed, that the modest restraints on
current practices set out below even need to be proposed shows just how
intrusive prosecutorial discovery has become. Though not all discovery
against the defense is unconstitutional, basic constitutional principles
require the following limits on discovery against the defense:
1. The defendant may not be required under discovery rules to make
statements that the prosecution may use directly or derivatively in its
case-in-chief.
2. The defendant's statements required by discovery rules may not be
used to impeach his trial testimony, except when the discovery statement
was willfully false or materially impeded adequate prosecutorial
preparation.
3. Unfavorable expert opinions produced by the defense during efforts
to prepare a defense may not be discovered unless the defense will use
some part of the expert's opinion.
4. Confidential communications by the defendant to his counsel may
not be discovered. Discovery of the defendant's statements to his law-
yer's agents is allowed only when either the defense affirmatively uses
those statements at trial or the prosecution demonstrates a truly compel-
ling need for the expertise of that particular agent. "Compelling need"
would not be shown by a general state interest in improving the accuracy
of the trial process by impeaching a defendant with his prior inconsistent
statements.
Some of these limitations flow from the fifth amendment, which,
properly construed, prohibits at least discovery of testimonial evidence
10. At least in this area, the warning of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886), has
proven correct:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure .... A close and
literal construction deprives [constitutional provisions for the security of persons and
property] of half their efficacy and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it
consisted more in sound than in substance.
1572 [Vol. 74:1567
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the state may use to establish its case-in-chief. Often discovery rules,
such as the notice of alibi rule at issue in Williams, will not raise substan-
tial self-incrimination issues. Acknowledging the fact that many discov-
ery rules are valid under the fifth amendment, however, is a far cry from
declaring, as some courts have, that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is irrelevant."1 When the possibility of incrimination from required
disclosures is apparent, discovery, which the state may use to establish
guilt, violates this privilege.12 Indeed, protection against such use lies
near the heart of the historical origins of the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. 13
Other constitutional limitations derive from the sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel. This right is fundamentally in
conflict with a system that requires counsel to provide the government
with the product of his efforts when they prove damaging to the defense.
The defendant would be protected against such requirements if states
interpreted concepts of waiver of existing common law and statutory
privileges more restrictively and, I submit, more accurately. The confi-
dentiality of the defense counsel's efforts in developing a vigorous
defense, however, cannot and should not depend exclusively upon a
state's definition of such protections. Our adversary system and its con-
stitutional foundations require more. Unless we are only cynically guar-
anteeing a right to effective assistance of counsel, the sixth amendment
must protect counsel's ability to investigate and prepare a defense with-
out the fear that any misstep may help convict the defendant.1
Part I of this Article examines the history of prosecutorial discovery
and describes the extent of such discovery presently allowed in the states.
Because the revolutionary expansion of prosecutorial discovery was
prompted in large part by the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v.
Florida, I analyze that decision and show that it left unanswered most of
the critical constitutional issues raised by the use of independent
prosecutorial discovery.
Viewing the fifth amendment as the primary source of protection for
the criminal defendant, I devote the bulk of my analysis to the implica-
tions of the privilege against self-incrimination for discovery against that
defendant. Thus, in Parts II and III, I examine fifth amendment issues
11. See supra note 3.
12. I further argue that the defendant must also be allowed to demonstrate a likelihood of
incrimination from the required disclosure when the substantiality of the threat of incrimination is
not suggested directly by the nature of the defense. See infra note 195.
13. See infra note 89-92.
14. Some of these results are also required by the due process clause, but it has little
independent significance. Where the due process clause would forbid discovery, the privilege against
self-incrimination or the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel will even more
clearly require the same result. See infra note 144.
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raised by typical state discovery practices. I demonstrate that though
Williams might be read as virtually nullifying the fifth amendment as a
shield against prosecutorial discovery, the Supreme Court's analysis of
the compulsion issue in other cases belies that result. In Part II, I
examine the models of compulsion with which the Court tests the consti-
tutionality of practices that penalize the exercise of fifth amendment
rights. I demonstrate that in addition to proscribing compulsory self-
incrimination in its pristine form, the fifth amendment prohibits a range
of practices that unjustifiably penalize the defendant for asserting his fifth
amendment rights. In Part III, I test the limits of the Williams holding
by applying these models of compulsion to several hypothetical discovery
rules. I conclude that, though the precise discovery rule at issue in Wil-
liams will rarely create serious constitutional problems, other rules may
violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by placing too
heavy a penalty on the defendant's decision to remain silent prior to trial.
Following this treatment of the fifth amendment, I analyze the role
of the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, and the sixth
amendment in discovery against the criminal defendant. Part IV exam-
ines the way in which prosecutorial discovery has reshaped and limited
the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. I conclude
that in important respects, prosecutorial discovery violates the defend-
ant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and conflicts
with the policies supporting the work product doctrine.
I
THE SCOPE OF DEVELOPMENTS
A. History of Procedural Discovery
Discovery by the prosecution against the defense appeared first in
the form of notice of alibi rules.15 Such rules typically require the
defendant to give notice of his intention to rely on an alibi defense and
provide specific information on his location at the time of the crime and
the name and address of any witness who will support the defense. t 6 The
15. See Note, Federal Criminal Procedure-Proposed Rules on Notice of Alibi, Deposition, and
Pre-Trial Conference, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 35, 35 (1963).
16. Between 1927 and 1942, 14 states adopted some form of notice of alibi rule. These states
were: Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 29, 30 n. 16 (1964); Louisell, supra note 9, at 61 n. 13; Note, supra note 15,
at 35 n.8. See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 n. 11(1970) (listing the fifteen states in
addition to Florida that in 1970 had notice of alibi rules).
One goal of these enactments was the redress of the perceived advantage of the defense in
criminal procedure; another was the closely related desire to deter pejury. See generally Dean,
Advance Specification of Defense in Criminal Cases, 20 A.B.A. J. 435, 435-37 (1934); Millar, The
Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 344, 350 (1920). Citing
anecdotal information from states, several articles applauded the success of notice of alibi rules in
1574 [Vol. 74:1567
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major arguments in favor of such rules are: (1) prevention of surprise by
the defense through the last-minute production of this classic "hip
pocket" defense; (2) deterrence of perjured alibi testimony; and (3)
reduction of mid-trial delays, which would otherwise be required for the
prosecution to investigate the surprise alibi.7
Prosecutorial discovery expanded into new areas in 1962 when the
California Supreme Court decided Jones v. Superior Court.i" Jones is a
landmark case in the development of prosecutorial discovery, and its
rationale, which applies beyond the special circumstances of the alibi
defense, supported the development of broader and more specialized dis-
covery against the defense.
Jones was charged with rape. On the day set for trial he requested a
reducing the frequency of alibis and increasing the percentage of convictions. Esch, Ohio's New
"Alibi Defense" Statute, 9 THE PANEL 42, 42-43 (1931); Toy, Michigan Law on Alibi and Insanity
Defenses Reduces Perjury, 9 THE PANEL 52, 52 (1931).
Between 1942 and 1970, only two states, Florida and Pennsylvania, added notice of alibi rules.
Why the spread of such rules slowed so markedly is somewhat speculative. One cause may have
been the substantial questions raised by commentators concerning the fairness and constitutionality
of such rules. Cf Advisory Committee Note to Rule 12.1, 62 F.R.D. 271, 293; Everett, Discovery in
Criminal Cases--In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE L.J. 477, 497-99 (1964). Also, some
prosecutors found notice of alibi rules relatively unhelpful. See Note, supra note 15, at 38 nn.32-35.
The federal courts had no notice of alibi rule during this period. In 1943 and 1944, the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Criminal Rules proposed a notice of alibi rule for the federal
courts. The Committee, however, was strongly divided over whether there should be such a rule at
all and, if so, how it should be structured. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 12.1, 62 F.R.D. at 293;
Orfield, The Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 22 TEX. L. REV. 37, 57
(1943). The Committee submitted two formulations, but both were rejected by the Supreme Court.
In 1962, the Advisory Committee again drafted an alibi notice rule, but it was withdrawn before
submission to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 12.1, 62 F.R.D. at 293; Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal, and
Appellate Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 326 (1964); see also Note, supra note 15, at 36 n.l1.
17. Epstein, supra note 16, at 31-32. Epstein provides additional justifications for the notice of
alibi rule. First, he contends that the alibi notice rule will save trial time because the prosecutor will
choose to dismiss some cases once the alibi witness has been interviewed and "the district attorney is
satisfied that the alibi is true." Id. at 32. The author made this argument in the face of his own
survey data strongly undercutting that rationale. Id. at 32 & n.37. In his dissent in Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 106-16 (1970), Justice Black effectively refuted that argument: a defendant will
rarely need a rule to require disclosure that will likely result in a dismissal. Rather, "the only time
the State needs the compulsion provided by this procedure is when the defendant has decided that
such disclosure is likely to hurt his case." Id. at 111.
Epstein also argued that discovery against the defense is a prerequisite to liberal discovery:
"Neither prosecutors nor trial judges will agree to criminal discovery unless it is a two-way street."
Epstein, supra note 16, at 29. This is indeed a very important strategic concern for those who
support broader defense discovery, see infra notes 22 & 26, but does not speak to the validity of the
rule.
Epstein's article is probably most remarkable for its profound influence despite its rather
superficial analysis. For instance, he does not address the argument that while alibis are easily
fabricated, effective alibis, which involve independent corroboration or support by neutral witnesses,
F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATF, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL CASES § 7.9 (2d
ed. 1985), are little easier to manufacture than other defenses.
18. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
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continuance, asserting that he was impotent and needed additional time
to gather medical evidence pertaining to injuries, suffered several years
before, which allegedly caused that condition. The trial court granted
the continuance, and several days later the prosecution moved for discov-
ery of the names and addresses of medical experts subpoenaed by the
defendant to testify concerning his prior injuries and present impotence,
the names and addresses of physicians who had treated him, and reports
and x-rays bearing on prior injuries and present impotence. The trial
court granted the state's discovery motion. Jones sought a writ of prohi-
bition to block enforcement of the trial court's order. 19
Writing for the court, Justice Traynor noted that in expanding the
discovery available to the defendant, the California courts had not been
following a constitutionally mandated course but rather had been seeking
"to promote the orderly ascertainment of the truth. That procedure
should not be a one-way street."20 The court held that while the state
constitution's privilege against self-incrimination and the attorney-client
privilege barred discovery of those documents and witnesses that the
defendant did not intend to use at trial, discovery of witnesses and docu-
ments that the defendant did intend to use did not violate these
privileges.
Adopting a concept proposed some two decades before to validate
the notice of alibi rule, Traynor found no constitutional infirmity in
accelerating the timing of the disclosure of an "affirmative" defense2
such as impotence:
[T]he alibi statutes do not infringe on the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Rather they set up a wholly reasonable rule of pleading which in no
manner compels a defendant to give any evidence other than that which
he will voluntarily and without compulsion give at trial. Such statutes do
not violate the right of a defendant to be forever silent. Rather they say
19. Id. at 57-58, 372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
20. Id. at 60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
21. In dissent, Justice Peters argued that, even if limited to affirmative defenses, requiring the
defense to reveal the nature and substance of its defense would violate the privilege against self-
incrimination. The privilege, he argued, entitles the defendant to remain entirely silent until after
the government establishes a prima facie case against him. Id. at 63-65, 372 P.2d at 923-24, 22 Cal.
Rptr. at 883-84.
Justice Peters assumed that the majority found the disclosures constitutional for affirmative
defenses because there "the sought after material will not or perhaps cannot be used by the
prosecution in establishing its prima facie case but only to rebut this possible affirmative defense." 58
Cal. 2d at 65-66, 372 P.2d at 925, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 885. He assailed the majority's reasoning on both
theoretical and practical grounds. At the theoretical level, Peters argued that any defense revelation
prior to the government establishing its case might harm the defense-even informing the
government that the defense is weak is, in itself, an incriminating admission. At the practical level,
he believed it impossible for courts to determine what information the state could use only to rebut
an affirmative defense rather than to prove its case against the defendant. Id. at 66, 372 P.2d at 925,
22 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
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to the accused: If you don't intend to remain silent, if you expect to offer
an alibi defense, then advance notice and whereabouts must be forthcom-
ing; but if you personally and your potential witnesses elect to remain
silent throughout the trial, we have no desire to break that silence by any
requirement of this statute.2 2
Eight years after Jones, two events occurred which were critical to
expansion of discovery against the defense. In June of 1970, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Florida's notice of
alibi rule in Williams v. Florida.23  The Court held, without apparent
limitation, that conditioning the right to present certain defenses at trial
on pretrial disclosures does not violate the Constitution because such dis-
closures are not "compelled" within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
I will discuss the Williams opinion in detail below; 24 for now, it is enough
to note that many states viewed Williams as an invitation to expand
prosecutorial discovery against criminal defendants-free from the limi-
tations of the Constitution.25
Two months later the American Bar Association, reading Williams
very broadly, approved far-reaching discovery provisions as part of its
Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial. 26  These
22. 58 Cal. 2d at 61-62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (quoting Dean, supra note 16, at
440).
Professor Louisell concluded that for Justice Traynor "the viability of criminal discovery [was]
more important and valuable than avoidance of a relatively slight additional encroachment on the
principle against self-incrimination .... " Louisell, Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination:
Roger Traynor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 89, 99 (1965). Justice Traynor had been a
critical actor in advancing liberal discovery for the defendant in California, and both Traynor and
Louisell believed that defense discovery could not continue to expand without some reciprocal
prosecutorial discovery. Id. at 99 & n.37; see also Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 228, 246 (1964). Justice Traynor also believed that, with liberal
discovery in favor of the defense as a prerequisite to prosecutorial discovery, it was fair to require the
defendant to announce his defense prior to trial. Id. at 248-49.
23. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 57-83.
25. Indeed, in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973), the Supreme Court described the
opinion almost in those terms:
The growth of such discovery devices [such as notice of alibi provisions] is a salutary
development which, by increasing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the
fairness of the adversary system. As we recognized in Williams, nothing in the Due
Process Clause precludes States from experimenting with systems of broad discovery
designed to achieve these goals.
Specifically, in addition to other causes, the Williams decision helped rekindle the expansion of
the notice of alibi rule. In the 18 years between 1942 and 1970, only two states had adopted such
rules. See supra note 16. In the next 14 years, 25 others did so. Note, Alibi Notice Rules: The
Preclusion Sanction as Procedural Default, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 254, 254, 281-85 (1984).
26. While even prior to the Williams decision substantial prosecutorial discovery was in the
offing, that opinion had a clear and powerful impact upon the formulation of the American Bar
Association standards relating to discovery. STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 3.3 (1969 & Supp. 1970) [hereinafter 1969-70 ABA STANDARDS].
Section 3.3, which had not existed in the proposed standards, was adopted after the Williams
decision. It permits discovery of the names and addresses of defense witnesses. See id. § 3.3
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Standards, inter alia, authorize the court to require that the defense,
upon request by the prosecution, provide notice of any defense intended
to be used at trial and the names and addresses of all supporting wit-
nesses. They permit the court upon the prosecutor's request to require
the defendant to provide the results of scientific examinations "[s]ubject
to constitutional limitations."2
7
The Standards also define a work product "privilege" for the prose-
cution but set out no similar protection for the defense.28 Work product
is defined narrowly to include only the "opinions, theories, or conclu-
sions" of the "prosecuting attorney or members of his legal staff."29 The
commentary makes clear that the privilege is limited to the lawyer's ana-
lytical thought processes, not facts, 30 and to the prosecuting attorney or
those performing legal duties for her.3'
Many states used these Standards as a blueprint for enactment of the
expansive discovery systems that rapidly followed. 3' The scope of these
Commentary at 3, 4-5 (citing Williams and quoting its language); see also Norton, Criminal
Discovery: Experience Under the American Bar Association Standards, 11 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 661, 665
n.14, 704 (1980).
27. 1969-70 ABA STANDARDS §§ 3.2, 3.3.
28. See 1969-70 ABA STANDARDS § 2.6(a).
The failure to provide work product protection for the defense may have occurred because
defense disclosures were anticipated to be far less extensive than those required of the prosecution
before the last-minute modifications to the Standards. See Norton, supra note 26, at 695-96.
Professor Norton finds no evidence of an intention to give the defense counsel less protection than
the prosecution. He ascribes the difference in treatment to the fact that defense disclosures were seen
as unlikely to raise substantial work product issues. See also infra note 287.
Perhaps because of the haste with which prosecutorial discovery was expanded, another
provision which may have merited revision was left unchanged. Standard 2.1(a)(i) requires the
prosecutor to provide the names and addresses and written statements of witnesses she intends to
call. The commentary explains that this provision is not intended to include "rebuttal witnesses"
whom the prosecutor "holds in readiness to rebut evidence which he anticipates the accused will
present" as opposed to witnesses who would be presented as part of the state's case-in-chief. 1969-70
ABA STANDARDS § 2.1 Commentary at 58. Whether the ABA intended to restrict "reciprocal
duties requiring state disclosure to the defendant," which the Court in Williams had found
important in sustaining Florida's notice of alibi rule against a due process challenge, is unclear.
29. 1969-70 ABA STANDARDS § 2.6(a).
Since defense work product is not covered, the Standards, understandably, addressed neither
whether such a narrow definition of work product as applied to the defense would be appropriate nor
whether it might raise any constitutional issues under either the fifth amendment or the sixth
amendment's right to counsel.
30. [T]he report of an attorney as to what he had heard, seen or otherwise perceived with
his senses or implements would not be protected from disclosure .... Merely because the
investigator is a lawyer . . . does not throw the work product mantle around his
investigation of the facts. If a lawyer investigating the case finds an article of clothing, or
takes a statement from a witness, such items must be disclosed ....
1969-70 ABA STANDARDS § 2.6 Commentary at 90-91.
31. Since material and information are work product only to the extent that they reflect
the mental processes of the prosecuting attorney and his legal staff, the opinions, theories
and conclusions of lab technicians or other experts would remain discoverable.
1969-70 ABA STANDARDS § 2.6 Commentary at 91.
32. The 1969-70 ABA Standards also influenced the Advisory Committee on the Federal
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developments is detailed below.3 3
B. Impact of the Discovery "Revolution" in the States
Discovery against the criminal defendant expanded tremendously in
many states beginning in the 1970's. Currently, in addition to
prosecutorial discovery of the specific defenses of alibi and insanity,
available in the great majority of states, twenty-five states grant the pros-
ecution an independent right to receive discovery from the defense of at
least one of the following: defenses, witness names, statements of wit-
nesses, reports of experts, or documents and tangible evidence. 4 Another
seven states provide for very broad disclosure from the defendant,
Criminal Rules, which proposed similar provisions. See Proposed Amendments to Criminal Rules, 48
F.R.D. 553, 587-95 (providing extensive independent discovery rights to the prosecution under Rule
16). The Supreme Court approved such independent discovery in 1974, see 62 F.R.D. 271, 304-07,
but Congress revised Rule 16 before adoption and made all prosecutorial discovery conditional upon
a defense request for discovery. Seesupra note 2. Although not adopted, the proposed federal rules
influenced the formulation of discovery rules in a number of states. See, eg., N.M. DIST. Cr. R.
CRIM. P. commentary to Rule 28 at 67; VT. R. CRIM. P. commentary to Rule 16.1 at 101.
33. While the growth of prosecutorial discovery has been frequently noted, see, eg.,
Blumenson, ConstitutionalLimitations on Prosecutorial Discovery, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 123,
123 n.I (1983), its remarkable scope has not been documented. I set the developments out in detail
in the following pages to demonstrate the extent of these changes and their importance to the nature
of criminal litigation in many states. Readers who are familiar with these developments may
proceed infra to Section C of this Part.
34. Six states allow independent prosecutorial discovery in all five categories: Arizona,
Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, and Washington. Another four states provide independent
discovery in four categories: Massachusetts (defenses are independent, but documents, expert
reports, and statements of witnesses are conditioned upon prosecutor providing like information, see
infra note 36); Missouri (documents, expert reports, witness names, statements); New Mexico
(documents, expert reports, witness names, statements); Oregon (documents, expert reports, witness
names, statements). Four states allow independent discovery in three categories: Arkansas
(defenses, expert reports, witnesses); Colorado (defenses, expert reports, witness names); Idaho
(documents, expert reports, witness names); New Hampshire (defenses, expert reports, statements).
Six states provide discovery in only two categories, expert reports and documents: Alabama,
Connecticut, Maine, New York, Vermont, Wisconsin (also possibility of discretionary disclosure of
statements). Four states allow independent discovery in only one category: Alaska (expert reports);
Iowa (specified defenses); Maryland (expert reports); New Jersey (defenses). Utah has a
discretionary "catch-all" provision that the judge may use to provide for discovery. For specific
citations, see infra notes 37-38, 40, 45-47.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has proposed rules of criminal procedure that would allow
extensive independent discovery against the defendant, thus permitting discovery in all five
categories discussed above. Proposed Michigan Criminal Procedure Rule 6.205 mandates that "the
defendant's lawyer, upon request, shall disclose to the prosecutor" any defenses, Proposed Mich.
Crim. P.R. 6.205(1); names, addresses, and statements of witnesses, including "written or recorded
statements and memoranda summarizing their oral statements," id. Rule 6.205(2); expert reports, id.
Rule 6.205(3); and documents and tangible objects, id. Rule 6.205(4). The only restrictions imposed
are (1) the defendant must intend to use the evidence at trial and (2) his statement to members of his
legal staff are protected. Id. Rule 6.210(D). The proposed rules also give the court discretion to
order discovery of any other items from the defendant "if material to preparation of the
prosecution," apparently regardless of the defendant's intention to use the evidence at trial. Id. Rule
6.207(A).
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conditioned upon his request for discovery from the prosecution. 35 Sev-
eral states combine conditional and independent prosecutorial
discovery.36
The scope of prosecutorial discovery permitted in many of these
states is very substantial indeed. Under an independent right of discov-
ery, eleven states provide that the defendant is required to inform the
prosecution of the nature of his defense. 37 Fourteen states require the
defense to disclose names and addresses of all defense witnesses under an
independent right theory,38 and ten more provide for such discovery
upon request for discovery by the defendant.39
Twelve states give the prosecution an independent right to obtain
35. Florida (documents, expert reports, witness names, witness statements); Mississippi
(documents, expert reports, witness names); Nebraska (documents, expert reports, and witness
names are discretionary after the defendant requests discovery); Ohio (documents, expert reports,
witness names); Pennsylvania (witness names and expert reports are discretionary after the
defendant requests discovery); Rhode Island (documents, expert reports, witness names, statements);
West Virginia (documents, expert reports, witness names). For specific citations for discovery of
defenses and witness names, see infra notes 39 & 41.
36. The states that allow independent discovery combined with conditional discovery
provisions include: Iowa (expert reports, documents, witness names); New Jersey (expert reports,
documents, witness names, statements); and Wisconsin (witness names). See infra notes 39 & 41.
New York allows conditional discovery of property that the defendant intends to introduce at
trial. It defines property as "including, but not limited to, books, records, reports, memoranda,
papers, photographs, tapes or other electronic recordings, articles of clothing, fingerprints, blood
samples, fingernail scrapings or hand writing specimens, but excluding attorney's work product."
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.10(3) (Consol. 1982).
Massachusetts allows prosecutorial discovery following a defendant's request for discovery.
The statute also operates in a reverse manner by allowing the prosecution to trigger discovery by
requesting disclosure of specified items and disclosing similar information to the defense. MASS. R.
CRIM. P. 14(a)(3)(B). Consequently, Massachusetts discovery statutes have been included under
independent discovery categories.
37. ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(b); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 18.3; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 II(c); HAW. R.
PENAL P. 16(c)(3); ILL. S. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 413(d); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 10(11) (limited to defenses of
alibi, insanity, intoxication, entrapment, and self-defense); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02 Subd. l(3)(a);
MONT. R. CRIM. P. 46-15-323(4)(a) (limited to defenses of justifiable use of force, entrapment,
compulsion, alibi, or absence of state of mind essential to offense); N.H. SUPER. Cr. R. 101; N.J. R.
GOVERNING CRIM. PRAC. 3:12A; WASH. SUPER. Cr. CRIM. R. 4.7(b)(2)(XIV).
38. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(c)(1); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 18.3; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 11(c); HAW.
R. PENAL P. 16(c)(2)(i); IDAHO CRIM. R. 16(c)(3); ILL. S. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 413(d)(i); MASS. R.
CRIM. P. 14(a)(3)(A) (discretionary and contingent upon prosecutor providing similar information);
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02 Subd. l(3)(a); Mo R. CRIM. P. 25.05(A)(2); MONT. R. CRIM. P. 46-15-
323(4)(a); N.M. DIsT. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 28(a)(3); OR. REv. STAT. § 135.835(1) (1984); VT. R. CRIM.
P. 16.1(c); WASH. SUPER. Cr. CRIM. R. 4.7(b)(1)(i).
39. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(3); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 12(3); MISS. UNIFORM CRIM. R. CIR.
Cr. PRAC. 4.06; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1916 (1985); N.J. R. GOVERNING CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-
3(b)(3); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(1)(C); PA. R. CRIM. P. 305(C)(2)(b) (eyewitnesses only); R.I.
SUPER. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(C); Wis. R. CRIM. P. 971.23(3).
The nature ofthe triggering request varies greatly. In Florida, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania, disclosure of defense witnesses corresponds to a request by the defendant for discovery
of prosecution witnesses. In New Jersey and Rhode Island, a defendant may be required to disclose
any discoverable items, including witnesses, following a request for any type of discovery. Wisconsin
requires a defendant desiring discovery of prosecution witnesses to state in writing that he is willing
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the statements of all defense witnesses," and three more permit such dis-
covery from the defendant upon appropriate request by him for discov-
ery.4 Moreover, the requirement that the defendant reveal statements of
witnesses he intends to call at trial is given a broad reading in a number
of states. The simplest of these expansions defines the term "statement"
broadly to require the disclosure of not only written and recorded state-
ments but also "memoranda reporting or summarizing . . . oral state-
ments.",4 2 Some states go a step further and require the defense to create
a statement summarizing the testimony expected at trial or the oral state-
ments of its witnesses.4 3 Yet other states require the defense to furnish
not only statements of witnesses that it intends to call but also statements
taken from prospective government witnesses.44
to provide a list of his own witnesses to the prosecution. Iowa requires the defendant to disclose
witnesses only if the defense deposes government witnesses.
40. ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(c)(1); HAw. R. PENAL P. 16(c)(2)(i) (statements recorded by
defense counsel are excluded); ILL. S. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 413(d)(i); MAss. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(3)(A)
(discretionary and conditioned upon prosecution revealing similar information); MINN. R. CRIM. P.
9.02 Subd. l(3)(b); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.05(A)(2); MONT. R. CRIM. P. 46-15-323(4)(a) (statements by
defendants are excluded); N.H. SUPER. Cr. R. 99; N.M. DIST. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 28(a)(3) (statements
by defendant to attorneys are excluded); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.835(l) (1984); WASH. SUPER. Cr.
CRIM. R. 4.7(b)(1); Wis. R. CRIM. P. 971.24(1) (statements normally disclosed after prosecution has
presented its case but court may order disclosure at any time prior to trial upon showing of good
cause).
41. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(4)(i); N.J. R. GOVERNING CRIM. PRAc. 3:13-3(b)(3); R.I.
SUPER. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(4).
In Florida, the defendant must first request statements from the prosecution before the
prosecutor can claim a right to discovery of defense statements. New Jersey and Rhode Island allow
any request for discovery by the defendant to serve as a basis for discovery of defense statements.
42. See ILL. S. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 413(d)(i); see also MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02 Subd. 1(3)(b)
("written summaries within [defense counsel's] knowledge of the substance of any oral statements");
Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.05 (A)(2) ("written or recorded statements, and existing memoranda reporting
or summarizing part or all of their oral statements"); N.J. R. GOVERNING CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-3(b)(3)
("written statements, if any, including memoranda reporting or summarizing [witnesses'] oral
statements"); N.M. DIsT. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 27(f)(3) (includes written statement or notes that are in
substance recitals of oral statements).
43. R.I. SUPER. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(4) ("all written or recorded verbatim statements, signed
or unsigned, of [defense witnesses] ... and, if no such statement of a witness is in the possession of
the defendant, a summary of the testimony such person is expected to give at trial"); WAsH. SUPER.
Cr. CRIM. R. 4.7(b)(1) ("any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral
statements of such witness"); see also N.J. R. GOVERNING CRIM. PRAc. 3:13- 3(b)(5) (if no report
has been prepared, defense must provide "a statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion").
44. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02 Subd. l(3)(b) ("defendant shall permit the prosecuting attorney to
inspect and reproduce... statements of prosecution witnesses obtained by the defendant, defense
counsel, or persons participating in the defense"); WIs. R. CRIM. P. 971.24 (before witness testifies
at trial, his statement "shall be given to the other party"). State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d 425, 451,
247 N.W.2d 80, 94 (1976), holds that under this provision defense counsel must provide any
statement of a government witness it has: "All statements whether they be in the possession of the
direct-examining counsel or the cross-examining counsel are required to be produced."
N.J. R. GOVERNING CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-3(b)(4) contains a similar requirement that the defense
provide the prosecution with written statements of any witness the state may call at trial, regardless
of whether the defense intends to use the statement at trial. In State v. Williams, 80 N.J. 472, 404
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Twenty-two states allow discovery of expert reports under an
independent right;45 sixteen states make documents and tangible objects
similarly available.46 Finally, five states permit the trial court to order
discovery from the defense of additional, unspecified materials and infor-
mation upon a showing that it is useful, important, or necessary for the
prosecution adequately to prepare its case.47
Given the range of information available under prosecutorial discov-
ery, some applications of the rules are likely to require disclosure of
incriminating information-such as the defendant's admission that he
inflicted the injury when he provides notice of self-defense. As I argue
below, 48 where incriminating information is required, the constitutional-
ity of discovery under the fifth amendment will depend on the limitations
imposed by those rules on when the prosecution may discover informa-
tion from the defense and how it may use such information once
obtained. The rules generally, however, impose few restrictions on
prosecutorial discovery that address these concerns.
The defense is uniformly required to provide discovery of defenses
A.2d 34 (1979), the state supreme court held that, as to statements which the defense did not intend
to use at trial, the rule violates the defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.
45. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 18.2(c); ALASKA CRIM. R. 16(c)(4); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(c)(2); ARK.
R. CRIM. P. 18.2; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 II(b); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. 769(2); HAW. PENAL P.
16(c)(2)(ii); IDAHO CRIM. R. 16(c)(2); ILL. S. CT. R. CRIM. P. 413(6) (does not include reports that
contain statements of defendant if he does not intend to use them at trial); ME. R. CRIM. P. 16A(c);
MD. R. CRIM. P. 4-263(d)(2); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(3)(A) (discretionary and conditional upon
prosecutor providing similar information); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02 Subd. 1(2); Mo. R. CRIM. P.
25.05(A)(1) (does not include portions of reports that contain statements of defendant); MONT. R.
CRIM. P. 46-15-323(4)(b); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 99; N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 28(a)(2); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.30(l)(a) (Consol. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.835(2) (1984); VT. R.
CRIM. P. 16.1(b); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(g); Wis. R. CRIM. P. 971.23(5).
Like Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(1), most other states also provide for
conditional discovery of such reports. Because conditional discovery is generally outside the scope
of this Article, those states will not be individually listed.
46. ALA. R. CRIM. P. 18.2(a); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(c)(3); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. 769(2);
HAW. PENAL P. 16(c)(2)(iii); IDAHO CRIM. R. 16(c)(1); ILL. S. CT. R. CRIM. P. 413(d)(ii); ME, R.
CRIM. P. 16A(d); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(3)(A) (discretionary and conditional upon prosecution's
providing similar information); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02 Subd. 1(1); Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.05(A)(3);
MONT. R. CRIM. P. 46-15-323(4)(c) (requiring only list of such items); N.M. DIsT. Cr. R. CRM. P.
28(a)(1); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.30(1)(b) (Consol. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.835(3)
(1984); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(b)(2)(X); WIS. R. CRIM. P. 971.23(4). Most other states
provide for conditional discovery and are not specifically listed here.
47. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(f) ("substantial need in the preparation" of the state's case and an
inability "without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means"); ILL. S. CT.
R. CRIM. P. 413(e) ("[u]pon a showing of materiality ... and if the request is reasonable"); Mo. R.
CRIM. P. 25.06(A) ("reasonable" request for discovery "relevant and material to the state's case");
MONT. R. CRIM. P. 46-15-323(6) ("substantial need .... unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent by other means. . . . will not violate accused's constitutional rights");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-16(c) (1982) ("good cause shown . . . in order for the prosecutor to
adequately prepare his case").
48. See infra Part III.
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and the names and addresses of witnesses only if it intends to present the
defense or call the witnesses at trial.4 9 A number of states also include
the undefined limitation, "subject to constitutional limitations."50
Restrictions on discovery of defense medical and scientific reports vary
somewhat between states. Several states, following the 1970 ABA Stan-
dards, provide only that disclosure is "subject to constitutional limita-
tions.""1  Others add the requirement that the defense intend to
introduce at trial the report or expert testimony to which it relates."
Two states include an additional restriction that such reports are not dis-
coverable if they contain statements of the defendant.5 3 Only two states
go further and specifically prohibit the state's use of discovery in its case-
in-chief; Alaska and Connecticut restrict the use of such evidence to
"cross-examination or rebuttal of defense testimony.",5 4
Altogether, the developments noted above constitute a revolution in
49. See, eg., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(c).
50. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 18.3; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 II(c); ILL. S. CT. R. CRIM. P. 413(d); Miss.
UNIFORM CRIM. R. CIR. CT. PRAc. 4.06; Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.05(A).
51. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 18.2; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 11(b); Miss. UNIFORM CRIM. R. CIR. CT.
PRAC. 4.06 ("subject to constitutional limitations" and "made in connection with the case").
Whether the omission of defendant's intention to use the report at trial means that the report may be
discovered regardless of the defendant's intention to use the statement is unclear.
Florida imposes only the requirement that they be "made in connection with the particular
case." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(4)(ii). New Hampshire, while not requiring disclosure, permits
the court to require exchange of all scientific tests and reports without apparent limitation. N.H.
SUPER. CT. R. 99.
52. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.30(1)(a) (Consol. 1982); VT. R. CRIM. P. 16.1(b); WASH.
SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.7(g). PA. R. CRIM. P. 305(C)(2)(a) substitutes "defendant's rights against
compulsory self-incrimination" for "constitutional limitations."
53. ILL. S. CT. R. CRIM. P. 413(c). Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.05(A)(1).
The Missouri rule combines "constitutional limitations," intention to introduce, and exclusion
of statements of the defendant.
In Illinois, the rule combines "constitutional limitations" and the prohibition against discovery
of reports that contain the defendant's statements. Apparently, rather than providing a further
restriction upon the discovery of such reports, this provision was fashioned to define the full scope of
protection under both the fifth amendment and attorey-client privilege. The Comment to the
Illinois rule states that unless based upon statements of the defendant, disclosure violates neither
attorney-client privilege nor the fifth amendment. It is silent on any requirement that the defense
intend to use the expert at trial and appears to impose no such requirement. ILL. S. CT. R. CRIM. P.
413(c) Committee Comments; but see People ex rel. Bowman v. Woodward, 63 Ill. 2d 382, 349
N.E.2d 57 (1976) (where prosecution has no knowledge of tests performed, requiring defendant to
disclose any tests conducted violates fifth amendment).
54. ALASKA CRIM. R. 16(c)(4); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 772. Connecticut extends the
prosecution's independent discovery right beyond alibi and insanity defenses only as far as
documents, physical evidence, and scientific reports. As to those materials, the discovery rules
impose four restrictions: (1) the defendant must intend to use the evidence directly or indirectly
through the testimony of the witness who prepared the scientific report at trial; (2) documents that
contain communications of the defendant are excluded (The provision may be read not necessarily to
exclude the entire document from discovery if the defendant's communications are excised.); (3) the
document must be "adequately identified by the prosecuting authority"; and (4) these items may be
used only on cross-examination and rebuttal of defense testimony. CONN. SUPER. CT. R. §§ 769,
772.
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criminal discovery with potentially significant detrimental effects upon
defendants who wish to present a defense and to undertake independent
investigation." Yet the constitutional limits on these developments have
not been clearly established. 6 The Supreme Court's opinion in Williams
v. Florida encouraged these developments but left unanswered most of
the critical constitutional questions raised by criminal discovery.
55. The impact on the defense is damaging not only in absolute terms but also in terms of the
relative advantages it previously possessed. Obtaining the names of witnesses is the single most
critical element of criminal discovery. Of the 13 states that presently provide the most extensive
discovery (Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington), all but four gave witness names to the defense
unilaterally before the recent expansion of prosecutorial discovery. See 1969-70 ABA STANDARDS
2.1 Commentary at 56-57. Now the defense must also provide such information to the prosecution.
It should be noted, however, that many defendants have gained by the general expansion of
criminal discovery. These developments gave many defendants a relative advantage by requiring the
state to provide the defense some of the fruits of the prosecution's greater investigative resources.
Accordingly, due process is generally not offended by these changes since that analysis turns on the
overall relative balance of advantage, on whether discovery rules skew that systemic balance against
the defendant, see Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973), and in the individual case, on
whether the fundamental requisites of justice have been denied. These developments viewed as a
whole do not appear to have substantially shifted the relative balance against the defense.
Nevertheless, though the general liberalization of discovery may have benefitted many defendants,
these changes have adversely affected individual defendants. The issues of the individual's fifth and
sixth amendment rights remain to be resolved.
56. Notably, the body most responsible for expansion of prosecutorial discovery in the states-
the American Bar Association-has now reconsidered its position. Under the 1978 Standards on
discovery, the ABA requires only that the defense disclose its intention to raise alibi and insanity
defenses and provide names and addresses of witnesses supporting those defenses. The information
disclosed concerning defenses is explicitly excluded from direct use by the prosecution as evidence in
its case; its use is further limited to refuting the testimony of witnesses called by the defendant.
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURES
BEFORE TRIAL § 11-3.3 & Commentary at 11-54 through 11-56 (Approved Draft 1978) [hereinafter
1978 ABA STANDARDS].
The standard requiring disclosure of defense medical and scientific reports protects any
communications from the defendant in such reports from disclosure and similarly limits direct and
derivative use of the reports exclusively to refuting the medical or scientific evidence offered by the
defense. 1978 ABA STANDARDS § 11-3.2. The commentary explicitly attributes some of these new
provisions to the need to protect the defendant's right against self-incrimination and to avoid
improper impact on the burden of proof and presumption of innocence. 1978 ABA STANDARDS
§ 11-3.2 Commentary at 11-53 through 11-54.
Unlike the standards approved in 1970, which expanded discovery against the defense and
clearly had an enormous impact upon discovery rules in many states, these more restrictive
standards have been largely ignored by the states. No explanation is readily apparent. Perhaps the
considerable effort by the ABA to implement the standards, see COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
STANDARDS AND GOALS OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS WITH STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION vii-ix (1973), was not mounted for the revised Standards. More likely, in contrast to
the Standards, the revisions do not fit the tenor of the times. Today's atmosphere is not conducive to
providing advantages to criminal defendants, even if only to restore an earlier balance of advantage
between the sides.
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C. Williams v. Florida
In Williams v. Florida,57 the Supreme Court examined the constitu-
tionality of Florida's notice of alibi rule under the fifth amendment.5 8
Analysis of the constitutional limits upon prosecutorial discovery must
begin with the Williams decision, not because of its clarity in deciding
the constitutionality of prosecutorial discovery, but because of its per-
ceived importance as a landmark in the area. Indeed, the guidance the
opinion provides for resolution of critical fifth amendment issues
presented by such discovery is apparent rather than real.
Petitioner Johnny Williams, who was charged with robbery, wished
to present an alibi defense. As a prerequisite to presenting that defense,
Florida law required him to state where he was at the time of the crime
and to provide the names and addresses of witnesses he intended to call
in support of the alibi.5 9 Williams moved for a protective order, admit-
ting that he intended to rely upon an alibi but seeking to be excused from
compliance with the other notice requirements of the statute. The trial
court denied the motion. Rather than refuse to provide the required
disclosures on the basis that they violated his rights against compulsory
self-incrimination, Williams complied with the rule and provided the
name and address of an alibi witness, Mrs. Scotty. In response, the pros-
ecutor subpoenaed Mrs. Scotty to his office on the morning of trial and
deposed her concerning her testimony.60
At trial, the defendant presented his alibi that he and his wife had
been at Mrs. Scotty's apartment during the time of the robbery and
called Mrs. Scotty in support. During the cross-examination, the prose-
cutor twice confronted Mrs. Scotty with inconsistencies between her
deposition and her trial testimony. The prosecution also introduced
57. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
58. Williams also argued that the Florida notice of alibi rule violated his due process rights.
The Court quickly dismissed that claim, observing that the state has a legitimate interest in avoiding
surprise from "an eleventh-hour" defense and that Florida requires reciprocal disclosures by the
state under other provisions of the alibi discovery rule and otherwise provides for liberal discovery
by the defendant from the state. Id. at 81-82. It concluded:
We find ample room in [the adversary] system, at least as far as "due process" is
concerned, for the instant Florida rule, which is designed to enhance the search for the
truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity
to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.
Id at 82.
59. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.200 and 33 FLA. STAT. ANN. (West 1967). The rule has been
renumbered and is now FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.200 (West 1973).
60. Florida criminal procedure permitted both the prosecutor and the defense to depose
opposing witnesses prior to trial. The prosecutor could depose witnesses at any time--either before
or after the defendant had been formally charged. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.04, 32.20 (West 1961).
Defense counsel had no right to be present during such questioning. The defendant could depose all
witnesses, except confidential informants, after formal charges had been instituted. FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 1.220(f) and 33 FLA. STAT. ANN. (West 1967).
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rebuttal testimony from a police officer who stated that at the time Wil-
liams was allegedly with Mrs. Scotty in her apartment she was actually
elsewhere.
Petitioner's major claim was that the alibi notice rule violated his
rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments by requiring him to
provide the state with "information useful in convicting him."61 The
Court held that the rule did not violate the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination because his compliance with the rule had not been
compelled within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
In assessing the defendant's fifth amendment claim, the Court held
three elements were necessary to find a fifth amendment violation. First,
the evidence must be testimonial in nature.62 Second, the danger of self-
incrimination must be "real and appreciable."63 Third, the witness must
be subjected to "physical or moral compulsion."'  Although the Court
was willing to assume that the defendant's discovery disclosure was both
testimonial and incriminating, it concluded that the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination was not violated because "the alibi defense
... cannot be considered 'compelled' within the meaning of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 65
The Court noted that at trial a criminal defendant often faces pow-
erful pressues to call witnesses or to testify in his own behalf in an
attempt to avoid conviction. That he faces such pressures and may
respond to them by putting on testimony that ultimately leads to his
undoing has never been viewed as violating the fifth amendment. Such
pressures, even though very powerful, simply do not give rise to the sort
of compulsion recognized by the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court concluded that state enforcement of a notice of alibi rule
imposes similar constraints and pressures upon the defendant, and appar-
ently nothing more. Accordingly, the operation of the rule produces no
more cognizable state compulsion than the defendant's own decision to
testify or adduce evidence.
The Court did acknowledge that the decisions faced by the defend-
ant under the rule and at trial differ in one obvious respect. The notice of
alibi rule requires him to "accelerate the timing of his disclosure, forcing
him to divulge at an earlier date information that the petitioner from the
beginning planned to divulge at trial."' 66 Nonetheless, the Court did not
61. Williams, 399 U.S. at 82.
62. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
63. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896) (quoting Regina v. Boyes, 1 Best & Smith 311,
330, 121 Eng. Rep. 730, 738 (Q.B. 1861)).
64. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918) (emphasis added); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) (emphasis added).
65. Williams, 399 U.S. at 84.
66. Id. at 85.
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consider the difference in timing alone a constitutionally critical one.
Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a mat-
ter of constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before
announcing the nature of his defense, any more than it entitles him to
await the jury's verdict on the State's case-in-chief before deciding
whether or not to take the stand himself.
67
Williams appears to say that acceleration in the timing of disclo-
sures that the defendant intends to make at trial entails no constitution-
ally significant compulsion. This is the principal holding of Williams,
and its application and expansion represent that decision's chief impact
upon criminal discovery. Since compulsion is a necessary element of a
fifth amendment violation, Williams seems to mean that even where the
evidence in question is highly incriminating and unmistakably testimo-
nial in character, the prosecution may "obtain under threat of sanction
complete disclosure by the defendant in advance of trial of all evidence,
testimony, and tactics he plans to use at that trial.' 68
The Court's decision rests on two critical premises. First, it relies on
the unassailable position that a criminal defendant's decision to present
an alibi defense at trial is not compelled within the meaning of the fifth
amendment even though it may be the product of powerful forces bear-
ing upon him. Second, it assumes that the forces and pressures acting
upon a defendant faced with the requirement of giving an alibi notice are
of the same nature. Thus, the Court concluded, "In the case before us,
the notice-of-alibi rule by itself in no way affected petitioner's crucial
decision to call alibi witnesses or added to the legitimate pressures lead-
ing to that course of action."'69
Though the Court recognized that providing advance notice of an
alibi differs from the presentation of the defense at trial in that it requires
earlier specification of the defense, it assumed that the difference was not
constitutionally significant.70 Rules requiring pretrial disclosure of
defenses, however, may implicate the fifth amendment in two important
respects-neither of which was present in Williams.
First, the rule may have a significant impact upon the interests pro-
tected by the fifth amendment depending upon the evidentiary nature of
the disclosure itself. By requiring the defendant to provide notice of his
defense, the state requires him to "speak," and the speech itself may have
evidentiary significance. For example, under the state's evidentiary law,
the notice may be considered an admission by the defendant that may be
67. Id.
68. Id. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 85.
70. For a discussion of the testimonial aspects of discovery see infra notes 161-68 and
accompanying text.
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used either directly to establish his guilt or to impeach him if his trial
testimony is inconsistent with his notice.
Second, the rule may implicate the fifth amendment depending upon
the timing of the disclosure. By directing the defendant to provide the
prosecutor with information before the state has completed its case, the
rule may require the defendant to assist the state in proving its case
against him. The timing of the disclosures will have great significance if
the defendant's "statement" is used to strengthen the government's case-
in-chief, in addition to helping defeat the defense.
A notice of alibi rule such as Florida's may harm7I a criminal
defendant's prospects for success at trial in either or both of these ways.
Several fact patterns are possible. First, the prosecution may be able to
use the notice to obtain other information that strengthens its case
against the defendant. Clearly, derivative use by the prosecution of any
witness identified by the notice poses a problem. For example, the
defendant may have an alibi that puts him so close to a crime scene that
it corroborates some aspects of the government's case. The prosecution
can then preempt the defense's presentation of that witness's testimony
accordingly. The state may call the witness first to testify that the
defendant arrived in the vicinity at a certain time-as the state's witness
would testify the perpetrator of the crime did-even though the details of
the alibi, if later fully accepted, would put him in another location at the
precise time of the crime.72 Second, the notice may provide collaterally
damaging information. For example, the alibi may connect the defend-
ant with nefarious individuals who are able to incriminate him in other
crimes. 73 Third, early disclosure may provide the government with
opportunities to obtain impeachment evidence, otherwise unavailable,
that would be used to weaken the defense case. Fourth, the notice itself
71. I use "harm" rather than "incriminate" advisedly. Some consequences that disadvantage a
defendant are not sufficient to constitute "incrimination." For instance, the Court in Williams
declined to hold that the fifth amendment guaranteed the defendant the right to surprise the state
with his defense. 399 U.S. at 86. See infra note 76.
72. Professor Nakell used a similar example to explain how advance specification of a defense
might require a defendant to provide information that is at least partially incriminating. Nakell,
supra note 9, at 500. Other examples of defenses that are exculpating but potentially incriminating
when specified in advance of trial are: provocation, which supports a lenient sentence but also
provides an incriminating motive, Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part , 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1118 (1976), self-defense which establishes incidentally the identity of the
perpetrator, and a defense to the major offense that establishes guilt of a lesser one, Prudhomme v.
Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 327, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1970); Van Kessel,
Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Accommodation or Capitulation,
4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 855, 861 n.33 (1977); Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule
16, 85 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1004-05 (1972).
73. While frequently cited as an example of the incriminating potential of alibi notice, see, e.g.,
Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alaska 1974), the potential incrimination presented here does not
rise to the level prescribed by the fifth amendment. See infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
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may be used to impeach a defendant's testimony if he presents any other
inconsistent defense.74 Finally, the requirement that a defendant give
notice of alibi requires him to assist the state in even more subtle ways.
For example, the notice tells the state that it must meet only the defense
specified, thereby allowing it to focus its efforts.7 5
The Williams case touched on several of these potential adverse con-
sequences of the notice of alibi rule. It did not decide, however, whether
the fifth amendment would have been violated by any of them because
there was no evidence in the record that Williams had suffered any con-
crete harm as a result of his disclosure. After Williams's motion for a
protective order was denied by the trial court, he gave the required notice
and presented his alibi. Because of the procedural posture in which peti-
tioner raised his claims, the facts were fully available. Those facts in no
way suggested, nor did Williams allege, that the government used the
notice either directly or derivatively to enhance the strength of its case-
in-chief or that there was any reasonable prospect that it would give rise
to other, independent prosecutions.76
74. Cf In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569, (1985) (requirement
that defense disclose statements of its witnesses after their direct testimony, designed to facilitate
their impeachment, lightens state's burden to prove defendant's guilt and violates California's
constitutional right against self-incrimination).
75. Van Kessel, supra note 72, at 888-89. Professor Van Kessel concludes that such a
consequence does not threaten the values supporting the privilege sufficiently to violate the fifth
amendment. Id. at 889. The result in Williams supports his position. See infra note 81; See also infra
note 164. But see Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 65-66, 372 P.2d 919, 925, 22 Cal. Rptr.
879, 885 (1962) (Peters, J., dissenting) (allowing state to determine whether defendant intends to rely
solely on not guilty defense or urge affirmative defense "emasculates" defendant's constitutional
rights).
76. At oral argument, counsel for Williams, when pressed, admitted "[tihere may not be
anything 'incriminating'" in the disclosure under the facts of this case. 69 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416 (P.
Kurland & G. Casper ed.) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]. His ultimate response to the Court's
question of how the alibi notice incriminated him rested solely on the proposition that a criminal
defendant has an "absolute right to remain silent up until the very close of the State's case." Id. The
closest petitioner came to arguing that the state used his notice of alibi against him was his
contention that if he had decided not to present the alibi defense after giving notice his failure would
"certainly become known to the jury by way of opening and closing statements." Brief for Petitioner
at 6, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra, at 331. The
case in fact proceeded otherwise, however. Petitioner announced his defense in his opening
statement; the state responded only after the alibi witness testified. Williams, 399 U.S. at 84 n.15.
Indeed, the Court was able accurately to say, "Nothing in [the alibi notice rule] ... requires the
defendant to rely on an alibi or prevents him from abandoning the defense; these matters are left to
his unfettered choice." Williams, 399 U.S. at 84.
The Court did not explain fully what it meant by this statement. It may have been referring to
the state's concession, in its brief, that if petitioner chose not to present an alibi defense after giving
notice, federal constitutional principles prohibited a negative inference. Brief for Petitioner at 8-9,
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), reprinted in 69 LANDMARK BRIEFS 352-53. The Court
seemed hesitant to rely upon that protection for the defendant, making no direct comment upon it.
Perhaps this is because the prosecution relied, not on state law, but on federal fifth amendment law.
The Court suggested that it might reach a different conclusion on the constitutional issue, observing
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The state did use the information it obtained as a result of Wil-
liams's notice to weaken his case in two concrete ways. It impeached
Mrs. Scotty twice with portions of the deposition obtained after her iden-
tity was revealed under the rule. Also, the information that either Wil-
liams provided directly in his notice or the state obtained indirectly
through Mrs. Scotty's deposition permitted the state to locate a witness
to rebut her testimony. The Court found this use of the alibi notice of no
consequence because, as Williams acknowledged, the state could have
achieved the same result by obtaining a continuance as soon as Williams
called the witness.77 During that continuance, which the Court assumed
would violate no constitutional provision, the state could have done
exactly what it did here-take a deposition and find rebuttal evidence.
Based on this factual analysis of Williams, it is easy to agree with
the Court's conclusion, at least in this case, that
the pressures that bear on [a defendant's] pretrial decision are of the same
nature as those that would induce him to call alibi witnesses at the trial:
the force of historical fact beyond both his and the State's control and the
strength of the State's case built on these facts.78
The Court's further determination in Williams that the notice of alibi
rule did not affect Williams's decision to call alibi witnesses or add to the
inherent pressure flowing from historical facts to call them is equally
accurate.
Ultimately, the notice of alibi rule at issue in Williams had no
impact on the defendant's conduct of his trial. It did not directly create
evidence or permit the state to present evidence in its case-in-chief that
otherwise would have been unavailable. Williams's "statement" was not
given any evidentiary significance in the case, and no incriminating evi-
dence came directly or derivatively from the requirement that he "speak"
before the state's case was completed.79 On the facts of Williams, then,
the Court reached the correct result.
that restrictions on changes in defenses would not necessarily offend the Constitution. Williams, 399
U.S. at 84-85 n.15.
Rather than reacting to the state's concession, the Court was more likely commenting upon the
specific factual record before it. Petitioner made this argument in general but did not allege that "his
choice of defense at trial in this case would have been different but for his prior compliance with the
rule." Id. at 84 n.15.
77. Id. at 85-86.
78. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
79. The Court's brief treatment of the alibi notice as testimonial conduct implies that the Court
anticipated no evidentiary use of the notice, or other use of the information it contained, to assist the
state in proving relevant historical facts. Justice White suggested that "'testimonial' disclosures
protected by the Fifth Amendment include only statements relating to the historical facts of the
crime, not statements relating solely to what a defendant proposes to do at trial." Id. at 86 n.17
(emphasis added). Only if the notice is given no direct evidentiary use at trial and if it is not used
derivatively to incriminate is this suggestion sensible. Cf Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation:
Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74 n.425 (1977) (Justice White's contention,
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Williams itself raises the larger issue of the validity of prosecutorial
discovery in other contexts only when the fifth amendment is viewed
from the absolutist perspective that the Constitution protects the defense
from any required disclosures. In dissent, Justice Black argued that the
state may require nothing of the defendant that might conceivably
lighten the government's load or provide "assistance ... in convicting
him."8 The Court rejected that position, 81 but decided nothing more.82
The Court's holding reveals little about the constitutional limits on
prosecutorial discovery because there were no specific fifth amendment
interests implicated by the facts of the case. 3 To discover these limits,
which has no precedential basis, relates solely to matters of trial strategy, not matters of evidence);
see also infra note 163.
80. Williams, 399 U.S. at 11 (Black, J., dissenting).
Justice Black, taking this broad view of the fifth amendment in dissent, saw no need to examine
the "practical effects" of the notice of alibi; he found the rule to be "a patent violation of [the
privilege against self-incrimination] because it requires a defendant to disclose information to the
State so that the State can use that information to destroy him." Id.
81. Justice White, for the majority, stated, "Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles
a defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announcing
the nature of his defense," id. at 85, or "guarantees the defendant the right to surprise the State with
an alibi defense." Id. at 86.
82. Despite the holding's limits, it would be wrong to denigrate its significance. Indeed,
Williams provided one of the first signals that the Court would tolerate substantial limitations on the
scope of the privilege. It was one of the first cases to sound the theme that not every burden on the
fifth amendment right and not every pressure against its exercise violates the Constitution, a position
articulated directly or reflected in the holding of numerous cases decided over the course of the next
decade. See, eg., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980); Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333
(1978); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971);
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
Indeed, the California Supreme Court departed from the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the fifth amendment at this fundamental juncture, adopting under the state
constitution Justice Black's extreme view of the privilege against self-incrimination. Prudhomme v.
Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 326, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1970) (The California
constitution prohibits discovery that "conceivably might lighten the prosecution's burden of proving
its case in chief."); In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 555, 698 P.2d 637, 645-46, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569, 577-
78 (1985) (Requiring disclosure of defense witness statements for impeachment by the state "would
be of use to the prosecution in securing a conviction [and] would for that reason be incriminatory,
and thus privileged.").
Because analysis of discovery under the California constitution differs so radically from that
under the fifth amendment, this Article includes no discussion of developments in California.
83. Analysis of the difference between pretrial discovery of information from the defendant
and his own presentation of that same information at trial, may focus on a number of factors: (1) the
timing of the disclosure and the use the prosecution may make of it, see Van Kessel, supra note 72, at
882; (2) the degree to which the disclosure may "incriminate," see Alshuler, supra note 72, at 1118
n.201; Nakell, supra note 9, at 499; (3) the uncertainty created by requiring the defendant to make a
choice of defenses before trial, see, Westen, Order of Proof An Accused's Right to Control the Timing
and Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 949-52 (1978) (focusing on the
uncertainty faced by the defendant as an important factor in the Court's analysis); and (4) the extent
to which these factors compel, in the sense of coerce, the defendant to alter his decision to testify, see
3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.2 at 266 (1986 Supp.); Note, The Use of Suppression
Hearing Testimony to Impeach, 59 IND. L.J. 295, 305-06 (1984).
Williams reveals little about the relative importance of any of these factors. The most that can
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one must examine other Supreme Court opinions analyzing the compul-
sion issue under the fifth amendment. I will examine the models of com-
pulsion used by the Court in cases challenging prosecutorial practices
under the privilege against self-incrimination. Then, in Part III, I apply
these models of compulsion to various hypothetical discovery rules in an
attempt to define the constitutional limits of the Williams Court's
approval of prosecutorial discovery.
II
COMPULSION UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Because the Williams decision can be interpreted to mean that com-
pulsion is never present in the typical discovery situation, a careful exam-
ination of the Supreme Court's treatment of compulsion is of central
importance to the constitutional analysis even though compulsion is but
one of the three prerequisites to a fifth amendment violation.84
The Supreme Court cases analyzing compulsion fall into two
groups. In the first group, the Supreme Court invalidates state practices
because they threaten the defendant with sanctions external to the trial
process, often for the purpose of producing testimonial assertions that
may be used in a criminal prosecution. In the second group, there are no
external sanctions; instead, operation of the rule impairs the defendant's
fifth amendment interests to a certain degree. In this situation, the Court
in some circumstances weighs the policies behind the fifth amendment
right affected against the state's interest in the practice, or the Court may
simply conclude that, employing a facially different treatment of the
issue, the practice "burdens" the exercise of the fifth amendment and
therefore is necessarily unconstitutional.
Such varying treatment of the compulsion issue can be best under-
stood by viewing the cases as creating two models of compulsion. The
first, which may be termed the pristine model, covers cases in group one
above: the individual is subjected to direct, external sanctions for his
refusal to speak. The second model covers the cases in the second group
irrespective of the Court's apparently differing treatment. Here the
defendant is not threatened with direct, external sanctions, but claims
that the state practice in question indirectly penalizes him for exercising
his fifth amendment rights, and the Supreme Court uses a balancing pro-
cess to determine whether unconstitutional compulsion is present. This
second model explains both the cases in which the Supreme Court explic-
itly weighs the threats to policies behind the fifth amendment against the
be gleaned from the case is that the coercive effect of uncertainty generated by prosecutorial
discovery standing alone does not create compulsion forbidden by the fifth amendment in every case.
These arguments will be addressed in Part III, infra.
84. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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state's interest and those in which the Court declares the practice invalid
simply because it burdens the defendant's contitutional rights. 85 State
discovery practices will fall primarily under the second model, and their
constitutionality must be evaluated by its standards.
Under the second model, key factors in the balance are the state's
purpose in exerting the pressure, the strength of its policy supporting the
disclosure independent of an interest in obtaining incriminating state-
ments, and the nature and degree of impact of the practice upon the
values protected by the fifth amendment. While coercive state pressure
must produce incriminating testimonial evidence to violate the fifth
amendment,86 the second model does not focus primarily on the precise
nature of that coercive pressure as does the pristine model. Instead, the
Court looks to how the state may use the information it obtains from the
defendant.
A. Compulsion in Its Pristine Form
New Jersey v. Portash 87 illustrates use of the pure compulsion model.
There the Court described testimony under legislative immunity before a
grand jury as "the essence of coerced testimony"-"the constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine
form."88 Such testimony before the grand jury presents a modem version
of the historical practice that is generally credited with producing the
fifth amendment-calling a witness under the oath ex officio and con-
fronting him with the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt. 89
85. The broad outlines of this analysis have been developed elsewhere. Arenella, Schmerber
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 34-35 (1982);
see also M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 193-219 (1980). Regrettably, despite development of that
analysis, the lower courts continue to treat compulsion either as present only when external
sanctions are threatened or as an issue without rational resolution. See McCracken v. Corey, 612
P.2d 990, 993-95 (Alaska 1980) (no pattern can be found in decided cases to distinguish between
impermissible compulsion and permissible pressures inherent in difficult strategic choices facing a
defendant). With respect to pretrial discovery generally, the result has been the virtual denial of the
possibility of a viable fifth amendment claim. It is my hope that clarification and expansion of this
analysis will render it more persuasive to the courts and bring greater rationality to the resolution of
these cases.
86. The coercive pressure in the discovery context is provided by a state statute, rule, or court
order that requires the defendant to provide disclosures or suffer a significant penalty, often the
exclusion of evidence or testimony.
87. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
88. Id. at 459. "In such cases there is no question whether physical or psychological pressure
overrode the defendant's will; the witness is told to talk or face the government's coercive sanctions,
notably, a conviction for contempt." Id.
89. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); see also L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Nakell,
supra note 9, at 481-88.
The Court has expanded in modern-day contexts the type of external coercive force that may
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According to the Court, a person cannot constitutionally be coerced
into such a choice by the penalty of contempt or its modem-day eco-
nomic variant. 90 When faced with such compulsion, he may refuse to
answer "unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his
compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent
criminal case .. . , [and] [a]bsent such protection, if he is nevertheless
compelled to answer, his answers are inadmissible against him ...."
produce the "core" or "pristine" form of compulsion. In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), compulsion was found in the operation of
independent criminal statutes requiring gamblers to furnish tax information that would subject them
to criminal prosecutions for their gambling activities. Subsequently, in a series of cases spanning a
decade, the Court expanded the definition of compulsion beyond a threat of imprisonment to include
economic sanctions such as the loss of employment, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), the right to secure public contracts, Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 (1973), and the loss of the right to hold an office in a political party entailing both social
prestige and economic benefits, Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806.07 (1977).
90. See supra note 89.
While the full range of prohibited sanctions outside contempt has not been defined, it includes
other "potent sanctions" beyond "direct economic sanctions and imprisonment." Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 805-06. Civil sanctions must be imposed "automatically and without
more" upon refusal to waive the privilege to constitute compulsion. Id. at 808 n.5 (citing Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976)).
In Baxter, the Court held that in non-criminal prison disciplinary proceedings the fifth
amendment permitted respondent's silence to be used against him. Since the proceedings themselves
were not criminal, the fifth amendment did not apply directly. Rather, it applied only if the sanction
in the civil proceedings constituted compulsion under the fifth amendment which might cause
respondent to provide statements that could be used in a later criminal case against him. Also,
unlike the situation in the economic penalty cases, no loss of job, for example, would automatically
follow his refusal to provide the requested information. Under these circumstances, the Court held
that an inference upon silence utilized only as a factor in determining whether the prisoner would be
disciplined was not a sufficient sanction to constitute compulsion.
91. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. at 78.
A witness may vindicate his fifth amendment privilege by either (1) refusing to provide the
testimony and defending against imposition of the sanction under the fifth amendment or (2)
invoking the privilege and, if the assertion is not honored, providing the testimony and moving at
any subsequent trial to have the testimony excluded. Thus, a person faced with this choice will be
protected, with certain limitations, by the fifth amendment, whichever choice he makes. See Westem
& Mandel, To Talk, to Balk or to Lie: The Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the "Preferred
Response" 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521 (1982) (state may require the defendant to litigate fifth
amendment claims in a specified manner if the mechanism prescribed will fully protect those rights).
The sanction that will compel within the meaning of the privilege is equal to the sanction or penalty
prohibited by the privilege from being imposed upon the exercise of the right.
Professor Westen has described the relationship as follows:
The privilege [against self-incrimination] prohibits the state from putting a person to the
cruel choice of either becoming a witness against himself or suffering a penalty for
remaining silent. Accordingly, the constitutional interests of a defendant who has been put
to such a choice are violated regardless of whether he responds to the dilemma by taking
the witness stand over his objection or by suffering a penalty for remaining silent.
Whichever his response, he suffers constitutional injury because he should never be put to
the choice in the first place. In other words, there is a relationship of equivalence between
penalties and compulsion. A "penalty" on the privilege against self-incrimination is the
kind of illicit pressure on a defendant to become a witness against himself which, if it is
effective as a threat would "compel" him to take the witness stand over his objection.
Westen, supra note 83, at 942 (footnotes omitted); cf. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31-32
[Vol. 74:15671594
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No state interest, regardless of its strength, justifies such compulsion, 92
and the testimony obtained may not be used for any purpose against the
individual, not even to impeach him. 
9 3
The pristine model of compulsion and its attendant principles are
not directly applicable to existing discovery practices because the defend-
ant is not faced with direct, external sanctions for his refusal to provide
the requested disclosures. The second model of compulsion provides the
analytical framework for determining the constitutional limits of typical
discovery requirements.
B. The Second Compulsion Model-The Balancing of Interests
The Court has been far less clear with the second model94 in specify-
n. 19 (1973) (Court's focus is on whether the practice "created a burden on the exercise of the right to
remain silent, or, stated differently, encouraged its waiver.").
92. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 (1977) ("We have already rejected the notion
that citizens may be forced to incriminate themselves because it serves a governmental need" even
where governmental interest is substantial and alternative methods of promoting state aims are not
apparent.); see also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (balancing state interest in
preventing perjury against deterrence of unlawful police conduct impermissible where statements
compelled); cf. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60-61 (1968) (important governmental
interest in accurate fiscal information insufficient to justify violation of fifth amendment where
information could be obtained by methods consistent with constitutional guarantees).
Of course, where the privilege is protected through the grant of immunity, persons not
responding to government inquiry may be sanctioned. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. at 84 ("[G]iven
adequate immunity, the State may plainly insist that employees either answer questions under oath
about the performance of their job or suffer the loss of employment.").
93. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
94. Whether it is appropriate to describe the cases as fitting into two models of compulsion can
be debated. On the one hand, terminology other than "compulsion" might be used to explain these
results, such as the unconstitutionality of requiring that one right be "forfeited" in order to exercise
another. See, eg., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393-94 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). On the other, at least some of the discovery practices I examine are
arguably unconstitutional without resort to a second model-because they involve compulsion in the
pristine sense. My difficulty with either of these positions is that both ultimately require a balancing
of interests to decide specific cases. I believe, therefore, that thefirst step of analysis should examine
the interests involved.
Analyzing the issue in terms of the unconstitutionality of requiring one right to be forfeited so
that another may be exercised ignores the key question of compulsion. Unless a defendant is
compelled to speak, his fifth amendment rights are not violated; the simple fact that tension exists
between the exercise of two rights does not mean that one is violated. Using "forfeiture"
terminology provides no useful guidance for determining when that tension rises to an
unconstitutional level. Finally, in order to determine which practices are invalid, the court must
inevitably evaluate and weigh the interests behind the exercise of competing rights. The appropriate
beginning point is just such an interest analysis. See generally Westen, Incredible Dilemmas:
Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741 (1981).
In a different analysis, compulsion in its pristine form is arguably present when a discovery rule
requires the defendant to provide incriminating, testimonial evidence that aids the state in convicting
him and threatens exclusion of undisclosed evidence as a sanction for noncompliance. Although the
Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, its descriptions of pristine compulsion seem to
require external sanctions of a type not present here. Though the perimeters of the pristine model
might reasonably be expanded to include this factual situation, and such expansion would be
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ing the dimensions of the fifth amendment right. In some cases, the
Court has simply stated that a state practice that imposes a burden upon
the exercise of the fifth amendment right is invalid. In others, the Court
has explicitly used a balancing approach.
The second model of compulsion began with Griffin v. California, 91
in which, for the first time, the Court found a violation of the fifth
amendment despite the absence of external compulsion. In Griffin, the
Court invalidated California's practice of permitting comment by both
the court and the prosecutor on a defendant's failure to testify. The
defendant faced no compulsion in terms of a penalty external to the trial
process, such as imprisonment or an economic sanction, operating auto-
matically upon his exercise of the right to remain silent.
In holding that the practice unconstitutionally burdened the defend-
ant's fifth amendment rights, the Court sidestepped the issue of compul-
sion entirely. The Court made no attempt to explain how comment on
the defendant's silence compelled him to incriminate himself.96 Instead,
it analyzed the practice in terms of the burden it placed on the defend-
ant's assertion of his right to remain silent. Thus, it held that a comment
upon silence is invalid under the fifth amendment because it "is a penalty
imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion costly."97 The Court found fur-
consistent with the fundamental purpose of the fifth amendment, such expansion is unlikely for two
reasons. First, the present Supreme Court shows no inclination in that direction. If anything, the
historically based definition of compulsion appears to be assuming greater importance. Second, in
determining this expanded core meaning of compulsion, something very similar to the balancing
process, which I describe, would have to be used. Once the Court moves away from defining
compulsion by comparing the challenged practice in modern contexts to the historically based
external-sanction model, it must analyze the values behind the right and can no longer use directly
the pristine model. Indeed, it is hard to see how any discovery practices could be found to violate
the privilege against self-incrimination if these values are ignored. As a result, whether the analytical
process is termed a second model or not, an analysis of the competing interests must be used to
determine when compulsion is present.
95. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
It is apparent that the situation and language of Griffin are different from the economic sanction
cases. There was no clear difference, however, in the Court's initial treatment of these issues. Justice
Douglas wrote both Griffin and the first of the "employment cases," Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967). In Garrity, he described the fifth amendment almost precisely in the language of
Griffin-as one of those "rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by
the exaction of a price." 385 U.S. at 500.
96. In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice White, found compulsion to be entirely
lacking even though he would have made it the "focus of the inquiry." He argued: Any possible
compulsion would be of "a dramatically different and less palpable nature than that involved in the
procedures which historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment guarantee.... I think that the
Court in this case stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds .... " Griffin,
380 U.S. at 620; see also Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin
v. California after Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841, 852-66 (1980).
97. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
Commentators have attempted to explain Griffin in a number of ways. One suggests that the
opinion correctly balanced a weak and almost irrational state interest in being able to infer guilt from
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ther that the practice undermined the values behind the fifth amendment,
considering it reminiscent of the "inquisitorial system of criminal
justice."98
Similarly, in Simmons v. United States,99 the Court found a practice
unconstitutional because it rendered the assertion of a constitutional
right too costly. It ruled that statements made by a defendant at a sup-
pression hearing to establish his standing to contest the validity of a
search could not be used as evidence of guilt at his subsequent trial. The
Court recognized that as an "abstract matter" the testimony was volun-
tary and was not strictly compelled within the meaning of the fifth
amendment. Nevertheless, requiring the defendant to forfeit his right to
testify in support of his fourth amendment claim in order to preserve his
fifth amendment right to silence created "an undeniable tension." The
Court concluded, "in these circumstances... it [is] intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert
another." 1"
It was not until McGautha v. California0 1 that the balancing
approach of the second model of compulsion emerged. In McGautha,
petitioner argued that Ohio's unitary procedure for determining guilt and
punishment in a capital case created an unconstitutional tension between
his fifth amendment right to remain silent as to guilt and his due process
right to be heard on the issue of punishment. The Court immediately
rejected the suggestion in Griffin that all burdens on the exercise of fifth
amendment rights are unconstitutional.
Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimen-
sions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not
by that token always forbid requiring him to choose. The threshold ques-
tion is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent
silence against the defendant's substantial interest in the enforcement of the policies underlying the
fifth amendment, which favor an accusatorial system in which the state must shoulder the entire
load. Arenella, supra, note 85, at 53-54 n. 118; see also Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable
AfterAll These Years, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1290, 1292-94 (1981) (Griffin justified by irrationality of the
California inference that the reason a defendant will choose not to take the stand is because of his
guilt). Another finds Grffin supported under a due process rationale rather than by the fifth
amendment. Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's
Definition, 61 MINN. L. REv. 383, 401 (1977).
98. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614. The Court was here quoting from the descriptions of the values
behind the fifth amendment in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). One of those
values is described as "our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice .... Id.
99. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
100. Id. at 393-94. Although Justice Harlan, in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 211-12
(1971), questioned the validity of the opinion in Simmons, which he authored, the fifth amendment
element of Simmons did not die so easily. In Lefkovitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-08 (1977),
the Court relied explicitly on Simmons and its conflict-of-rights rationale.
101. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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any of the policies behind the rights involved.10 2
The Court then examined the impairment of the defendant's fifth
amendment rights. Reiterating an important element of the Williams
analysis, °3 the Court held that when the "compulsion" to testify flows
from the force of historical fact-the evidence available to the prosecu-
tion-it is not of the sort forbidden by the fifth amendment. 104  The
Court concluded that McGautha faced pressures analogous to those con-
fronting any defendant who considers taking the stand at trial and,
accordingly, found no violation of the fifth amendment. 105
After McGautha, one might have expected the Court to recognize
no violations of the fifth amendment outside the pristine model, espe-
cially when the pressures on the defendant to testify or remain silent flow
primarily from the operation of the trial process. During the next term,
however, in Brooks v. Tennessee, 116 the Court struck down a statute that
required the defendant to take the stand first in the defense case or not at
all.
Because the statute created pressure on the defendant by forcing
him to make a decision when uncertain whether "his own testimony
[would] be necessary or even helpful,"'0 7 the Court concluded that the
102. Id. at 213.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), the Court described in some detail the
policies behind the fifth amendment. While this description leaves the precise dimensions of these
policies ambiguous, see Arenella, supra note 85, at 37-38, it remains the most complete treatment
provided by the Court to date:
[O]ur unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be
elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair
state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with
the individual to shoulder the entire load"; our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life"; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (citations and footnotes omitted).
In addition, in Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976), the Court identified "the
fundamental purpose of the Fifth Amendment" as "the preservation of an adversary system of crimi-
nal justice," which is "undermined when a government deliberately seeks to avoid the burdens of
independent investigation by compelling self-incriminating disclosures." The Court thus empha-
sized the central importance of the fifth amendment in preserving that element of the adversary
system that prohibits the government from compelling disclosures from the defendant that it uses
directly to secure his conviction.
103. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1970).
104. McGautha, v. United States, 402 U.S. 183, 215-16 (1971).
In Williams, the Court concluded that the alibi notice rule involves pressures "of the same
nature as those that would induce [the defendant] to call alibi witnesses at the trial." Nothing in the
rule "added to the legitimate pressures" to call alibi witnesses. 399 U.S. at 85.
105. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 217.
106. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
107. Id. at 610.
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rule might well cause defendants to remain silent or to testify who would
do otherwise in its absence. While acknowledging the state's interest in
preventing the defendant from coloring his testimony once he heard the
testimony of his other witnesses, the Court found that interest insufficient
to override the defendant's right to remain silent. "o The Court declared
the statute unconstitutional finding that it restricted Brooks's decision
whether to remain silent, burdened the exercise of his fifth amendment
right, and made its exercise costly. 109
While Brooks uses a balancing test for determining when a burden
on the exercise of the defendant's rights is impermissible, the standards
for finding compulsion are far from clear.'10 Subsequent cases, however,
provide some guidance. For example, in Jenkins v. Anderson,111 the
Court upheld the impeachment of a criminal defendant with his prearrest
silence, again employing a fifth amendment balancing test. The Court
recognized that the practice may discourage or burden the exercise of the
right to remain silent, 2 but found that danger outweighed by the state's
interest in enhancing the reliability of the trial process. 1 3
McGautha and Jenkins make clear that the second model of com-
pulsion requires a balancing between fifth amendment policies and the
legitimacy of the state's infringement upon them. For the challenged
practice to survive, its benefit must outweigh the extent of its impairment
of the policies behind the fifth amendment. 1 4 The results in Griffin and
Brooks are explained by the relative insubstantiality of the state's interest
in the practices at issue and the centrality of the fifth amendment values
adversely affected. 5
108. Id. at 611.
109. Id. at 610-11. The Court's approach in Brooks is closer to the Griffin approach, that any
burden upon the fifth amendment is invalid, than to the explicit balancing of McGautha.
110. See Arenella, supra note 85, at 36-38 ("balancing without scales"); Note, Resolving
Tensions Between Constitutional Rights: Use Immunity in Concurrent or Related Proceedings, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 674, 687 (1976) [hereinafter Columbia Note] ("broad, unfocused balancing"); Note,
Revocation of Conditional Liberty for the Commission of a Crime: Double Jeopardy and Self-
Incrimination Limitations, 74 MiCH. L. REv. 525, 547 n.103 (1976) ("no clear line between
permissible and impermissible consequences... of invoking the privilege"); Note, The Due Process
Need for Postponement or Use Immunity in Probation Revocation Hearings Based on Criminal
Charges, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1077, 1080 n.13 (1984) ("remains unclear exactly what constitutes an
impermissible penalty") [hereinafter Minnesota Note].
111. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 238. ("Once a defendant decides to testify, '[t]he interests of the other party and
regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the
balance of consideration determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-
incrimination.' ") (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)).
114. McGautha v. United States, 402 U.S. 183, 215-16 (1971); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231, 238 (1980) (citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 & n.20 (1973)).
115. In Griffin the value at stake was the impermissibility of the court's creating evidence from
the defendant's silence. 380 U.S. at 614-15; see also Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 295, 301
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These decisions also indicate that the Court will independently
assess the overall importance of the state interest involved and whether
the interest can be attained only by impairing the right at issue. 1 1 6 More-
over, the Court will examine the state's underlying purpose in adopting
the practice in question. If the fifth amendment right is burdened inten-
tionally in an effort to discourage or penalize its exercise, the constitu-
tionality of the practice is highly unlikely.' 17  Conversely, if the burden
upon the right is only an incidental result of an otherwise legitimate prac-
tice, its validity is supported.118
In summary, under the second model of compulsion, the Court bal-
ances the defendant's interests in exercising his fifth amendment rights
freely against the state's interest in, and need for, the challenged practice.
On one side of the balance, the Court will place:
1. The importance of the policy behind the right which is impaired;
and
2. The extent to which the right is impaired.
These factors will be weighed against:
(1981). InBrooks, it was the right of the defendant not to take the stand-a right at the heart of the
privilege against self-incrimination-at a moment prescribed by the state, Brooks, 406 U.S. at 611-
12, see infra notes 192 & 194, coupled perhaps with the defendant's traditional right under our
adversary system to control the timing of his testimony. Westen, supra note 83, at 975-85.
116. The plea bargaining process, which the Court has recognized as a "legitimate," indeed "an
'essential' and 'desirable' 'component of the administration ofjustice' " will inevitably discourage the
exercise of rights; but this effect must be approved if plea bargaining is to be permitted. Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 & n.18 (1973) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61
(1971)); see also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-23 (1978) (pressure to waive jury trial in
exchange for lower maximum sentence permissible).
117. In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), the Court suggested that the purpose of a
state practice may be critical to validity when its impact is uncertain: "This [practice] does not
smack of an invalid attempt by the State to compel testimony without granting immunity or to
penalize the exercise of the privilege." Id. at 318; see also Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801,
808 (1977) (rejecting "notion that citizens may be forced to incriminate themselves because it serves
a governmental need").
118. In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court found that jury sentencing was
used by the state for a legitimate purpose and was not merely a means for discouraging or penalizing
the assertion of protected rights. It described the burden-a potentially higher sentence after
retrial-as similar to the burden at issue in McGautha: the "incidental consequence" of a valid state
practice. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 31-32 & n.20.
Issues similar to those in McGautha have been frequently raised in cases challenging a state's
right to hold probation or parole revocation hearings prior to resolution of pending criminal charges
forming the basis of the alleged violation of conditional release. Two of these cases, Ryan v.
Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 977 (1979) and Flint v. Mullen,
499 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974), focused upon the state's neutral
purpose in holding the revocation proceedings promptly. Both courts contrasted this situation to
one in which the state's explicit purpose is to gather incriminating evidence from the defendant.
There, any penalty upon the defendant for violating the state's rule would directly burden the
exercise of the right. Both courts stated that, if the state had instituted revocation proceedings first
for the purpose of obtaining incriminating information from the defendant, the practice would have
been unconstitutional.
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1. The overall importance of the state's practice to the administra-
tion of justice;
2. The underlying purpose of the state in promulgating the partic-
ular rule;1 19 and
3. The degree to which that purpose cannot be achieved without
impairing the right.
120
The method of determining whether a challenged practice violates
the Constitution thus differs between the two compulsion models. The
two analytic methods also differ in another important respect. Under the
"pristine" model, a constitutional violation results from requiring the
individual to make certain choices-silence, incrimination, or perjury-
which the fifth amendment prohibits. Generally, how the challenged
procedure affects a defendant's decision to testify or remain silent is irrel-
evant. The practice is invalid because it forces this choice, regardless of
the defendant's actual decision.121
Under the second model of compulsion, a constitutional violation
results only when the burdens imposed on the fifth amendment policies
by the state practice outweigh the state's interest in that practice. A vio-
lation of the defendant's rights thus depends primarily upon the impact
of the state's practice, not merely upon the fact that a choice is required.
Consequently, the actual impact of the rule-the state's use of the state-
ment against the defendant-is critical to a violation of the fifth amend-
ment. Thus, evaluating whether the defendant's rights have actually
been impaired during the course of litigation becomes complicated.
119. The key issue here is whether the rule is designed to serve a neutral purpose or to
discourage and penalize assertion of the fifth amendment right. See supra notes 117 & 118.
120. Arguably, this second model is simply an aberration in the development of fifth
amendment law. Only two cases, Griffin and Brooks (possibly a third, Simmons), involving fifth
amendment violations can be explained in no other way than this second mode of analysis. Because
of their small number, the cases in this category might be labeled aberrational or be limited to their
facts.
Indeed, a limiting process began in Griffiln. Justice Stewart dissented there because he
concluded that a comment on defendant's silence did not constitute compulsion. See supra note 96.
Later, in Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339-41 (1978), he spoke for the majority in holding that
no compulsion arose when the trial court instructed the jury, over defense objection, not to draw any
inference from the defendant's silence. Justice Stevens argued in dissent that if Griffin was still the
law the challenged instruction was constitutionally invalid. Id. at 345. He noted that two of the
justices in the Lakeside majority had dissented in Griffin and expressed doubt that "any Member of
the Giffin majority would join today's opinion." Id. at 344-45 & n.3.
Alternatively, the Court may determine that the fifth amendment should protect only against
the types of compulsion similar to those with historically based origins. Such a strict interpretivist
approach to the fifth amendment-that is, one holding that only those practices specifically
contemplated by the Framers of the amendment may be judicially forbidden-would not lead to the
result I urge here. Compare R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) with J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). The Court, however, has not consistently followed such a
strict interpretivist approach in its fifth amendment cases (as shown by the results reached in Griffin
and Brooks and by the mode of analysis employed in McGautha).
121. See supra note 91.
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Since a required choice does not automatically violate the privilege
against self-incrimination, a reviewing court must often determine
whether the defendant's choice was in fact affected by the threatened
sanction or simply reflected his judgment concerning the best litigation
strategy. Accurately assessing the subjective impact of the threatened
sanction upon the defendant is an important, but rarely easy,
determination.
1 22
The Supreme Court's analysis of the compulsion issue in McGautha,
Brooks, Jenkins, and other cases shows that practices that unjustifiably
penalize the exercise of a defendant's constitutional rights may be invalid
even when compulsion in a strict sense is absent. As we have seen, most
discovery rules do not subject defendants to the "cruel trilemma." They
use no direct, external compulsion. Therefore, the extent to which they
unconstitutionally burden the exercise of a defendant's fifth amendment
rights will rarely be immediately obvious. In the following Part, I will
apply the balancing approach developed above to several hypothetical
discovery rules, some inspired by existing state rules. With this analysis,
I will demonstrate that in cases in which the defendant's disclosures may
be used to incriminate him, the fifth amendment is violated and mandates
invalidation of that discovery practice.
122. In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court observed that the petitioner, who
had in fact appealed his conviction, obviously had not been deterred from taking an appeal by the
possibility of receiving a greater sentence from the jury after retrial. The Court expressed doubt
"that the 'chill factor' will often be a deterrent of any significance," id. at 33, and could not agree
with the petitioner "that such speculative prospects interfere with the right to make a free choice
whether to appeal." Id at 35. Since courts will rarely be able to determine the actual impact of any
"burden" on the exercise of a defendant's constitutional rights, they must, generally, either speculate
or deny relief because of an inadequate showing of prejudice.
In some situations a rule's impact is clearer when separated from the defendant's strategic
judgments. For example, contrast the state's unitary trial procedure in McGautha with another
state's bifurcated proceedings. In the unitary proceedings, the requirement that the defendant's
testimony be available for both guilt and punishment presents a difficult strategic decision. To
obtain the benefits of having his testimony considered by the jury on the issue of punishment, the
defendant must comply with the state's procedural rules which impose substantial, though
incidental, costs.
In bifurcated proceedings, the same requirement would present very different issues. The
defendant's decision to testify at the guilt phase, when he wishes only to present testimony on
punishment, could hardly be attributed to a tough strategic decision. It could only be a condition on
the right to testify. It is either a justifiable burden on testimony, or it is constitutionally invalid. See
Minnesota Note, supra note 110, at 1086-88 (separate revocation hearing subject to discretionary
scheduling by the state distinguishes such proceedings from unitary trial in McGautha); Columbia
Note, supra note 110, at 709 (where state uses separate revocation proceedings, difficult choice facing
defendant not inherent in adversary system, and tension between rights to remain silent and to testify
"exerted not by the state's evidence but by its choice of procedure").
1602
1986] DISCOVERY AGAINST THE DEFENSE 1603
III
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT APPLIED TO PROSECUTORIAL
DISCOVERY
Though all discovery rules certainly do not violate defendants' fifth
amendment interests, those rules that require the defendant to make a
statement or to provide information that the state may use to prove his
guilt 123 may significantly affect his fifth amendment rights. Yet, as
shown above, the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Florida
approved a discovery practice that required the defendant to choose
between notifying the prosecution of his defense in advance of trial and
foregoing the defense altogether.
Does Williams mean that the coercive force of the defendant's desire
to retain the right to present evidence at trial alone does not constitute
compulsion under the fifth amendment? Stated differently, does
Williams hold that all pretrial discovery rules requiring the defendant to
provide information that he intends to offer at trial are valid under the
fifth amendment-no matter how incriminating-provided the only
sanction is exclusion at trial of the undisclosed information?124
I will test the limits of the Williams holding by applying the second
123. For a discussion of the testimonial aspects of discovery, see infra notes 161-68 and
accompanying text.
124. The Court's conclusion in Williams that the alibi was not compelled has two possible
meanings. The first meaning is that the defendant was not compelled because he would have taken
the same action in the absence of the rule. We know this is true because at any time prior to
introducing the alibi he could have abandoned it without adverse consequence. Since the state had
not used his disclosures in its case, he suffered no harm directly resulting from discovery as opposed
to his own decision to present the defense. Under this view, the extent of compulsion is irrelevant
since a witness cannot be unconstitutionally compelled to take actions he would take freely absent
the compulsion.
State v. Nelson, 14 Wash. App. 658, 545 P.2d 36 (1975) exemplifies the first interpretation. The
defendants were ordered under threat of contempt to reveal prior to trial the nature of the defense
they intended to present, together with the identity of their witnesses. When they refused to comply,
they were jailed for contempt. The sanction obviously constituted direct compulsion. The appellate
court, however, upheld the trial court's action. Id. at 667, 545 P.2d at 41. It applied the Williams
rationale, holding the defendants' fifth amendment rights were not violated since the rule only
accelerated the disclosure of information that they ultimately would have revealed; the court ignored
any significance in the nature of the compulsion employed. Cf South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.
553 (1983) (admitting into evidence defendant's refusal to take breathalizer test does not violate
privilege against self-incrimination since he has no fifth amendment right to refuse the examination).
The second possible meaning is that the coercive force presented by discovery is simply
insufficient to violate the fifth amendment. Under this rationale, preclusion of the testimony, or any
lesser sanction, is permissible but a threat of contempt is improper. Under this approach, Nelson
would have been wrongly decided.
In some instances these meanings operate with a perfect overlap; there will be no need or
occasion to separate them. As developed below, resolution of the questions of prosecutorial use,
incrimination, and uncertainty determine whether the two meanings of compulsion are separated.
One reason that Williams decides so little is that, under its facts, these two possible meanings of
compulsion remain perfectly intertwined.
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model of compulsion to a series of hypothetical discovery rules and illus-
trations that present the major fifth amendment issues raised by
prosecutorial discovery. In the first hypothetical, I examine a discovery
rule that requires the defendant to provide a discovery deposition as a
condition of his right to testify at trial. I assume in this hypothetical that
the defendant is not faced with the pressures flowing from uncertainty;
he knows the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecutor's case and that
his deposition will be used in the prosecutor's case-in-chief. By eliminat-
ing the element of uncertainty, I highlight in this hypothetical the critical
importance of the state's use of the defendant's disclosures to the consti-
tutionality of prosecutorial discovery. I demonstrate that, under the sec-
ond model of compulsion, such a rule would be invalid. In support of
this conclusion I refer to analogous cases concerning discovery rules and
the insanity defense; courts have recognized that the potential for incrim-
ination in discovery of the insanity defense requires fifth amendment pro-
tections even when there is no compulsion in its pristine form.
In the second hypothetical, I examine typical discovery rules that
require disclosure of defenses, witnesses, and witnesses' statements. As
in the first hypothetical, I have eliminated the element of uncertainty; the
defendant is fully aware of the potential for incrimination in his disclo-
sures. The analysis of these rules focuses on the testimonial and poten-
tially incriminating nature of the defendant's responses, and again leads
to the conclusion that such practices unconstitutionally penalize the
exercise of the defendant's fifth amendment rights.
The third hypothetical focuses on the factual situation at issue in the
Williams case. As in the second hypothetical, I examine typical discov-
ery rules requiring pretrial disclosure of defenses and witnesses. In this
case, however, I have included the element of uncertainty. The defend-
ant is unsure of the consequences of his disclosure, both in terms of its
potential to incriminate him and the extent to which it will lead to the
discovery of other information that might strengthen the state's case.
This hypothetical demonstrates that such uncertainty complicates the
fifth amendment analysis, as illustrated by imagining the facts of the
Williams case litigated in a procedural context different from that
presented to the Supreme Court. The hypothetical shows that it is the
absence of potential for incrimination in the typical notice of alibi that
justifies the discovery rule at issue in the Williams case. Thus, I conclude
that where the defendant refuses to provide the required disclosures
because he reasonably believes that his response will incriminate him,
preclusion of his testimony will unconstitutionally burden his fifth
amendment right.
In the fourth hypothetical, I examine a rule that requires the defend-
ant to give a pretrial deposition if he intends to testify, but protects the
[Vol. 74:15671604
DISCOVERY AGAINST THE DEFENSE
defendant against use of the deposition in the prosecutor's case-in-chief.
This hypothetical focuses examination on the validity of impeaching the
defendant with discovery disclosures. I conclude that even this limited
use of discovery disclosures may unjustifiably impair the defendant's fifth
amendment interests. Impeachment use should be permitted only when
the defendant provides willfully false information or when his conduct
places the state in a position such that it cannot adequately prepare to
meet the defense at trial. I complete the discussion of impeachment use
of discovery by examining specific state discovery practices regulating the
use of discovery information for impeachment purposes.
A. Hypothetical Case One: A Fully Usable Pretrial Discovery
Deposition with Uncertainty Eliminated
Assume that a state has enacted a discovery rule requiring all wit-
nesses intending to testify (prosecution witnesses, defense witnesses, and
the defendant himself) to give pretrial depositions under oath and sub-
ject to cross-examination. The rule states that no judicial compulsion by
way of contempt may be used as a sanction, but only witnesses who have
provided a deposition may testify at trial. In addition, it provides that
such statements may be used by the adversary for any purpose and
explicitly authorizes the state to use the defendant's deposition in its
case-in-chief.125 Though the rule applies to all witnesses, my analysis
treats only its application to the defendant.
Let us also assume that the pressures added by the uncertainty
inherent in pretrial discovery are eliminated. The defendant knows, for
example, that his deposition will tend to incriminate him and that the
state will use his deposition, if he gives one, in its case-in-chief.126
125. This hypothetical was inspired by an argument of Professor Westen. Westen, supra note
83.
Professor Westen compares the Court's ruling in Williams with its decision in Brooks v.
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972). In Brooks, see infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text, the Court
held unconstitutional Tennessee's statute requiring the defendant to testify first in the defense case or
have his testimony barred. Professor Westen argues that under the Court's rationale in Williams a
modified version of the Tennessee rule would be constitutional. The new rule would require the
defendant to disclose the substance of his testimony 10 days in advance of trial or be precluded from
taking the witness stand. It would be constitutional "because the statute does nothing but
'accelerate' a decision that the defendant eventually will be compelled to make at trial." Westen,
supra note 83, at 958 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 978.
Professor Westen does not state explicitly whether he believes that to satisfy Williams the
statute must impose limits on the prosecutor's use of the pretrial statement, but his analysis of the
critical elements of Williams indicates that he believes no restrictions would be required. He argues
that the ability of the prosecutor to use the evidence in its case-in-chief is not a critical factor in the
Williams rationale; indeed, he suggests that it would be constitutional to require the defendant to
present his case before the state produced any evidence. Westen, supra note 83, at 948 n.55, 981
n.198; see also infra note 194.
126. The state is virtually certain to use the deposition if, for example, its case will withstand a
motion for judgment of acquittal but is very weak on a critical issue for which the deposition is very
1986] 1605
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
The potential effects of the rule are significant. A defendant who
wishes to testify must provide a full statement of his proposed testimony
in advance of the government's presentation of any evidence. His state-
ment may be used to shore up a weak government case; it may enable the
state to present an effective, coherent theory selectively utilizing the
defendant's own words to fill in important gaps. 12 7 Because the rule does
not threaten the defendant with an external sanction, the only pressure
on him to give the deposition stems from his desire to avoid the force of
historical facts and to reduce his chances of conviction by testifying at
trial.
Even though compulsion is not present in its pristine form, such a
rule undeniably raises constitutional issues. First, the deposition consti-
tutes testimonial evidence that the defendant would not have provided
for independent, strategic reasons. Second, under the facts of the hypo-
thetical, the deposition will not only provide no benefit to the defendant
but will actually incriminate him. The rule forces the defendant to
choose between incriminating himself, to avoid being penalized with
exclusion of his testimony at trial, and exercising his fifth amendment
right not to incriminate himself by remaining silent, in which case he will
not be permitted to testify in his own defense.
Regardless of the defendant's choice, the rule arguably is unconsti-
tutional since it "casts a heavy burden" on the defendant's fifth amend-
ment right12 or "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion
costly.""2 9 Recognizing this burden only begins the analysis, however. 130
The fifth amendment is violated only if the defendant's statement is com-
pelled. That is, the practice is invalid only if it impairs fifth amendment
policies more than it furthers independent, legitimate state interests.
L Constitutionally Impermissible Burdens Are Imposed by the
Operation of This Hypothetical Rule
Under the balancing approach described above, the hypothetical
rule meets the level of constitutional "compulsion" under the fifth
amendment by unjustifiably impairing the policies that lie at the heart of
the privilege. On one side of the balance, the fifth amendment policy
incriminating. Assume also that the defendant facing this rule is certain of (1) the strength of the
government's case, (2) the impact of his statement in aiding the state's case, and (3) the substantial
value of his own testimony if presented in the defense case.
127. Indeed, when the uncertainty of an actual discovery situation is present, the deposition
may even provide the evidence necessary for the state to make out a prima facie case and to
withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of its case. Then, the effect of the rule would
be profound.
128. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610 (1972).
129. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
130. See, eg., Ayer, supra note 96, at 853-55.
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impaired is the defendant's interest in being free from direct self-incrimi-
nation. The defendant's disclosures are both testimonial and incriminat-
ing, and the use permitted under the rule is substantially prejudicial
to the defendant.131 As the Supreme Court stated in Garner v. United
States, 132 the fundamental purpose of the fifth amendment is "under-
mined when a government deliberately seeks to avoid the burdens
of independent investigation by compelling self-incriminating
disclosures." 13
3
The other side of the balance fails to justify these impairments of
fifth amendment policies. First, the legitimate interests in disclosure that
traditionally justify discovery-the avoidance of unfair surprise and the
efficient administration of justice-provide support that is both practi-
cally and theoretically insufficient to outweigh the defendant's fifth
amendment interests. Pretrial discovery promises to foster the states'
interests by eliminating needless delays and unfair verdicts that result
when the state is confronted with last-minute defense evidence. There is
no solid evidence, however, that a rule requiring pretrial depositions is
necessary to achieve this end.134 Moreover, even enhanced accuracy of
131. The Court has not stated its standard for judging when the fifth amendment right has been
substantially impaired. Presumably, it would assess how clearly the defendant's conduct falls within
the privilege as well as the extent and directness of the penalties.
In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), the Court acknowledged that permitting a
defendant's trial testimony to be impeached with his prearrest silence might marginally discourage
exercise of his right to remain silent before arrest. Nonetheless, the Court found the burden too
insubstantial to violate the policies behind the right. The Court certainly would have reached a
different result had the state prohibited the defendant's trial testimony because he maintained his
prearrest silence. Similarly, in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), the Court held that
adverse inference upon silence of a defendant in a noncriminal prison disciplinary proceeding was
valid because the sanction upon the petitioner's silence was only one factor in determining whether
disciplinary action would be imposed.
132. 424 U.S. 648 (1976). See supra note 102.
133. Id. at 655-56.
134. Only empirical evidence can show whether discovery against the defense has had a
meaningful impact on either of these concerns. Unfortunately, no studies on the subject have been
done. Even if such studies were to show that prosecutorial discovery results in a higher percentage
of convictions, that fact alone would not prove that discovery eliminated "unfair surprise." Instead,
prosecutorial discovery may deter vigorous defense efforts or otherwise shift the balance of
advantage in favor of the prosecution.
Based on appellate cases, it is unclear whether extensive criminal discovery aids in eliminating
delays. The one apparent result of broader discovery is a greater volume of appellate litigation.
States in the southeast provide a useful example. Florida has an extensive discovery system and
substantial prosecutorial discovery. The nearby states of Georgia, South Carolina, and North
Carolina provide relatively little criminal discovery and virtually none against the criminal
defendant. Florida has produced scores of reported cases challenging discovery procedures, and a
large number of cases have been reversed because of trial court errors. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 372
So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1979) (conviction reversed where trial court did not conduct immediate hearing upon
appropriateness of preclusion sanctions for defense discovery violation). The body of appellate
litigation in the other three states is far smaller.
Certainly, one cannot judge whether the entire criminal trial system is working more efficiently
or more fairly by the volume of appellate litigation on discovery. If, however, the appellate courts
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the fact-finding process cannot sustain a direct violation of the fifth
amendment privilege and its policies. If it could, only fifth amendment
violations that threaten the reliability of the information secured would
be invalid, and that is certainly not consistent with settled fifth amend-
ment doctrine. 135
Second, the rule's purpose is immediately suspect. While the state's
interest in avoiding unfair surprise is technically distinct from a purpose
of encouraging waiver of fifth amendment rights, the distinction is not
always clear. Even with a carefully structured rule, the state's purpose is
to know the defendant's case so to better secure his conviction. Under
the best circumstances, this interest is not very different from requiring
disclosure of a directly incriminating statement for the purpose of con-
victing the defendant. 136 Since the hypothetical rule permits the prosecu-
tion to use the disclosures directly to incriminate, and thus to impair the
policies behind the privilege, any separate purpose loses all significance.
Furthermore, the rule serves no independent strategic purpose for
the defendant; disclosure does not result indirectly from actions serving
his own self-interest as occurred in McGautha.137  He complies only
because he must in order to be able later to present evidence or testimony
at trial.1 38  The rule requires the defendant to speak when, except for its
are spending considerable time and energy grappling with discovery issues, the trial courts must be
similarly engaged. Whether efficiency has been enhanced is open to question.
135. The possibility that coercion or compulsion might produce unreliable statements has been
a concern in the context of both the due process concept of involuntariness and the fifth amendment.
Regardless of reliability, however, statements that are involuntary or compelled are constitutionally
invalid. See, eg., Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
136. More than virtually any other type of procedural rule, the "separate" purpose of
discovery-avoiding unfair surprise-tends to merge with the purpose forbidden by the fifth
amendment-requiring disclosures helpful to convict the defendant. While the California Supreme
Court is wrong as a matter of federal fifth amendment analysis, its basic position in In re Misener, 38
Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985) is not. Compelling communications from the
defendant to impeach him and thereby assist in convicting him is hardly distinguishable, in terms of
the policies behind the privilege, from more directly incriminating disclosures.
137. The defendant in Williams also gained no litigative advantage from providing discovery.
The discovery practice in Williams is constitutional, not because it served an independent interest of
the defendant, but because it posed no reasonable threat of incrimination. See infra, text
accompanying notes 195-210.
138. Under rules that grant the prosecution an independent right of discovery, the preclusion
sanction for noncompliance is a pure form of coercion that by design burdens a defendant's right to
remain silent. When the information that would be disclosed is incriminating, these sanctions
approach the level of coercion of the cruel trilemma.
When a defendant receives some trial benefit for providing testimony or evidence that may
incriminate him, he provides it to serve his strategic interest in that benefit. In such a circumstance,
the defendant is not compelled by external, independent sanctions levied for the purpose of causing
him to waive his right to remain silent.
In discovery, the defendant enjoys no benefit from disclosing the information. Admittedly, the
sanction is not separate to the trial process and therefore is not a direct, external penalty for refusing
to waive his right. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1976). Nevertheless, the rule
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operation, he would remain silent.1 39
The only remaining issue is how critical the infringement upon the
privilege is to achieving an important state interest. A first examination
suggests that the state's interest in avoiding unfair surprise could be satis-
fied without using the defendant's statements in its case-in-chief. Appar-
ently, then, the primary cost of the rule is unnecessary for the state to
achieve its legitimate goal."4
In summary, the rule imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of
a defendant's fifth amendment right, and the state's legitimate interests in
the rule do not justify the imposition of that burden.1 4 ' Thus, whether
the defendant declines to give the deposition and is barred from produc-
acts as a direct penalty in the sense that it requires him either to relinquish his right to remain silent
or to suffer the penalty of being prohibited from later presentation of testimony or evidence. Thus,
where the disclosure required by the rule is potentially incriminating, either the defendant abandons
his protections under the fifth amendment, or, solely because of the discovery rule, he is denied the
right to produce evidence to defend against the charge. Since an unattenuated result of being
prohibited from producing evidence may be the defendant's conviction and imprisonment, it is
difficult to distinguish between the discovery sanction and the threat of contempt under the cruel
trilemma.
139. A comparison of McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) with Brooks v. Tennessee,
406 U.S. 605 (1972) supports the conclusion that the hypothetical rule is unconstitutional. In
McGautha, the unitary trial procedure served a legitimate and independent purpose of efficient
litigation. There is no indication that the procedure was designed to coerce waiver of fifth
amendment rights or to deny the right to present mitigating evidence. In fact, rules permitted the
defendant to present evidence and arguments in mitigation through other means even when he did
not testify. Moreover, the defendant's decision to remain silent or to testify served some independent
strategic interest. In short, a unitary trial procedure produces pressures much more similar to those
faced by a defendant choosing whether to testify at trial than does the hypothetical rule.
On the other hand, the requirement in Brooks that the defendant testify first in the defense case
or not at all is virtually indistinguishable from the hypothetical rule on the key issues. Like the
hypothetical rule, the Tennessee statute required either -incrimination or forfeiture of the right to
testify, and compliance with the statute served no independent interest of the defendant.
140. Separating the state's use of evidence in its case-in-chief from use on rebuttal may prove
very difficult. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. Where the justification for the pretrial
discovery is strong enough, as with the insanity defense, fifth amendment protections may simply be
compromised by necessity. See infra text accompanying notes 214-21.
141. This balancing process shows why "conditional discovery" generally is constitutional.
Under conditional discovery a defendant may discover certain categories of information from the
government if he allows prosecutorial discovery of similar information. The defendant waives his
fifth amendment right by requesting discovery from the government. United States v. Ryan, 448 F.
Supp. 810, 811 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 594 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944
(1979); see also NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1916(2) (1985) (where defendant's request for conditional
discovery is granted, "he shall be deemed to have waived his privilege of self-incrimination").
The distinction between conditional discovery and independent prosecutorial discovery of any
information a defendant wishes to introduce at trial turns on the extent of the disadvantage which
the defendant suffers in the two situations. It does not turn on any difference between surrendering a
"constitutional right" rather than a "privilege." See Westen, supra note 94. But see Statements of
Justice Douglas Opposing Submission of Proposed Federal Rules to Congress, 39 F.R.D. at 276, 276-
78 0966). Independent discovery requires a defendant either to forfeit his fifth amendment right to
remain silent or to relinquish his right to introduce evidence and present his own testimony.
Conditional discovery, by contrast, requires a defendant either to relinquish his fifth amendment
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ing testimony at trial'4 2 or gives the deposition and it is used against him
in the state's case-in-chief,'43 his fifth amendment rights have been vio-
right or to surrender only his ability to discover information that the state is otherwise not
constitutionally required to reveal.
The independent prosecutorial discovery skews the individual-state balance in favor of the state
by making the defendant choose between self-condemnation or a seriously weakened defense.
Conditional discovery offers the defendant an advantage at the price of reciprocal disclosure. The
adversarial balance remains unchanged, so the fifth amendment is unimpaired.
It bears emphasis that conditional discovery is constitutional solely under a traditional waiver
theory. It must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Discovery is not like plea bargaining, in which some
coercive force is an "inevitable attribute" of the "system which tolerates and encourages the
negotiation of pleas" and in which constitutional rights are necessarily limited. Chaflin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1978).
In the discovery context, unless the defense has purposefully abused the system, there is no adequate
justification for the courts to impose an adverse consequence upon defendant's conduct. See Garner
v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976); United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (en banc). Thus, conditional discovery must satisfy either waiver principles or the same
standards as independent prosecutorial discovery.
On a practical level, where any discovery request by the defense entitles the prosecutor to
discovery of all defense information, the defendant's waiver will often not be knowing and
intelligent. Furthermore, since the defense counsel may not know at the time of discovery what
incriminating information later investigative efforts may unearth, some defense discovery requests
will not satisfy a waiver standard even at a theoretical level. See State v. Williams, 80 N.J. 472, 404
A.2d 34 (1979) (defense counsel's request for discovery considered not to have waived objection to
prosecutorial discovery of damaging information later developed by defense). Since competent
counsel would rarely request discovery when she knows of highly incriminating information that
would then be rendered discoverable, traditional waiver standards will not be satisfied in marginal
cases-the very cases in which independent discovery will run afoul of the constitution. Thus, both
conditional discovery and independent prosecutorial discovery will often run afoul of the
Constitution when the disclosure is truly incriminating, albeit for different reasons.
142. Professor Westen argues that where the defendant remains silent and is prohibited from
testifying, his right to testify under the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment is
violated, rather than his fifth amendment right against compulsory incrimination. Westen, The
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 117-20 (1974).
Other commentators, who find the right to testify in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, suggest that due process is violated by precluding his testimony under these
circumstances. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 711, 793-95 (1976); Ritchie, supra note 97, at 404-06; cf McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 211-12 (1971) (Justice Harlan characterizes Simmons as resting
exclusively on violation of defendant's rights under fourth amendment to litigate colorable claim,
independent of fifth amendment.). See generally Bradley, Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci, and the
Defendant's "Right" to Testify, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 419, 420-23 (1981) (discussing history and
constitutional basis for right to testify). While due process is concerned primarily with a fair balance
between the defendant and the state, it does, to an extent, require that the balance in discovery be
tipped toward the defendant and, like compulsory process, could be offended by exclusion of defense
evidence. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 n.9 (1973) ("Indeed, the State's inherent
information gathering advantages suggest that if there is to be any imbalance in discovery rights it
should work in the defendant's favor."); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due
process requires the state to bear the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
143. Professor Blumenson presents the novel argument that prosecutorial use of the defendant's
statements in the state's case-in-chief violates a defendant's due process right "to defend by failure of
government proof," rather than his fifth amendment right. Blumenson, supra note 33, at 125-26,
154-56.
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lated. " As a result, the hypothetical rule is invalid.145 The analysis also
demonstrates the general point that the state violates the fifth amend-
144. A discovery rule may be invalid under the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
compulsory process, and due process. The fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination
remains the most appropriate from an analytical perspective, however, since it is directly concerned
with preventing the prosecution from forcing the defendant to provide testimonial evidence useful to
convict, and it provides the most effective protection to the defendant. The due process clause has
been particularly unhelpful in discovery contexts.
The notice of alibi rule demonstrates the limited impact of due process on discovery rules.
Under FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 12.1, the government can demand defense
disclosure of the names and addresses of its alibi witnesses. Reciprocally, the government must
provide the names and addresses of its witnesses who would place the defendant at the scene of the
crime and who would rebut his alibi. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973). But this
restriction does little to insure that discovery will not be entirely a one-way street favoring the
prosecution. Because the prosecution alone controls the "trigger," this flow of information, while
superficially reciprocal, will in fact be favorable to the government. The government never has to
reveal information unless it determines that the net exchange will be to its advantage.
Defendants have unsuccessfully challenged the inequality of the rule on several occasions.
United States v. Bouye, 688 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1058-
59 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Savage, 430 F. Supp. 1024, 1036 (M.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem.,
566 F.2d 1170 (1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1078 (1978). In Bouye, the court stated explicitly that
the alibi notice rule "was designed to be a prosecution-triggered devicefor the primary benefit of the
government . . . to avoid unfair surprise and delays at trial" (emphasis added). To permit the
defendant to initiate discovery would allow him to thwart the congressional policy of protecting the
names of government witnesses from disclosure, 688 F.2d at 475, and nothing in the due process
clause prevented this one-way advantage. Id. at 473-475.
145. This hypothetical might be challenged on several grounds. First, one might argue that it is
unrealistic because no defendant would decide before trial to introduce testimony he knew to be
incriminating. It could happen, however, under some circumstances. For example, defense counsel
often will admit substantial elements of the state's case in his opening statement for the purpose of
appearing honest with the jury. If the defense determines in a homicide case that the state's case on
identity will withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, counsel may acknowledge that the
defendant did kill but assert that he did so in self-defense. Discovery would be provided under that
fact pattern.
Second, one might disagree with my result-that the rule is unconstitutional-since the
defendant would present his testimony in any event. Under my assumptions, the defendant must
present the testimony when the defense case begins and, because the state's case otherwise is
sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, he would certainly do so. This
hypothetical of total certainty focuses the issue on why the rule violates the fifth amendment even
when the defendant would produce testimony anyway. The question is, how is the defendant
harmed?
The answer to this question turns on the fundamental meaning of the fifth amendment: what
practices it prohibits, and what policies it reflects and protects. Historically, the privilege protected
against the suspect being placed under oath, without formal accusation, for the purpose of extracting
testimonial assertions from him that would be used to prove his guilt. See generally L. LEVY, supra
note 89; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The privilege also clearly grew
out of and protects a group of values, L. LEVY, supra note 89, at 331-332, 430-32, relating to the
requirement that the government "shoulder the entire load" rather than require proof from the
mouth of the defendant, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), and the central
proposition that our "system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the
fifth amendment privilege is its essential mainstay." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
My hypothetical invokes these values central to the fifth amendment. The evidence at issue is
the testimony of the defendant that will be used to establish his guilt and is produced under threat of
forfeiture of his right to testify. See M. BERGER, supra note 85, at 96 ("The use of [discovery] ... to
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ment when, under threat of precluding his testimony, it requires a
defendant to make a statement in discovery that it uses directly to prove
his guilt. Direct use of a defendant's statement obtained through discov-
ery is itself sufficient to violate the fifth amendment.
2. The Insanity Defense-Application of Fifth Amendment Principles
to Discovery That Incriminates
My conclusion that the hypothetical rule examined above is
unconstitutional can be tested by reference to cases challenging discovery
of the insanity defense. The insanity defense, like the deposition
described above, manifests obvious potential for incrimination. Perhaps
as a result, courts have examined fifth amendment issues with care.
Though profound prosecutorial need for discovery has produced a
"necessity" exception to the privilege against self-incrimination, courts
consistently have held that the defendant's incriminating disclosures can-
not be used by the state in its case-in-chief to prove his guilt.
In federal criminal prosecutions before 1984,146 if the defendant
raised the issue of insanity and introduced some evidence to support his
defense, the government bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was sane at the time of the crime.147  Rule 12.2 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: (1) the defendant must
give notice to the prosecution if he intends to rely upon a defense of
insanity, (2) the court may order the defendant to submit to a psychiatric
examination at the request of the government, and (3) the court may
prove guilt as opposed to rebutting a so-called affirmative defense is the essence of compelled self-
incrimination.").
Furthermore, whether or not the rule influences the defendant's choice, it has an important
impact on how the evidence is used against him. When the defendant reveals incriminating
information on his own, such as through the opening statement, he does so in a way to help his case.
If the prosecutor may require the disclosure and introduce it in the first instance, the defendant loses
his advantage. The statement may be truncated; its timing will be such as to fit within the state's
framework of proof, generally the presentation will not enhance the exculpatory value to the
defendant. Professor Westen argues that under Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), the
defendant has a right to control the timing of his testimony to "be most effective." Westen, supra
note 83, at 975; see also infra note 194. If Westen's contention is true, the defendant should, a
fortiori, have the right to control who presents his testimony, and when. Professor Westen argues
that this right is distinct from the fifth amendment. Id. I contend it is simply one of the values
protected by the fifth amendment prohibition against the state requiring the defendant to produce
evidence that incriminates him. In my hypothetical, discovery permits the state to use the
defendant's testimony in a way detrimental to his interests.
My total-certainty hypothetical notwithstanding, most discovery rules create great uncertainty,
exacerbating their violation of the fifth amendment. Accordingly, even if I am wrong in concluding
this hypothetical violates the fifth amendment, when the uncertainty of real world discovery is
added, the fifth amendment is certainly violated.
146. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 20(b) (Supp. 1985), changed the
law. It places the burden on the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was
insane.
147. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
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exclude the testimony of defense experts for the defendant's failure to
give notice of an insanity defense or to submit to an examination by gov-
ernment psychiatrists. 1
48
Many of the issues raised by discovery of the insanity defense are
indistinguishable from those raised by the hypothetical discovery rule
described above. The insanity defense rule authorizes the judge to order
the defendant to submit to an examination by government psychiatrists.
The penalty for violating the order is not contempt but preclusion of
favorable psychiatric testimony. Also, because a defendant will generally
discuss the details of the crime and often admit factual guilt in his inter-
view with the psychiatrists, the government's use of the testimony in its
case-in-chief would incriminate the defendant. Thus, discovery in this
context, as with the hypothetical rule discussed above, is incriminating as
well as testimonial. 149 Generally, however, it is no more compelled than
under the notice of alibi rule at issue in Williams.
Courts examining prosecutorial discovery of the insanity defense
have addressed two major fifth amendment issues. The first and most
frequently examined issue is whether use of the government's examina-
tion to rebut the defendant's insanity defense violates the fifth amend-
ment privilege. When the government has the burden of proving sanity if
the defendant raises the issue, even using his statements to prove sanity
incriminates the defendant.1" 0 Nevertheless, the lower federal courts
consistently have held that such use does not violate the fifth
amendment. 151
148. The rule also prohibits the prosecution from using directly or indirectly a defendant's
statements to a psychiatric expert made under the rule "except on an issue respecting mental
condition on which the defendant has introduced testimony." FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
149. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463-65 (1981) (holding that statements given to a
psychiatrist are "testimonial" when "the substance of [defendant's] disclosures" is used as evidence
against him).
150. See, e.g., Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("Nothing in the
background or application of the [federal pretrial examination] statute.., suggests any reason but
long practice to except statements relating to sanity from the protection of the Fifth Amendment.").
151. See, e.g., United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
843 (1982) (where defendant gives notice of insanity defense and introduces substantial psychiatric
evidence to prove incompetence at the time crime was committed, a psychiatrist "may testify against
the defendant concerning the competency issue without violation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege"); United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030, 1033-34 (8th Cir. 1976) (where psychiatrists
do not testify regarding incriminating statements made by defendant but only provide their
evaluations of her mental state when the crime occurred, such testimony does not violate defendant's
fifth amendment rights); United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 46-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
855 (1976) (using a balancing test to measure state's ability to counter defendant's proof regarding
sanity against defendant's fifth amendment rights); United States v. Handy, 454 F.2d 885, 888-89
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846 (1972) (court order appointing psychiatrist does not
violate fifth amendment where statute authorizing such appointments forbids using statements made
by defendant regarding guilt and where order "did not compel 'communications' or 'testimony'"
about the defendant's guilt); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1971) (psychiatric
evaluation does not violate defendant's fifth amendment rights where testimony based on the
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In United States v. Byers, 52 the District of Columbia Circuit court,
sitting en banc, examined the issue in some detail. Judge Scalia, writing
for the majority, rejected, as "at best a fiction,"' 3 the theory that the
defendant waives any fifth amendment objection by introducing expert
testimony. He stated that a defendant's decision to submit to an exami-
nation by a government psychiatrist is not voluntary, as traditional
waiver theory requires, since the defendant must do so if he is to present
any evidence. 154
Judge Scalia also examined-and rejected-other theories various
courts had used to justify use of the information. He found that despite
their stated reasoning, those decisions implicitly relied on principles of
necessity and fairness:
[Those courts] have denied the Fifth Amendment claim primarily
because of the unreasonable and debilitating effect it would have upon
society's conduct of a fair inquiry into the defendant's culpability.... We
agree with this concern, and are content to rely upon it alone as the basis
for our rejection of the Fifth Amendment claim.' 55
Byers thus holds that when the demands of litigative fairness are extreme
enough, the fifth amendment right, which is designed to protect the indi-
vidual against the state's ability to compel testimony from him for his
own condemnation, is overridden.
The Byers court did not explicitly address the critical second issue
raised by the hypothetical rule: the use to which discovery disclosures
may be put. To say that a strong claim of necessity by the state will
sometimes justify compelling an incriminating response from a defendant
for rebuttal purposes is not to say that the state is similarly justified in
using the defendant's disclosures to establish the defendant's factual
guilt. Courts consistently have held that the evidence obtained through a
psychiatric examination may not be used for the purpose of proving that
examination speaks only to defendant's mental state and not to his guilt); United States v. Weiser,
428 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971) (defendant is estopped from
claiming a violation of his fifth amendment rights where prosecution introduces psychiatric evidence
regarding defendant's mental state, but not his guilt, to counter defendant's showing on his mental
condition); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 723 (4th Cir. 1968) (psychiatric examination
does not violate defendant's fifth amendment rights when the examination's results are used to
determine defendant's mental condition, not his guilt).
152. 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
153. Id. at 1113.
154. Id.
155. Id.
In United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1968), the Fourth Circuit articulated
the same necessity argument as follows: "[I]f the government is required 'to shoulder the entire
load,' it cannot be denied access to the only reliable means of ascertaining the truth concerning a
defendant's sanity." The court ruled that the government accordingly must have access to the
defendant's personal thoughts through a psychiatric interview. See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454, 465-66 (1981) (noting with apparent approval requirement imposed by several of the federal
circuits that defendant submit to such psychiatric examination when asserting insanity defense).
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the defendant committed the charged crime. Such use would violate
either the fifth amendment, 156 the due process clause,1 -7 or both.15 8 The
same courts also have held that the prosecution violates the defendant's
rights when it uses the evidence to establish factual guilt whether or not
the defendant was compelled to submit to the mental examination.
159
156. Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1416 (6th Cir.) (admitting defendant's inculpatory
statements during psychiatric examination to prove factual guilt "would make the privilege against
self-incrimination illusory"), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983); Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75,
78-81 (4th Cir.) (fifth amendment prohibits use of incriminating statements made during a
psychiatric examination to prove factual guilt whether defendant or prosecutor requested the
examination and whether conducted for the purpose of determining competency or sanity), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 996 (1978); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1971) (use of
testimony from compelled examination to prove guilt improper (apparently) under fifth
amendment).
157. Collins v. Auger, 428 F. Supp. 1079, 1082-83 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (due process prohibits the
use of defendant's statements to psychiatrist as part of prosecution's case to establish guilt, regardless
of who requests the examination and whether it is for insanity or competency determinations), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 577 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 1133 (1979);
State v. Evans, 104 Ariz. 434, 436, 454 P.2d 976, 978 (1969) (en banc) (due process prohibits use to
establish guilt); People v. Finn, 64 A.D.2d 526, 526, 406 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (1978) (due process
prohibits use of defendant's statements to establish guilt, whoever requests the examination).
158. State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d 668, 673-74 (Iowa) (fifth amendment and due process violated
by state use of defendant's statements to his own psychologist on issue of guilt, but harmless given
the overwhelming state case on this issue), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
159. Gibson v. Zahradnick, Collins v. Auger, State v. Craney, People v. Finn. See supra notes
156-58.
The Supreme Court might well hold that these and other cases are wrongly decided on the fifth
amendment issue where the defendant is subjected to no external compulsion to undergo the
examination. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) may even be read to suggest disagreement with
the rationale of these cases. In that case the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit because Smith had not
been warned of his Miranda rights and "did not voluntarily consent to the pretrial psychiatric
examination after being informed of his right to remain silent and the possible use of his statements
.... " 451 U.S. at 468. This description of the violation suggests that if he had voluntarily consented
to the examination in order to obtain the benefits of the insanity defense, Smith would have had no
fifth amendment protection. See Collins v. Auger, 428 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (S.D. Iowa 1977) ("If
the giving of a Miranda warning ... made the defendant's [statements] admissible, the defendant
would be placed in a situation where he must sacrifice one Constitutional right to claim another."),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 577 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133
(1979). The more reasonable reading of Smith, however, is consistent with these cases. Under this
interpretation, the Supreme Court approves a required psychiatric examination by the prosecution if
the defendant raises an insanity defense, Smith, 451 U.S. at 465, while recoguizing a type of limited
use immunity when the defendant's refusal to waive his fifth amendment rights would thwart a
legitimate state interest. Id. at 468.
Even if the Court disagreed with Gibson, Collins, Craney, and Finn, the resolution of the fifth
amendment issue in the insanity area would not necessarily mean that the defendant could be
required generally to forfeit either his fifth amendment protection or his right to offer testimony. A
defendant has no constitutional right to raise an insanity defense if his mens rea is proven. Cf
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1977) (burden of proof on insanity may be placed on
defendant); Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d 561, 562-63 (Del.) (state may require defendant to prove
mental illness by preponderance of evidence), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 (1976); Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 789-99 (1952) (state may require defendant to prove insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt). The state would logically have somewhat more latitude in imposing conditions
upon the exercise of that "optional" defense than it would have on the right of a defendant to testify
and to introduce evidence.
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In summary, in the insanity context, as with the hypothetical rule,
the defendant "voluntarily" provides incriminating testimony in order to
raise his defense. In spite of Williams, however, under accepted doctrine
the state violates the fifth amendment (even absent formal compulsion) if
it uses the incriminating information to prove facts other than sanity.
Courts' treatment of the constitutionality of discovery under the insanity
defense suggests that fifth amendment analysis of discovery rules as well
requires more than the narrow focus on compulsion employed in Wil-
liams, and that a broad reading of that holding is unjustified. The
insanity cases suggest that it is the use of the pretrial disclosures, rather
than their "voluntariness," that is crucial to the determination of the
constitutionality of discovery rules.
Other concerns must also be addressed to complete the analysis of
doctrines applicable to prosecutorial discovery. The next hypothetical
concentrates on another of these issues-the testimonial quality of dis-
covery disclosures.
. Hypothetical Case Two: Typical Discovery Rules with
Uncertainty Eliminated
For this analysis, assume the state requires the defendant person-
ally 160 to give notice of any defense he intends to use at trial together
with the names and addresses of supporting witnesses, under threat of
preclusion of all defenses and all witnesses, including his own testimony,
not disclosed. In this hypothetical, like the first, the defendant has full
knowledge of all consequences of his choice to provide discovery. While
appearing to change the nature of the problem dramatically, these modi-
fications of the hypothetical only change the major issues if the defend-
ant's response to the discovery request were considered not
"testimonial." But, as will be demonstrated, the disclosures required
under this hypothetical retain the essential testimonial quality of a
deposition.
160. In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, for instance, an alibi notice must be signed by the
defendant. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(1)(A); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 100. Other states permit either the
defendant or counsel to sign the notice. See, e.g., ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.2(b); PA. R. CRiM. P.
305(C)(1)(a).
As a general rule of evidence, statements by counsel, as agent of the defendant, constitute
evidentiary admissions by the defendant. As a result, counsel's response to a discovery rule may
often be used as a statement by the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30-
31 (2d Cir. 1984) (opening statement of counsel at prior trial inconsistent with subsequent opening
statement constitutes admission that government may introduce to show consciousness of guilt);
State v. Dault, 19 Wash. App. 709, 717-18, 578 P.2d 43, 48 (1978) (statements by attorney
concerning nature of defense at pretrial hearing in presence of defendant were within scope of
attorney's duties and therefore constituted admission); accord State v. Howell, 56 Or. App. 6, 11, 641
P.2d 37, 39 (1982) (pretrial defense disclosure signed by defense counsel may be used to impeach
defendant's testimony at trial).
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1. Testimonial Aspects of Discovery
The defendant's response under this rule constitutes testimonial dis-
closure16 1 under two different theories. First, the response is testimonial
if the state exploits its communicative content and uses it directly in evi-
dence or derivatively to develop other evidence. Second, it may be testi-
monial if, under the "production doctrine" of Fisher v. United States,62
the defendant provides information in his response of which the state was
ignorant.
Under the first theory, the testimonial nature of the response
depends upon the state's intended use of the defendant's disclosures. 163
For example, the state may use the required disclosures as an admission
or as an inconsistent statement. Some states presently permit such use
with a withdrawn alibi notice. The state may also use the disclosures
derivatively to develop other admissible evidence that will aid it in con-
victing the defendant. When the state uses discovery for what it conveys
about historical fact,'" no principled distinction exists between explicit
statements of the defendant and discovery disclosures of his defenses and
witnesses.
Under the second theory, if the state uses discovery to learn about
161. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the
privilege against self-incrimination "protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against
himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature."
While the Court itself did not explain how testimonial conduct differs from conduct constituting
"real or physical evidence," the most widely accepted definition of testimonial conduct is "any
activity performed for the purpose of communicating." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 124 at 302
(E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
162. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
163. In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the state argued that the defendant's statements
during a psychiatric interview were real evidence. The Court rejected the argument because at trial
the state had relied upon "the substance of [the defendant's] disclosures." Id. at 465. Where the
state uses the disclosure in a way that relies upon the defendant's "moral responsibility for
truthtelling," the testimonial requirement has been satisfied. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 at
379 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis in original); see also 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 256 at 106-07 (1982); cf. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411 (testimonial requirement not
satisfied where government does not rely on defendant's "truthtelling").
164. In Williams, Justice White wrote, "It might also be argued that the 'testimonial'
disclosures protected by the Fifth Amendment include only statements relating to the historical facts
of the crime, not statements relating solely to what a defendant proposes to do at trial." Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 n.17 (1970). His argument can best be understood by separating the
backward-looking historical discovery information from forward-looking trial conduct information.
Justice White's construction of the concept of testimonial conduct is too restrictive, however.
In terms of the defendant's intention to communicate information, a statement relating to trial
conduct is clearly testimonial; in terms of prosecutorial use, the disclosure enables a narrowing of the
prosecution's case to focus on the proffered defense. Thus, even the totally forward-looking aspect of
the disclosure is testimonial. See supra note 81.
Nonetheless, statements of anticipated trial conduct may not be sufficiently incriminating to
implicate the fifth amendment. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.4 at 520
(1984); Columbia Note, supra note 110, at 699 n.146.
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facts of which it would otherwise be ignorant, the disclosure is testimo-
nial under Fisher's production doctrine.16 In Fisher, the Court identified
three implicit communications that may result from a response to a
demand for information: (1) a concession that the document demanded
exists; (2) an acknowledgment of possession or control of it; and (3) an
implicit authentication of the document.166 This discussion will focus on
the first of these three communications since it is generally the only one
at issue in the discovery context.
Under Fisher, for disclosure of preexisting information to come
within the fifth amendment, the state must be unaware of the information
that the defendant provides or of the other facts that may reasonably be
obtained from it. In Fisher, for instance, the Court found no testimonial
conduct when "[t]he existence and location of the papers (under sub-
poena] are a foregone conclusion and taxpayer adds little or nothing to
the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he in
fact has the papers . . . . 'The question is not of testimony but of
surrender.' "167
In other situations, however, the defendant's statement will be testi-
monial under Fisher. In a self-defense case, for instance, both of the fol-
165. See People ex rel Bowman v. Woodward, 63 Ill. 2d 382, 349 N.E.2d 57, 60 (1976);
Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 11-
40 (1987) (analyzing testimonial and incriminating aspects of the act of producing documents and
impact of foregone conclusion concept).
166. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
167. Id. at 411 (quoting In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911)).
By contrast, in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the court of appeals found that the
government did not know whether the documents subpoenaed existed, but rather drew "'broad.
sweeping subpoenas ... to compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring the [defendant] to
become, in effect, the primary informant against himself.'" Id. at 613 n.12 (quoting Matter of
Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 335 (3d Cir. 1982)). Thus, under the facts
of Doe, a response to the subpoena would be sufficiently testimonial to invoke the protections of the
fifth amendment, as distinguished from Fisher where it had "only minimal testimonial value." Id, at
613; see also United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983).
In Doe, the Court ruled that the act of production could be immunized and that immunity need
not extend to the contents of the document: "[Tihe privilege in this case extends only to the act of
production. Therefore, any grant of use immunity need only protect respondent from the self-
incrimination that might accompany the act of producing his business records." 465 U.S. at 617
n.17.
Because of the limited nature of the defendant's "testimonial" act under the "production"
theory, the state may call a witness (other than the defendant) who it learns through "legitimate"
sources has relevant knowledge. In United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), the Court held
that a defense witness could be compelled under court order to provide information previously
obtained from a government witness. The Court relied on the fact that the fifth amendment privilege
is personal to the defendant and that the disclosures were required of, and compulsion was directed
toward, a defense witness. Id. at 234. Furthermore, the defense in Nobles had voluntarily disclosed
both the existence of the witness and the document in question. Thus, the prosecution was not
requiring the defendant to disclose the existence of incriminating facts of which the prosecution was
ignorant. Once the defendant voluntarily made the disclosure, his witness could be compelled to
produce the item at issue.
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lowing types of disclosures are testimonial for purposes of the fifth
amendment: (1) a defendant's statement in which he says that he com-
mitted the killing but did so in response to an attack by the decedent; and
(2) a notification by the defendant that he will claim self-defense and that
he will rely upon a witness whom he identifies and locates for the state,
accompanied by the witness's statement reciting that the defendant killed
the decedent in response to an attack.
168
Typical discovery rules, then, can and do elicit "testimonial"
responses from the defendant. In my hypothetical, where the defendant's
uncertainty has been eliminated, the responses will be incriminating as
well; that is, the defendant knows not only that his response will inform
the prosecution of facts of which it was ignorant but also that these facts
will be used by the state to establish his guilt. This hypothetical illus-
trates the fact that where a class of information is not covered by the fifth
amendment, the reason it is excluded is not because it fails to satisfy the
testimonial requirement but because the disclosure is insufficiently harm-
ful to the defendant.
A number of specific types of discovery requirements might be man-
dated under the hypothetical rules.
2. Discovery of the Nature of the Defense
Some states require only that the defendant specify his defense. As
we have seen, specifying the nature of the defense is testimonial. If the
state will use the discovery response itself as a piece of evidence in its
case-in-chief,16 9 as we have assumed in this hypothetical, then, that use
violates the fifth amendment just as the use of the deposition would in the
first hypothetical.
On the other hand, if the state prohibits direct use of the defendant's
discovery response, such a limited disclosure would rarely be sufficiently
incriminating to violate the fifth amendment. Though helpful to the
prosecution by narrowing the focus of its proof, the disclosure does not
violate the privilege against self-incrimination because it provides inade-
quate information for the state to exploit.
1 70
168. The fifth amendment threat in the second example results almost exclusively from
derivative use of the information to incriminate the defendant; information in the first example may
be used either directly or derivatively against the defendant. The distinction has no impact on the
resolution of the testimonial issue, however.
169. In a homicide or assault case, for example, the state could use the notice of self-defense as
an admission by the defendant proving his identity as the person who inflicted the injury.
170. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 164, § 19.4 at 520; Van Kessel, supra note 72, at
888-89. But cf Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 526 n.4, 557 P.2d 65, 68 n.4, 134 Cal. Rptr.
774, 777 n.4 (1976).
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3. Discovery of Witness Names and Addresses
Once discovery goes beyond disclosure of the general nature of the
defense to specification of the names and addresses of witnesses, the crit-
ical demarcation line is crossed whether or not the domestic evidentiary
law or discovery rule permits direct use of the discovery response as a
statement. Specification of the nature of the defense, together with the
witnesses who will support it, is sufficient to incriminate. The nature of
the defense alerts the government to defendant's basic construction of
historical events, and the names and addresses of defense witnesses gives
the state sufficient information to develop usable evidence from the
defendant's communication.
4. Discovery of Witness Statements
Requiring the defendant to provide witness statements adds specific-
ity to his construction of historical fact, but would rarely make an other-
wise innocent disclosure incriminating. Without witness statements,
disclosure of the nature of defense and witness identity would typically
provide the prosecutor with sufficient information to develop whatever
incriminating information was available. Thus, whether the rule violates
the fifth amendment does not depend upon its requirement of witness
statements;1 71 rather, it turns on whether the defense specified or the wit-
ness revealed might realistically incriminate the defendant. 172
In sum, the rules examined in this hypothetical are frequently
unconstitutional, and while more realistic in form than those examined
in the first, violate the fifth amendment for the same reasons applicable to
171. The statement itself would not be usable under any generally accepted principle of
evidence, either directly to prove guilt or to impeach the defendant's own testimony. The defendant
could not be considered to have adopted the witness's version of events simply by providing his
statement. If, however, the domestic evidentiary law were to consider that the defendant adopts the
truth of the witness statements by providing them to the state, then turning over the statements
would pose substantial incrimination problems; however, no state permits such use. But cf United
States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 937 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (by authorizing agent to present sworn
statement to magistrate, government adopted testimony of agent).
172. In Richardson v. District Court, 632 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1981) (en bane), the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the state's discovery rule, which required the defendant to reveal both the
nature of his defense and his witnesses, did not permit the prosecution to obtain witness statements.
The court noted the absence of any specific provision covering witness statements in the rules and
suggested constitutional foundations as well for the restriction:
The exclusion of non-expert witnesses' statements from prosecutorial discovery, far from
being an oversight, reflects a purposeful decision to prevent the impairment of
constitutional rights that arguably could result from a rule permitting the court to enlarge
the categories of prosecutorial discovery on the basis of an ad hoc evaluation of each case.
Id at 599. The court did not explain how providing witness statements qualitatively adds to the
threat to constitutional rights otherwise posed by the requirement that the defendant disclose his
defense and supporting witnesses.
Though its concern for potential violation of the fifth amendment is a valid one, the Colorado
court's analysis of the point at which the violation occurs is misguided.
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the pretrial deposition considered earlier. In both hypotheticals, the
defendant is required to make testimonial statements that he knows the
state may use to incriminate him as a condition of his right to present his
defense.
In both of these hypotheticals I assume a critical fact that would not
be present in the typical discovery situation: the defendant is fully aware
that his disclosures can be and will be used to strengthen the state's case
against him. As a result, the prejudice to the defendant from the opera-
tion of the rule is readily apparent.
Thus, these hypotheticals do not deal with the constitutionality of
rules, such as the rule at issue in Williams, that require advance specifica-
tion of the defenses in situations in which the defendant is uncertain as to
the effect his disclosure will have. In the following hypothetical, I will
examine the scope of the Court's approval of the rule at issue in Williams
by reintroducing the complicating factor of uncertainty.
C. Hypothetical Case Three: Typical Discovery Requirements with
Uncertainty Present
The constitutionality of most discovery rules is difficult to analyze
precisely because they generally include the complication of uncertainty.
Here, as before, the state requires the defendant personally to give notice
of any defense he intends to present along with the names and addresses
of any witnesses he would call and threatens exclusion if notice is not
provided. But the defendant in this hypothetical does not have full
knowledge of the consequences of his choice.
The typical discovery situation contains uncertainty on a number of
issues. First, the defendant may be uncertain both of the strength of the
case the state will present against him173 and of the necessity or impor-
tance of his testimony. Second, he may be unsure how incriminating his
testimony will prove to be.174 Third, a reviewing court will face uncer-
tainty over the true impact of discovery upon the conduct and motiva-
tions of the defendant. 175
Assuredly, the pressures flowing from the defendant's uncertainty
concerning the strength of the state's case against him reach constitu-
173. The defendant may be uncertain for either of two reasons. First, he may have incomplete
discovery of the state's evidence. Second, even with complete discovery the defendant might remain
uncertain because the strength of the case actually presented often varies substantially from the
potential evidence available. See infra note 180.
174. At least three subsidiary issues are involved here: (1) Will his disclosure be useful to the
state's case? (2) Will the state recognize or develop the incriminating value of the disclosure? (3)
Will the state choose to use the incriminating information, assuming it recognizes its potential?
175. The court's uncertainty remains whether or not the defendant testifies: How much did the
fear of incrimination motivate the defendant not to testify? Or, to what extent did the fear of the
preclusion penalty cause him to divulge the requested information?
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tional dimensions. The Supreme Court made this clear with its analysis
of the practice at issue in Brooks v. Tennessee.176 In Brooks, the state
required the defendant to testify as the first witness if he was to testify at
all. The rule attempted to prevent the criminal defendant, who has the
constitutional right to be present throughout the trial, from tailoring his
testimony to match that of other defense witnesses whose testimony he
could otherwise hear before taking the stand. 177 The Court observed that
uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of his other witnesses may have
legitimately motivated the defendant to exercise his right to remain silent
until their value had been "realistically assessed." 178 As a result of exer-
cising that right to remain silent, however, his testimony was barred from
the case. The Court held that burden to be impermissible.179 Brooks
thus could be read to mean that where the defendant's uncertainty legiti-
mately encourages the defendant to delay a decision on whether to waive
his right against self-incrimination, the state may not penalize that delay
by barring his testimony.
In my hypothetical, the pressures created by the unknown are sub-
stantially more powerful than in Brooks because the defendant faces far
greater uncertainty. First, unless the state's discovery rules permit total
disclosure of its evidence, he will not know the state's potential case.
Second, he will not have had the opportunity as the defendant in Brooks
had to view that potential case as actually presented in the courtroom. 80
Third, he will not know what, if any, use the state will make of his
response to the discovery rule-whether it will use his disclosures at all
or will use them directly or derivatively to develop other incriminating
information.
The defendant here is also faced with more complicated decisions
than the single issue facing the defendant in Brooks. These separate, yet
interrelated, decisions might well exacerbate the effect of uncertainty.
For example, the trial judge has not yet ruled on the sufficiency of the
state's case. Assuming the motion for a judgment of acquittal is denied,
the defendant has not had a chance to make the strategic decision
176. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
177. Id. at 607.
178. Id. at 610.
179. Id. at 610-12.
180. As Justice Black observed in his dissent in Williams, the potential prosecution case and
that which is actually presented in the courtroom may vary greatly. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 109 (1970).
Where the potential for incrimination from the disclosure is not immediately apparent, the
defendant will face the additional uncertainty of whether the state will recognize the incriminating
value of his disclosure and use it against him. Whether such uncertainty increases pressures under
the fifth amendment is unclear. In the pretrial setting, the defendant may assume a "worst case"
scenario with the result that the pressures are increased. Alternatively, he may optimistically
assume the state will remain ignorant of the incriminating potential and so lessen the pressure.
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whether to present no defense and challenge the denial of his motion to
acquit on appeal or, more likely, to rest and argue the case to the jury on
the basis of the state's failure to meet its heavy burden of establishing
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A decision to provide the required
notice could harm his chances of success at each of these points.
Facing such uncertainty, a defendant may make the reasonable deci-
sion to follow a conservative strategy and not provide the discovery.181
Or he may choose to provide the discovery out of fear of the preclusion
sanction.1 82 Does Brooks then mean that any discovery rule permitting
use of the defendant's disclosures in the prosecutor's case-in-chief is
unconstitutional because the defendant's decision to testify or remain
silent is not "the unfettered exercise of his own will"? 83 Clearly not; as
we saw earlier,18 4 not all procedural rules that create additional pressures
on the defendant's decision to exercise his fifth amendment right are
unconstitutional. Rather, the constitutionality of the hypothetical rule
turns on the extent to which the policies underlying the right are
impaired, as balanced against the legitimacy of the state's interest in the
rule.
L Impact of Procedural Issues: The Character of the Defendant's
Response
a. Defendant Provides Discovery
The facts of Williams provide a good reference point for examining
the procedural issues presented by this hypothetical rule.185 There, peti-
181. At least as a theoretical matter, the government's "heavy" burden should counsel silence-
unless the defendant is confident that the state has established its case sufficiently. See Note, supra
note 72, at 1007-08.
182. Either result may violate the fifth amendment. In Brooks, the Court held that where the
defendant failed to testify first, preclusion of his testimony constituted an unconstitutional penalty
upon the exercise of his right not to take the stand. 406 U.S. at 610-11. It concluded that his rights
would also have been violated had he taken the stand to avoid the preclusion penalty. Id. at 611-12;
see also supra note 91.
183. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). In Brooks; the Court quoted this language and
relied upon it when concluding that the Tennessee statute violated the defendant's fifth amendment
rights. 406 U.S. at 610-11.
184. See supra notes 155-70 and accompanying text.
185. The facts of Williams also illustrate the limited procedural opportunities for challenging
discovery when there is no compulsion in its pristine form. When the defendant faces an immediate
external penalty for remaining silent, he may enforce his fifth amendment rights by refusing to
provide the testimony and challenging the penalty exacted against him. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804 (1977) (when defendant refused to comply with statute that
required him to testify to grand jury or be disqualified from holding public office, his automatic
disqualification permitted him to sue to enjoin enforcement of statute). In contrast, a defendant in
the discovery context faces no sanction outside the upcoming criminal trial. Thus, he has no
separate vehicle with which to litigate his constitutional claim.
Moreover, pretrial interlocutory appeals, which are limited even in civil litigation, are even
more restricted in most criminal cases. 3 W. LAFAvE & 3. ISRAEL, supra note 164, § 26.2(b). The
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tioner admitted freely from the beginning of the case that he intended to
use an alibi defense. t86  He did not protest the requirement that he
divulge the nature of his defense." 7 Second, he made no claim that the
state utilized that notice either directly or derivatively in its case-in-chief.
Third, because he complied with the notice once his motion for a protec-
tive order was denied, a record was available that demonstrated that the
state did not use the notice against him."' Finally, Williams raised no
claim that he experienced any reasonable fear that the state would use his
notice against him, and the record showed no reasonable basis for such
fear. Accordingly, the Court was correct that Williams's response to the
alibi notice rule was not compelled; Williams failed to demonstrate that
the rule had any adverse impact on the exercise of his fifth amendment
rights.
The question remains, however, whether the result would have been
different had the defendant raised his fifth amendment objection in a dif-
ferent procedural context. Two factors may have been crucial to the
Court's holding in Williams. Perhaps the petitioner has the burden of
demonstrating prosecutorial misuse of his disclosure. If so, Williams
failed to meet his burden of proof. Alternatively, the pivotal fact may
absence of a separate penalty together with the restriction on pretrial appeal of discovery rulings
force the defendant to challenge a discovery ruling as part of his overall appeal. He must proceed to
trial and if convicted, challenge the state's use of the information, when he complies with the
discovery rule, or challenge the preclusion of his testimony, when he declines to do so.
The absence of a separate appellate remedy may be largely responsible for the relative lack of
constitutional challenges to discovery requirements. Defendants probably remain entirely silent
about a potentially damaging defense when the defense, though not frivolous, is of marginal utility,
and when the state could effectively use the information provided in its case-in-chief. Substantially
incriminating information may simply be too dangerous to reveal when the defendant is not assured
that it cannot be used to convict him.
186. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 79, 84 n.15 (1970).
187. Id. at 84 n.15.
188. The path chosen by Williams has a number of advantages for the efficient administration of
justice. First, when the defendant provides the required notice, his ability to manufacture bogus
issues is severely limited. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 42 (1984); New Jersey v. Portash,
440 U.S. 450, 462 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). By contrast, if he can raise the issue without
providing disclosure, a defendant can claim that he was deterred from presenting a defense, when in
fact he had no desire to introduce any evidence. The Court observed in Luce that a defendant's
guarantee to testify if granted relief "is virtually risk free because of the difficulty of enforcing it,"
469 U.S. at 43, and expressed the view that "an accused's decision whether to testify 'seldom turns
on the resolution of one factor.'" Id. at 42 (quoting Justice Blackmun's dissent in Portash, 440 U.S.
at 467). Unfortunately, it is practically impossible to distinguish defendants with manufactured
claims from others with legitimate desires to testify who are in fact deterred from doing so by a
reasonable fear of incrimination.
Second, if actually given, the court can observe some of the actual consequences of providing
the notice, rather than being forced to speculate. Finally, providing notice and proceeding to trial
also assures the court that harm is real rather than a sincere but inaccurate anticipation. By
contrast, courts will often have difficulty determining precisely when a claimed fear of incrimination
is reasonable since generally a defendant may not be required fully to specify the reason he fears
incrimination. See infra notes 190 & 195.
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have been that Williams's response was neither used to incriminate him,
nor had such potential. Since Williams provided discovery and alleged
no reasonable fear of specific incrimination, it is difficult to determine
which of these factors the Court found decisive.
b. Defendant Declines to Provide Discovery Under Claim of Self-
Incrimination
Assume that Williams makes a different response to the notice of
alibi rule. After his request for a protective order is denied, rather than
supplying discovery, he argues that the notice is potentially incriminating
because his alibi witnesses might provide evidence or leads that could
incriminate him in this and other crimes.189 He declines to be more spe-
cific, arguing that the law does not require him to prove his guilt in order
to assert the privilege.19 He further contends that he is faced with
uncertainty pressures. He argues that he will not know until the close of
the state's evidence whether it can establish a prima facie case or
whether its case is so weak that he should present no evidence and argue
to the jury that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt. He asserts that
he ultimately may want to present an alibi defense but that the rule
improperly burdens his right to remain silent until he can effectively
assess the situation by requiring that he provide discovery before trial or
lose his right to present a defense.
Further assume that after the trial court denies the motion for a
protective order, the government presents a case that withstands spirited
attack by defense counsel, and the court denies a motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the state's case. The defendant now asks to be
allowed to present his alibi defense because, having seen the govern-
ment's case, he realizes that he must run the risk of incrimination
through the alibi witnesses in order to avoid conviction. The trial court
responds that his case is exactly like hundreds arising in the state yearly
and that to grant relief from the rule on this showing would be to destroy
the notice of alibi rule. Accordingly, the court denies Williams's request
to present his alibi and precludes both his testimony and that of any alibi
witnesses.191
189. This argument is generally based on Justice Black's dissent in Williams. 399 U.S. at 110.
190. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 50 (1968); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,
486 (1951); see also infra note 195.
191. In spite of the greater efficiency of requiring the defendant to provide discovery before
raising fifth amendment challenges, see supra note 188, courts have traditionally permitted a
defendant to litigate his claim without first complying with the rule at issue. He may instead refuse
to provide the potentially incriminating disclosure on the ground that it may be used by the state to
incriminate him. See Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 246 (1966) ("A witness has . . . a
constitutional right to stand on the privilege against self-incrimination until it has been fairly
demonstrated to him that an immunity, as broad in scope as the privilege it replaces, is available and
applicable to him."); see also Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 473 (1975) (White, J., concurring in
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Despite very little change in the substantive facts, this case begins to
look substantially different from the Williams case. Now it strongly
resembles Brooks-suggesting, perhaps, a different outcome from Wil-
liams. The result would not be different, however. Applying the analy-
ses of these two cases to the hypothetical explains both why the Court
would not reverse here and when the Brooks rationale will require hold-
ing a discovery rule unconstitutional.
The major distinction between the hypothetical and Brooks is that
the statute in Brooks required that the defendant incriminate himself
within the meaning of the fifth amendment or forfeit his right to testify;
in contrast, the hypothetical rule requires no such incrimination. A
criminal defendant has the absolute right under the fifth amendment not
to be called to the stand in a criminal case.19 Requiring him to testify
violates this constitutional provision, regardless of the tenor of his testi-
mony. The Court held that Brooks could not be compelled by the pres-
the result). But cf Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1984) (states may permit claim on basis
of anticipated harm since it satisfies "case or controversy" requirement but apparently need not do
so).
When compulsion is present in a pristine form, the defendant may litigate the validity of his
fifth amendment claim while refusing to provide the required statement. If the defendant is not
given adequate assurances of immunity, his rights are violated at the moment he is compelled to
answer, regardless of how the state may later use his testimony. See supra note 91. If immunity is
given, however, it not only prevents the government from improperly using his statements, it
eliminates any violation by granting protection as broad as the privilege. Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972).
Under the second compulsion model operating in the hypothetical, the violation of
constitutional rights turns on the use the state makes of the statement, rather than the impropriety of
confronting the defendant with certain choices. As a result, the state should not be required to
permit litigation of a claim based on the anticipation of improper use of the statement. Rather, the
state could require the defendant to provide discovery and proceed to trial before raising the claim,
since a constitutional violation would occur only if the prosecution improperly used the statement.
Under such a procedure, however, the protections afforded the defendant - including the risk
of persuasion regarding improper use of the information - must be as effective as those under use
immunity. The Court has held that where the nature of the statement raises a reasonable fear that
the state may use it to incriminate the defendant, it is a sufficient remedy to impose upon the
government "the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
Unless such a burden is placed on the government, the danger of undetected prosecutorial derivative
use would not be curtailed. The defendant's fear of incrimination from disclosure would remain
valid. In the typical discovery situation, no apparent justification exists for shifting the burden of
demonstrating misuse by the prosecution to the defendant. Indeed, any such shift strikes directly at
the substance of the defendant's constitutional right.
192. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2268(2) at 406 & n.6 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (universally
held that the criminal defendant cannot even be called to the stand to be sworn); MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 130 at 315 (E. Cleary ed. 1984); Patty v. Bordenkircher, 603 F.2d 587, 588 (6th Cir.
1979) ("We do not remember or find any cases where the prosecution has called a criminal
defendant to the stand.... The general acquiescence of lawyers in a custom to the contrary suggests
that Professor Wigmore's observations on this subject are correct . )..."); United States v. Echeles,
352 F.2d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 1965) (" 'universally held' interpretation of this right prohibit[s] any
person who is on trial for a crime from being called to the witness stand" (citing WIGMORE and
MCCORMICK)).
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sures of uncertainty to incriminate himself in this way or suffer a penalty
for asserting his right to remain silent.
Outside of the criminal trial courtroom, the rights of the accused are
different, however. For instance, he can be required to give a statement if
he is protected against its direct or derivative use in a criminal case. 193
Thus, while a defendant's uncertainty may be as great and the penalty for
declining to provide a discovery statement the same, requiring his state-
ment outside the criminal trial does not automatically violate the fifth
amendment. Analyzed in this fashion, the results in Williams and
Brooks are consistent under the fifth amendment. The rule in Brooks
required the defendant to incriminate himself within the meaning of the
fifth amendment or forfeit his right to testify; Williams required him to
provide information that did not threaten incrimination and that the
prosecution, in fact, did not use to establish its case.194
193. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See also S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, Grand
Jury Law and Practice § 6.14, at 78 (1986) (while fifth amendment prohibits calling defendant at
trial, majority view is that he may be called at grand jury and must invoke privilege to incriminating
questions); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 179 n.8 ("There is no constitutional prohibition
against summoning potential defendants to testify before a grand jury."); United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 189 (1977) (status as potential defendant "neither enlarges nor
diminishes the constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination" when called to appear
and answer questions before grand jury); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1973) ("The
obligation to appear is no different for person who may himself be subject of the grand jury inquiry";
he may be required to provide nontestimonial evidence).
194. See Berger, supra note 79, at 78.
Professor Westen argues that the two cases are irreconcilable. Westen, supra note 83, at 939-40.
He argues that the fifth amendment protects a defendant equally against being compelled "to make
incriminating statements" and being compelled to take the stand. Indeed, he contends, if anything,
the right to be free of compulsion to take the stand should have less protection since historically it is
"a subsequent and subordinate development" to the right not to be compelled to make incriminating
statements. He also argues that the defendant in Williams would have been under greater coercive
pressure due to the uncertainty from having less information about the government's case than did
the defendant in Brooks Id. at 954-56.
These arguments rest on the unsupported assumption that the notice of alibi rule in Williams
required production of incriminating statements. Id. at 981 n.198. This assumption is erroneous.
See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text. Thus, the correctness of the two results does not
turn on a determination of whether it is more, or less, prohibited to compel incriminating discovery
than to compel testimony. Similarly, Professor Westen may be correct that a greater uncertainty as
to the strength of the state's case places additional pressure on a defendant who faces discovery
demands than was felt by the defendant in Brooks. Nevertheless, if the discovery rule does not
threaten incrimination, the protections of the fifth amendment are not invoked.
Professor Westen argues that Brooks rests on the defendant's right to control the timing of his
testimony. Id. at 975-85. The right of the defendant to exercise such control is a traditional part of
our adversarial procedure; however, I contend that, rather than a separate right, that interest is part
of the justification for fifth amendment protections against rules that require the defendant to speak
at a time specified by the state or forfeit his right to testify later. See supra note 145. See also
Lapides, Cross-Currents in Prosecutorial Discovery: A Defense Counsel's Viewpoint, 7 U.S.F. L. REv.
217, 227-28 (1973) (also arguing that Brooks and Williams are inconsistent); Nakell, supra note 9, at
516 n.382, 500-02; cf Blumenson, supra note 33, at 148 (arguing that the two cases are consistent if
discovery is carefully confined to evidence which defendant presently intends to introduce).
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L Reasonable Fear of Incrimination: A Necessary and Sufficient
Condition of a Valid Claim. In the Williams opinion, the majority was
willing to assume that the alibi notice might prove incriminating because
it nevertheless concluded that Williams was not compelled within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. If Williams had claimed that he rea-
sonably feared incrimination through the alibi notice, he would have
raised an apparently more substantial claim of compulsion within the
meaning of the Constitution. His claim ultimately would have failed,
however, because revealing his alibi defense would not reasonably have
threatened to incriminate him.195 On that basis his case and Brooks are
distinguishable.
In Williams, petitioner gave no explanation for reasonably fearing
incrimination from providing the notice.' 6 In his dissent, Justice Black
suggested some potential dangers of incrimination: the defendant would
be required to provide the names and addresses of person who have
knowledge of him and his activities, and the state may discover new leads
and evidence from such persons.197
Others have made similar arguments.198 This type of presentation is
made in Scott v. State. 199
Although the list [of witnesses] might not appear to be incriminating
on its face, certain of the persons identified in such a list may be known
felons, perjurers, accomplices, co-defendants, or individuals under suspi-
cion or police surveillance. Moreover, the police may possess additional
195. The fifth amendment "protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes
could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used."
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added). The court, rather than the person claiming the
privilege, determines whether that fear is "reasonable." To do so the court examines the
"implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked." Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486 (1951). If these circumstances do not sufficiently demonstrate the danger, the witness
bears the burden of providing further explanation. United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 919 (2d
Cir. 1984); see also infra note 204.
196. In his brief, Williams provided only the most general argument on the incrimination issue:
While [the Fifth] Amendment ordinarily tests patently incriminating practices, the literal
mandate is "to be a witness against himself". It is this mandate which is violated because
while the alibi witness rule is only latently and by practical application incriminating, it
still requires a defendant to furnish information which the state will use to its own
advantage in an effort to convict.
Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), reprinted in 69 LANDMARK
BRIEFS 328-29.
He suggested, but only as a theoretical possibility, that compliance with the rule would
adversely affect a defendant by prematurely "locking in" a defense and intimidating defense wit-
nesses. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), reprinted in 69 LANDMARK
BRIEFS 331. Obviously, such fears did not deter Williams from providing the notice or presenting an
alibi defense; neither of those adverse effects occurred. Furthermore, Williams claimed no reason-
able fear of future harm from the notice.
197. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 110 (1970).
198. See, eg., Van Kessel, supra note 72, at 891 n.147; Wsten, supra note 83, at 981 n.198.
199. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
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incriminating information about some of the witnesses and an accused's
reference to such persons may tend to arouse suspicion about his rela-
tionship with the witness or may tend to implicate him in the criminal
activities of such witnesses.2 "°
These broad arguments that the alibi notices are incriminating go
too far.20 1 As a general matter, alibi information is not incriminating
under traditional fifth amendment principles. First, the defendant is
asserting that the witness will exculpate him by placing him elsewhere at
the time of the crime. The nature of his offer of proof, if true, suggests no
direct or derivative possibility of incrimination. Second, in the typical
case, there is no "real and appreciable" danger of incrimination.2 °2
While incrimination certainly does not have to be direct or certain, and
providing information that would "prove a significant 'link in a chain' of
evidence tending to establish his guilt '20 3 is also protected, there is little
200. Id. at 785.
201. The court's argument in Scott that the notice collaterally incriminates the defendant, by
revealing his association with others linking him to additional crimes, fails on two grounds. First,
the notice replicates exactly what will happen when he presents his defense at trial-the state will
learn of his witnesses. Since the state may at that point use the information to charge him with other
crimes, it receives no additional advantage from the notice of alibi. See L. LEVY, AGAINST THE
LAv 147-48 (1974).
Second, in Scott, the court argued that if disclosure of the names and addresses of witnesses
were required in another context, the practice's unconstitutionality would be plainly apparent: "We
doubt, for instance, whether any court would uphold a statute or rule which would require the
defendant to make such disclosure to the police at the station house." Scott, 519 P.2d at 786.
Indeed, the error of the argument in Scott can readily be seen by examining this analogy.
Assume that the police routinely ask during booking that a defendant provide the names and
addresses of his close family members, friends, and associates. The information could provide the,
same "incriminating" leads that concerned the Scott court. Is it protected by the fifth amendment?
The Supreme Court has suggested not. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the
Court defined "interrogation" under Miranda v. Arizona, 334 U.S. 436 (1966), as "any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at
301 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The majority of lower courts excludes responses to
questions about friends and associates from the protections of Miranda-even where the prosecution
explicitly uses the information to incriminate the defendant. See, eg., United States ex rel. Hines v.
LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976); Toohey v.
United States, 404 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1968); see also 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.7 at 504 (1984); cf United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 122-23 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (twenty-five minute substantive interview of defendant by FBI not typical of clerical procedure
during booking).
The courts' rationale is that such questioning does not compel because interrogation as defined
in Miranda "must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself,"
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300, and this "'questioning' does not enhance the pressure and anxiety generated
by arrest and detention." Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confession, in THE SUPREME COURT:
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1979-80 at 83, 88 (J. Choper, Y. Kamisar & L. Tribe ed. 1981).
Because it does not materially threaten incrimination, such routine questioning adds little to the
compulsion inherent in custodial situations.
202. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896).
203. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968) (footnotes omitted); see also supra notes
190 & 195.
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reason to suppose that the dangers present here constitute such a link
within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
Two examples of possible alibis test the limits of the argument that
an alibi response is not incriminating. For the first, assume that the
crime occurred in the defendant's apartment building and that his alibi
would put him in the building but in another apartment within that
building. The alibi exculpates in that it places him in another place at
the moment of the crime, but it has a tendency to incriminate-to pro-
vide a "link in the chain" of evidence by proving that he was nearby.
That atypical alibi will warrant fifth amendment protection; its facts
have a tendency to prove guilt. This specific conclusion does not mean,
however, that all alibis are protected. In this special situation, the
defendant can demonstrate the substantiality of the danger of incrimina-
tion by in camera proffer.2" The fact that some alibis are sufficiently
incriminating neither privileges all alibis nor relieves a defendant with a
legitimate claim from complying with traditional requirements of ade-
quately demonstrating that danger.
For the second test, assume that the alibi is false and that the
defendant directly procured this false testimony. Revealing the identity
of the witness may result in the prosecution's learning of the defendant's
actions. Such information would then be admissible in the prosecution's
case-in-chief as "consciousness of guilt."2 5 Certainly that is incriminat-
ing, but it is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.
At the core of the policies behind the fifth amendment is protection
against the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt. '20 6
That the defendant may not be forced to lie rather than incriminate him-
self does not mean that he is free to choose to lie instead of remaining
silent.20 7 Another way to explain this result is that when a defendant is
asked to show why his alibi response may incriminate him, it is not an
acceptable response to say "because the government may learn that I am
lying about my alibi and use the fact of the lie against me." The law is
204. See, e.g., Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 470 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 17
(1985); United States v. Edgerton, 734 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Goodwin, 625
F.2d 693, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980); United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1940).
See also supra note 195.
205. A similar hypothetical is suggested by Van Kessel, supra note 72, at 891 n.147.
206. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
207. In United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 82-83 (1969), the Supreme Court acknowledged
that Knox, a professional gambler, could not have been properly compelled by the Internal Revenue
Service to file a truthful tax return because such a response would have incriminated him. He could
have either refused to file any return and raised a fifth amendment defense to the prosecution or
responded truthfully and challenged the admission of that evidence on the ground that his response
was compelled in violation of the fifth amendment. He could not, however, perjure himself and then
raise the fifth amendment as a defense. That choice did not constitute testimonial compulsion.
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well settled that the fifth amendment does not protect a witness against
being compelled to testify when the only possible incrimination he can
identify is that his responses will be perjurious. Indeed, immunity offered
to witnesses explicitly notifies the witness that he may be prosecuted for
perjury in spite of the immunity.20 8
In sum, discovery of the alibi defense is justified by the absence of a
reasonable prospect of incrimination in the typical case. The justification
for permitting prosecutorial discovery of the alibi defense thus derives
from a very different basis from discovery of the insanity defense. With
respect to the insanity defense, discovery rests on extraordinary, well-
founded arguments of practical necessity and fundamental litigative fair-
ness. While the state's interest in avoiding surprise from an alibi defense,
which can easily be fabricated and presented at the "eleventh hour," is
"both obvious and legitimate, '2 9 such justification hardly rises to the
critical level of need to discover the insanity defense. Rather, notice of
alibi rules are justified because there is no reasonable likelihood of
incrimination; thus, discovery does not violate the fifth amendment.210
Thus far, I have discussed in detail only discovery rules requiring
disclosure of insanity and alibi defenses-rules which, for very different
reasons, are constitutional under the fifth amendment. Yet neither of the
justifications supporting these rules applies to other discovery rules
requiring the disclosure of potentially incriminating information. 211 The
question remains, then, whether such rules are necessarily invalid or
208. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 126-32 (1980); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S.
174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1976) (plurality opinion); Glickstein
v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1911).
209. Williams, 399 U.S. at 81.
210. The federal discovery rules for the alibi and insanity defenses reflect this basic difference.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1, covering the alibi defense, makes no provision for use immunity of the
information derived. Rule 12.2(c), pertaining to insanity, prohibits use of the information obtained
except on the issue of insanity, see supra note 148; the Advisory Committee Note bases the
restriction on constitutional grounds. 97 F.R.D. 294, 296 (1983). The 1978 ABA STANDARDS, on
the other hand, would restrict use of discovery under both defenses to rebuttal of the evidence
offered by the accused. 1978 ABA STANDARDS § 11-3.3(b).
211. These two defenses represent the extremes of the continuum on which other defenses may
be placed. In order to determine the constitutionality of their discovery, the other defenses may be
compared with the characteristics of these two defenses. The key elements are the degree to which
the defense will incriminate and the extent to which discovery is necessary for the adversary system
to operate at all.
Traditional characterizations of defenses as "affirmative" or "confession and avoidance" are not
sufficiently helpful for the analysis. The incrimination question must be answered on the basis of the
specific facts and circumstances of the individual case. Moreover, the timing of the disclosure and
the nature of government use must be carefully examined.
I believe that no defense but insanity will satisfy the analysis's necessity rationale. On the other
hand, other defenses may be like the alibi defense and, typically, present no appreciable prospect for
incrimination.
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whether they can be enforced in a manner that would meet fifth amend-
ment objections.
ii. Use Immunity-An Adequate but Impractical Solution. Discov-
ery of some defenses, such as self-defense, clearly requires an incriminat-
ing response from the defendant. Nevertheless, under the second model
of compulsion, a rule requiring such discovery is not necessarily invalid.
As shown earlier, a state may require incriminating disclosures if it can
later demonstrate that none of that information was used against the
defendant.212 Use immunity is thus a satisfactory answer to the possibil-
ity of incrimination, and rules providing such protection meet fifth
amendment objections. Constitutionality notwithstanding, that solution
is highly impracticable in the discovery area. Proving an independent
basis for prosecutorial knowledge would impose enormous administra-
tive burdens on the state and would make the overall costs of discovery
far greater than its benefits.213 The costs would be particularly high in
jurisdictions that have very broad, independent discovery as a matter of
course.
Probably the only method to assure protection against use of the
defendant's disclosures in the prosecution's case would be to seal the evi-
dence available to the state before discovery is obtained from the
defense. But this method too is impractical. The prosecution obtains dis-
covery in order to counter the defense case, and the state generally can-
not accomplish that task without comparing defense evidence with the
prosecution's version of events. Effective preparation usually requires
consultation between the prosecutor and his witnesses and investigators
concerning the evidence to be introduced by the defense. Once defense
witnesses have been questioned and the state's witnesses have been con-
sulted in response, it would be difficult to demonstrate that the state's
case is independently obtained should any of the defense evidence
incriminate.214
The difficulties of use immunity have been dealt with in the insanity
212. See supra note 191.
213. See Van Kessel, supra note 72, at 896-98.
214. Litigation on the constitutionality of Montana's discovery statute illustrates the conflict
between use of discovery for its intended purpose, aiding prosecutorial preparation, and the real
possibility of incrimination.
After unsuccessfully challenging Montana's discovery statute as facially unconstitutional, State
ex rel Sikora v. Thirteenth Judicial District, 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897 (1969), the defendant
provided notice that he intended to rely on either insanity or self-defense, or both. He was convicted
at trial and this time challenged the constitutionality of the statute collaterally in federal court.
The district court seriously considered Radford's claim that notices under insanity and self-
defense differed critically from a notice of alibi because of the possibility that the state would use
them to help prove its case. It found, however, "[a]s shown by the affidavit of the Yellowstone
County Attorney, no investigation was undertaken of the witnesses petitioner named and no
advantage was taken of petitioner's notice in presentation of the state's case-in-chief." Radford v.
Stewart, 320 F. Supp. 826, 829 (D. Mont. 1970), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1973). The district
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area. There, the government's burden of proving an independent source
for its evidence has been reduced to conform to the practicalities of the
litigation process. As a result, the defense has the burden of proving that
the government used an improper source in its case.
In United States v. Stockwell,215 the Second Circuit recently
examined the burden of proving compliance with the "use immunity"
provisions pertaining to the insanity defense under Rule 12.2 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure. Before trial, the prosecutor listened
to a tape recording of an interview between a government psychiatric
expert and the defendant. The Court of Appeals recognized that the fifth
amendment mandated that defendant's statements could be used only on
the issue of insanity.216 Nonetheless, the court rejected the defendant's
argument that, under Kastigar v. United States,217 the government must
demonstrate that "the evidence it intended to offer at trial on issues other
than sanity was based entirely on its independent investigatory efforts
and not on the information obtained in or derived from the
examination." '218
The court reached its conclusion primarily on the basis of practical
necessity. It concluded that when the defendant raises an insanity
defense he is not in the position of a witness whose testimony has been
immunized. Whereas the immunized testimony cannot be used for any
purpose, a psychiatric examination is admissible on the issue of insanity.
Furthermore, the discovery rule necessarily anticipates that the prosecu-
tor will receive the results of the examination so that she can prepare her
rebuttal. The court concluded:
Since there is nothing presumptively improper in the government's
use of the results of a psychiatric examination at trial, it would be illogi-
cal to conclude that the conducting of such an examination gives a
defendant an automatic right to a hearing in which the government must
demonstrate that it does not intend to misuse the information it has
court further found that the notices "did not provide the state with any evidence which was used
against petitioner." Id. at 831.
By completely undermining the utility of the rule, the state avoided a conflict between its
discovery rule and the fifth amendment. Pretrial discovery is to permit the prosecution time to
investigate the defense and to develop rebuttal evidence. In that respect, the prosecutor treated the
notices as if they did not exist. Under such constraint, required disclosure hardly furthers any
substantial state interest. While it may not violate the Constitution, its minimal benefits fail to
justify the threat posed by prosecutorial misuse of the rule. CC Van Kessel, supra note 72, at 894-96
(requiring disclosure of defenses after prosecution establishes prima facie case would avoid
constitutional issues but would not substantially further state interests in having sufficient time to
investigate).
215. 743 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984).
216. Id. at 125.
217. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
218. Stockwell, 743 F.2d at 126.
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obtained.2 19
Finding that the record affirmatively established only that the prosecutor
used Stockwell's statements on the insanity issue, the court required no
further showing. The government was not forced to prove that it
obtained its evidence independently.220
The result in Stockwell seems sensible, but is extraordinary nonethe-
less. It means that the defense bears the burden of proving improper use
of disclosures which are a prerequisite of raising the insanity defense.
Under Kastigar, shifting the burden is improper because immunity would
not then provide the defendant with assurances adequate to override his
fifth amendment objection. His belief that his disclosures might incrimi-
nate him would indeed be reasonable, and he would not be provided with
an adequate remedy. Kastigar means that if the defendant's original fear
of incrimination is reasonable, he cannot be required to provide discov-
ery, unless, that is, practical necessity is held to be a sufficient justifica-
tion for eliminating the protections of the fifth amendment.22'
Fifth amendment protections have thus been compromised on two
fronts in the insanity area. Courts have accepted that the need for an
insight into the defendant's mind justifies both requiring him to provide
admittedly incriminating information that the state may use to prove his
sanity and risking other uses of discovery that may aid in proving factual
guilt. In other discovery areas where necessity is not as great, however,
no similar theory justifies requiring the defendant to provide discovery
he reasonably fears will incriminate, unless he is provided protections
equivalent to use immunity.
Based on the above analysis, Williams cannot mean that the issues
of compulsion and incrimination are separate and unrelated. The first
and second hypotheticals show that when a discovery rule requires dis-
219. Id. at 127.
220. The court acknowledged that under some circumstances the government's actual trial
conduct might "raise a significant question as to whether it had improperly used information
obtained" and warrant a Kastigar-type hearing. Nonetheless, such a hearing was not required
merely by the fact that the prosecution had discovered potentially incriminating information.
Stockwell, 743 F.2d at 127. The court nevertheless encouraged the prosecution to avoid directly
monitoring psychiatric examinations and to rely instead on the psychiatrists' reports which would be
less likely to reveal factual information that might be misused. Id.
221. Under traditional analysis, the fifth amendment can be satisfied two ways. Either a
showing of a reasonable fear of incrimination must be accepted as sufficient to avoid the requirement
of providing pretrial discovery, or the state must assure the defendant of effective use immunity-
enforced in the manner specified by Kastigar. When the state does not guarantee protections
equivalent to use immunity, it cannot insist that the defendant litigate the issue by providing the
disclosure and proceeding to trial. See supra note 191. Since assuring sufficiently broad immunity is
virtually impossibile in the discovery area, the second option is not viable. Thus, where the
defendant's fear of incrimination is reasonable his fifth amendment claim is valid, and because no
alternative procedures are readily available to eliminate the reasonable fear, such a claim must be
held itself sufficient under the fifth amendment.
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closures that will incriminate the defendant, it violates the fifth amend-
ment if the state uses that information so obtained in its case-in-chief.
The third hypothetical shows that even when the prosecution does not
actually use the disclosures, preclusion of a defendant's testimony uncon-
stitutionally burdens his fifth amendment rights if the prospect of such
use produces a reasonable fear of incrimination and prompts his decision
not to provide the required discovery. Even should the defendant pro-
vide the disclosure, his response may properly be considered compelled.
Unless the state can demonstrate that it did not use the information indi-
rectly in its case-in-chief, traditional fifth amendment doctrine requires
reversal of conviction. Compulsion exists whenever a discovery rule
requires that the defendant provide incriminating information that may
be used by the state to make out its prima facie case. Compulsion thus
results either from direct use of discovery information in the prosecu-
tion's case or from the reasonable possibility that required disclosures
will incriminate in the absence of protections equivalent to use immunity.
A number of basic principles emerge from this analysis. First,
absent conscious fabrication by the defendant, a state's discovery rule
may not permit use of the required disclosure in the prosecution's case-
in-chief. Second, the rule must provide use immunity or equivalent pro-
tections. If it does so, discovery is constitutional, but without such pro-
tections, the rule is constitutionally deficient. Third, given the basic
legitimate purposes of prosecutorial discovery, which are to permit the
state to prepare rebuttal testimony and to investigate the validity of the
defendant's proposed defense, effective use immunity will be impractical
in many cases. The administrative burdens of enforcing immunity would
almost certainly bring to a halt any extensive discovery system. Fourth,
when the state's discovery requirement is based upon a sufficiently strong
foundation, as in the insanity area where only the defendant possesses the
critical data, the possibility of incidental incrimination may be justified
by practical necessity. The practical necessity rationale directly com-
promises the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, however,
and can only be justified by such a strong, indeed compelling, interest.
Finally, some defenses, such as alibi, raise no substantial likelihood of
incrimination. Discovery as to those defenses fails to violate the fifth
amendment because the danger of incrimination is insufficient, not
because discovery rules as a class fall outside the protections of the fifth
amendment.
D. Hypothetical Case Four: Discovery Deposition
Limited to Impeachment
The last hypothetical I will discuss is similar to the discovery-depo-
sition hypothetical. Assume the state enacts a discovery rule that
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requires the defendant to give a pretrial deposition if he intends to testify,
but restricts use of the deposition to impeachment of his testimony if he
takes the stand. Assume also that the rule makes the restriction against
uses other than impeachment effective by providing that the deposition
shall be taken outside the presence of the prosecutor and shall remain
sealed until the defendant takes the stand.2 2
As discussed in Part I, discovery rules involve consequences signifi-
cantly different from testimony at trial by requiring the defendant (1) to
disclose information earlier which may be critical if early disclosure per-
mits the state to make a different use of the information and (2) to make
a separate "statement., 223 This hypothetical emphasizes the statement
aspect of discovery. The distinction between pretrial disclosure and
presentation of a defense at trial does not turn upon the timing of the
disclosure or its use in the state's case-in-chief. Rather, direct use of the
disclosure as evidence, albeit only to impeach his testimony, harms the
defendant with his own testimonial act in a way that would not have
occurred if discovery had not been required.
As did the earlier hypothetical, which made the deposition available
for all purposes, this rule threatens no external compulsion. A defendant
is not punished directly, by contempt or otherwise, if he declines to pro-
vide the deposition. Any compulsion is provided solely by his desire to
present testimony and by the cost of exclusion of his testimony if he
refuses to provide the deposition before trial.
As stated earlier, the defendant's fifth amendment right is not
threatened if his statement cannot incriminate him.224 The fifth amend-
ment, therefore, is not implicated unless using the defendant's own state-
ment to impeach him constitutes self-incrimination. In New Jersey v.
Portash,2 5 the Court held that where the statement is compelled under
the "pristine" model of compulsion, the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination prohibits all testimonial uses of a defendant's state-
ments, including their use to impeach his subsequent inconsistent testi-
222. Given this effective protection against use of the deposition by the state in its case.in-chief,
the hypothetical has the essential characteristics of a discovery rule where the information sought
has no prospect of incriminating the defendant. If not incriminating, the disclosure would serve no
purpose in the government's case-in-chief.
Professor Westen maintains that a restriction against prosecutorial use of the deposition is
unnecessary to preserve the constitutionality of the hypothetical rule. Westen, supra note 83, at 958-
59. He contends that the deposition would provide an effective method for preventing a defendant
from tailoring his testimony to match that of his other witnesses without affecting the timing of his
testimony, which Westen considers the critical but unstated basis for the Court's opinion. Id. at 975-
78. In my opinion, Brooks rested on the fifth amendment basis stated by the Court, see supra notes
145 & 194, and effective protection against use of discovery in the state's case-in-chief is essential to
the rule's constitutionality.
223. See supra text accompanying note 70; see also supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
224. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
225. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
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mony.2 26 Portash, however, does not apply directly to prohibit any
impeachment use of the statement here because there is no direct, exter-
nal compulsion.227 Rather, whether the fifth amendment is violated
again turns on whether the impact of the rule impinges significantly upon
any of the policies behind the fifth amendment. The forces that will pro-
duce a response from the defendant in this situation are largely those
considered in the first hypothetical in which the disclosure could be used
by the state in its case-in-chief. The task is to determine how those forces
differ in degree and effect in this new situation.228
1. The Impact of the Rule
One possible effect of the rule is to deter a defendant from giving the
required deposition; as a consequence, he will be barred from testifying.
Alternatively, the rule may cause defendants to provide the deposition
out of fear of that very penalty should they exercise their rights to remain
silent. Starting with the first of the two potential effects of the rule, the
question remains whether the threat of impeachment use would logically
deter the defendant from giving the deposition.
Had the defendant absolute assurance that his deposition would not
226. Id. at 459-60. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966):
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to
incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination.
Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory
statements and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory." If a statement made were in
fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution.
See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.5 (1980).
Also, there may be substantial, even insuperable, difficulties in attempting to limit use of state-
ments of the defendant to impeachment. Such use has the arguably unavoidable effect of proving the
defendant's guilt where the inconsistency involves testimony establishing elements of the crime. See
Bradley, supra note 142, at 426 (prior inconsistent statements may supplement the prosecution's
case-in-chief by showing consciousness of guilt or may improperly be used substantively by the jury
when the inconsistencies concern inculpatory facts). See also Hoffman, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and Immunity Statutes: Permissible Uses of Immunized Testimony, 16 CRIM. L.
BULL. 421, 443-50 (1980).
On the other hand, impeachment use of a statement much less siguificantly affects the defend-
ant's rights than does direct use of the statement.
227. Where a defendant must choose between testifying in order to establish standing under the
fourth amendment, later facing impeachment with that testimony at trial, and remaining silent and
forgoing his fourth amendment claim, Professor LaFave argues he has been "'compelled' in the
Portash sense." Professor LaFave thus contends that impeachment with such testimony is
prohibited by the direct holding in Portash. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.2. at 243-44
(1985 Supp.).
This argument is not supported by the Court's analysis. The Court has drawn a clear distinction
between direct, external penalties in the form of contempt or economic sanctions and consequences
within the litigative process, which may or may not impermissibly burden the rights involved
depending upon a balancing of interests. Only the former involves compulsion as used in Portash.
228. Of course, "compulsion" from operation of the rule may have no impact upon a particular
defendant's course of conduct. He may choose to present any defense or no defense for reasons
overpowering any fear of incrimination or impeachment.
19861 1637
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
be used derivatively by the government, he would not be deterred from
revealing his most appropriate defense. If he were torn between three
possible options, for instance-alibi, self-defense, and no defense-and he
were assured that the deposition would be used only to impeach his testi-
mony if he took the stand, he would give notice of his most likely defense
that involved his testimony rather than his silence. By providing discov-
ery, he would retain his option to present his best defense or no defense
at all, without immediate adverse consequence.
In providing discovery, the defendant renders his defense less effec-
tive because the deposition may be used to impeach his testimony. Any
defense that requires the defendant's testimony is subject to such
impeachment. As a result, while the threat of impeachment may cause
the defendant not to present any defense at trial rather than one entailing
his testimony, it should not influence either his choice between the
defenses requiring deposition or his decision to provide a deposition for
his most likely defense. Accordingly, providing the statement imposes a
costless burden at the deposition stage. The defendant's choice among
defenses should remain unaffected at this stage.229
In practice, the rule will cause all defendants with any plausible
chance of testifying to respond in one way: by providing the deposition.
'Only a defendant failing to comply with the discovery requirement will
suffer a penalty. The fact that all defendants who might reasonably tes-
tify will respond identically hardly establishes that the rule entails no
compulsion. Rather, it indicates that the compulsion operates in a single
direction.
At the trial stage, the defendant's choice will no longer be even rela-
tively unencumbered. 23 ° Because he has been required to give that ear-
lier version of his testimony, he can be impeached if his testimony now
differs. Essentially, a defendant must either present no defense - to
avoid impeachment - or present the same defense covered by the depo-
sition. Even though no longer the most appropriate defense, the original
defense may be the most viable since any alternative will be impeached.
In some cases, variations even in minor details could prove critical in
229. If the hypothetical rule requires a deposition only as to some defenses, then the deposition
requirement may affect the choice of defense even at an early stage. By choosing a defense that
requires a deposition, the defendant restricts his ultimate choice either to that defense or to silence at
trial. By contrast, if he chooses other defenses that have no deposition requirement, he retains his
options to present that defense, any other defense without a deposition requirement, or no defense.
For example, if a defendant's statements to government psychiatrists relevant to the insanity
defense were admissible to impeach his later testimony if he were to present another defense,
marginal insanity defenses might be deterred. This is because all other defenses except alibi require
no "statement" by the defendant and even an alibi defense entails a much less extensive "statement."
By choosing any defense other than insanity, he would retain much greater freedom of action.
230. If at the end of the government's case the defendant decides independently that he does not
wish to present any defense, then the rule will have had no effect.
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causing a defendant to remain entirely silent. For defendants who would
choose to present a different defense, the threat of impeachment with the
deposition would decisively discourage that course of action.
Thus, operation of the rule will result in some defendants' giving
testimony at trial that is not the result of their "unfettered choice."
Moreover, courts cannot alleviate this burden on an individual basis after
determining the actual impact of the rule. The nature of the defense
actually presented will not clearly signal whether free choice has been
affected. A decision to present the same defense covered in the deposi-
tion or no defense may be the product either of unconstrained choice or
of fear of impeachment.
Is it a fifth amendment violation to impeach the defendant with his
pretrial statement under the state's discovery rule or to allow the rule's
operation to alter his choice of defense? Though the state applies no
direct compulsion to a defendant's decision to give the deposition, its rule
can impose substantial burdens that in some circumstances would violate
the fifth amendment. Under the second model of compulsion, the rule
has a substantial impact upon the policies behind the fifth amendment. It
requires a defendant to speak and permits the state to use that speech to
help convict him by impeaching his testimony.231 Also, possible use of
the statement may influence both his choice to present any defense and
his choice of which defense to present.
Nor does the rule operate independently of the fifth amendment,
only incidentally affecting its concerns. Where, as here, the rule
authorizes impeachment, the state's explicit purpose is to obtain informa-
tion from the defendant to better convict him.232 Second, the defendant's
response can hardly be construed as a strategic decision serving his own
litigative interests; the disclosure provides him no benefit other than pre-
serving a right to testify, which would not be at risk but for the state-
imposed rule.
The discovery rule thus impinges upon the interests protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination. The only remaining possibility for
the rule's validity is to be supported by a sufficiently substantial state
interest. The state has distinct interests at stake in three separate types of
factual patterns: (1) a change of defenses that permits inadequate state
investigation, (2) a change of defenses that demonstrates willful decep-
tion by the defendant, and (3) a change that is consistent with mistake or
231. Portash, Miranda, and Innis, see supra text accompanying notes 225-26 and note 226, tell
us at least that the impeachment use of a statement is not irrelevant to the interests protected by the
fifth amendment.
232. Because the prosecutor cannot have access to the deposition until the defendant testifies,
the only possible purpose of the rule is to impeach. All other uses, such as avoidance of surprise and
delay, are rendered untenable by the restriction upon prosecutorial access.
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uncertainty. The first two of these situations are easily assessed: the sub-
stantial state interest in each situation adequately supports use of the
deposition for impeachment. The third situation presents a set of com-
peting interests whose resolution is unclear. I argue that in those circum-
stances impeachment use would violate the fifth amendment.233
2. State Interests in Impeachment
a. Impeachment as a Remedy to a Change in Defenses That Permits
Inadequate State Investigation
When the defendant changes his defense from that for which he has
given notice, he may thwart the state's interest in avoiding surprise. If
the defendant waits until trial to substitute defenses that are materially
inconsistent, he will often place the state in the same position it would
have occupied had he provided no notice at all. Any sanctions properly
imposed for a failure to give notice should be available here, and
impeachment with the change of defenses is appropriate as a lesser sanc-
tion than preclusion of the entire defense.23
When, however, the defendant changes his defense in sufficient time
to permit the state to investigate and prepare for his new defense, the
interest of the state is fully protected. In this situation, a rationale based
233. Williams does not directly address the issue in any of these situations. The Court does
suggest approval of impeachment in at least some circumstances, specifically, where a discovery rule
required the defendant to make an irrevocable pretrial choice of defenses.
[W]e are simply not confronted with the question of whether a defendant can be compelled
in advance of trial to select a defense from which he can no longer deviate. We do not
mean to suggest, though, that such a procedure must necessarily raise serious
constitutional problems. See State ex rel Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 137, 163 N.W.2d
177, 181 (1968) ("[if we are discussing the right of a defendant to defer until the moment
of his testifying the election between alternative and inconsistent alibis, we have left the
concept of the trial as a search for the truth far behind").
399 U.S. at 84-85 n.15.
This statement has two possible interpretations. First, Simos cites another state case, State v.
Kopacka, 261 Wis. 2d 70, 51 N.W.2d 495 (1952), which upheld the right of the trial court to pro-
hibit the introduction of a different alibi than the one for which pretrial notice had been provided.
Reading this opinion into the Williams quotation is not a startling interpretation. Where the state's
rule requires notice of alibi, to the extent the defendant wants to rely upon an alibi defense, he
"cannot deviate" from the one selected in advance by substituting one for which no notice was given.
Second, Simos expresses the position that the fifth amendment protects only "the right of a
defendant to testify truthfully in his own behalf." 41 Wis. 2d at 137, 163 N.W.2d at 181. Again, it
would be reasonable to interpret the Court's Williams comment in this light. That sentiment and the
Court's position in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (The privilege "to testify in his
own defense, or to refuse to do so... cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury."),
share a common theme: To aid in finding the truth, the state should be able to confront a testifying
defendant with his prior statements.
234. Note, The Preclusion Sanction-A Violation of the Constitutional Right to Present a
Defense, 81 YALE L.J. 1342, 1358-59 (1972); see discussion of State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 2d 70, 51
N.W.2d 495 (1952), at supra note 233.
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on a change in defense cannot justify impeachment with the defendant's
initial deposition.
b. Impeachment as a Remedy for Willful Deception
A defendant may change defenses in a number of different situa-
tions, thus creating conflicts between the deposition and potential trial
testimony. Four likely explanations exist: (1) the defendant lied in his
pretrial deposition and wishes to tell the truth (or another lie) at trial, (2)
he told the truth in the deposition and wishes to lie at trial, (3) he was
mistaken in his deposition and wishes now to tell an accurate story, and
(4) his defenses are ambiguous.23
Related decisions indicate that the Supreme Court would uphold
impeachment in at least the first two situations described above. In
United States v. Knox 2 36 and United States v. Kahan,237 the Court used
somewhat different rationales to hold fifth amendment protections
unavailable when a defendant provides willfully false statements. In
Kahan, the defendant argued that Simmons v. United States2 38 prohib-
ited use during trial of statements by him at a prior indigency inquiry.
The Court found Simmons inapposite because Kahan clearly knew that
his representations were false at the time he made them. As such, there
was no basis to protect them as necessary to litigate a claim he believed
to be valid.23 9 In Knox, the Court held that though a professional gam-
235. The first two explanations are easy to understand; the last two would be helped by
examples. An initial alibi deposition might be innocently inaccurate. A defendant, who we assume
is innocent, knows he was not at the scene of the crime and, at the time of the deposition, believes he
was at home with his family. Later, he recalls that he was elsewhere and submits an amended notice.
Insanity and self-defense illustrate ambiguous defenses. A person with mental problems is
charged with a homicide. He may have been delusional at the time of the killing, reasonably feared
for his safety, acted with some degree of justification, or committed the murder with intent to kill.
Depending on his mental state, these defenses may be ambiguous.
236. 396 U.S. 77 (1969).
237. 415 U.S. 239 (1974).
238. 390 U.S. 377 (1968), discussed supra at text accompanying note 99.
239. Kahan, 415 U.S. at 243.
The Court based its opinion in part on the rationale that the statements were not testimonial
since they were introduced to show the defendant's knowledge of their falsity rather than for their
incriminatory content. The Court's subsequent decision in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463-64
(1981), undermines this rationale. But cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 561 (1983) (in
dictum, Justice O'Connor notes the appeal of characterizing defendant's statements as real
evidence). In his dissent in Kahan, Justice Marshall agreed that, just as willfully false statements
could be used in prosecutions for pejury or false statement, they could be used in the defendant's
pending trial. He concluded, however, that the trial court had not made the required finding of
willful falsehood. Kahan, 415 U.S. at 247-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Columbia Note,
supra note 110, at 690-93 (arguing that Justice Marshall's dissent would properly resolve the
competing values).
The Court's subsequent decision in United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980), provides a
more defensible basis for the result in Kahan. This rationale, too, accords with Marshall's position
that the government can use a pejured statement for its incriminatory content on a substantive
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bler may refuse to incriminate himself by filing a wagering tax return, if
he chooses to file a false return he can be prosecuted for that false
response: "[W]hen Knox responded to the pressure under which he
found himself by communicating false information, this was simply not
testimonial compulsion. ' 24 °
When the responses indicate that the defendant intends to commit
perjury at his trial or has lied in his deposition, impeachment is justi-
fied. 241 Either the defendant has forfeited his privilege by a willfully false
response before trial, or he will perjure himself at trial, raising legitimate
concerns for the integrity of the fact-finding process.242
offense. In Apfelbaum, the Court concluded that at the time the defendant was granted immunity
before the grand jury he was faced with only a "'trifling or imaginary' hazard of compelled self-
incrimination as a result of the possibility that he might commit perjury during the course of his
immunized testimony." 445 U.S. at 131-32. Since an honest response would not incriminate the
defendant, he had no fifth amendment protection against incrimination resulting from perjury.
Apparently, the logic of this position means that if the government shows that the statement was
perjured, the government can use the statement to show the defendant's consciousness of guilt
without violating his fifth amendment privilege. The danger that the defendant would commit
perjury during his testimony does not raise a sufficiently substantial prospect of incrimination to
invoke the privilege. See generally Hoffman, supra note 226.
240. Knox, 396 U.S. at 82; see also United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1977).
With Kahan, Knox, and Apfelbaum, the Court used three separate rationales to hold willfully
false statements outside the privilege against self-incrimination. In these different contexts, the
Court found the statement not testimonial, not compelled, or not incriminating. Apparently, the
Court has decided that perjured statements will not be protected by the fifth amendment, and it will
find a rationale to support that result.
241. It is not clear that every false discovery response should forfeit fifth amendment protection
and permit impeachment. Where the discovery mechanism is not a deposition taken under oath but
is merely an unsworn response to government counsel, the trial is not directly threatened with
"pollution" by perjury. Furthermore, logistical difficulties inherent in determining when
impeachment is appropriate could render impeachment problematic. The difference between a
purposefully false response and an innocent mistake can be difficult to determine, and it may be even
harder to ascertain whether trial testimony is perjurious or simply a correction of the false prior
notice.
On the other hand, if one of the two statements is unquestionably a willful falsehood, the
defendant has little equity to his argument that the the state should bear the burden of proving that
such falsehood occurred at trial. Given the Court's strong commitment against the use of
constitutional rights as a license for perjury, it is unlikely the Court will be solicitous of a defendant's
argument that the task of showing that the lie occurred before trial is too onerous. Even if the
defendant could prove this claim, the Court is unlikely to forbid impeachment.
242. The facts underlying Commonwealth v. Alicea, 498 Pa. 575, 449 A.2d 1381 (1982) provide
a good example. Prior to trial, the defendant gave notice of alibi and at trial testified that he
committed the homicide in self-defense. The state supreme court held that, since it was unclear that
the defendant had lied at trial rather than in his notice of defense, the trial court was not authorized,
without more, to increase his sentence on the basis of perjured trial testimony. As the dissent
observed, id. at 587 n.5, 449 A.2d at 1388 n.5 (McDermott, J., dissenting), the state should have
been permitted to impeach him with the prior, willfully false statement.
While willful misstatements of a defense may not necessarily indicate consciousness of guilt,
they support impeachment. In State v. Williams, 121 Ariz. 218, 221-22, 589 P.2d 461, 463-64
(1979), the state supreme court reversed on the trial court's exclusion of evidence of the victim's
consent in a rape case for lack of notice required by the statute. The supreme court concluded that
the state had not been prejudiced in its preparation, since it would necessarily prove lack of consent
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c. Impeachment Justified Solely as a Relevant Prior Inconsistent
Statement
Beginning with Harris v. New York,243 and continuing with Oregon
v. Hass, 44 United States v. Havens,245 and Jenkins v. Anderson, 246 the
Supreme Court has repeatedly authorized impeachment of a defendant's
testimony with suppressed or constitutionally suspect evidence. These
cases suggest approval of impeachment on the simple basis that use of the
prior inconsistent statements enhances the truth-seeking process. In
Harris, the Court emphasized that while the defendant has a right not to
testify, "[h]aving voluntarily taken the stand, [he is] under an obligation
to speak truthfully and accurately .... The shield provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into license to use perjury by way of a defense, free
from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances." 247
With Jenkins the Court took this logic even further. It recognized that
impeachment with prearrest silence may "burden" a suspect's right to
remain silent, yet found that burden permissible. Once the defendant
decides to take the stand, "'[t]he interests of the other party and regard
for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become rele-
vant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope
and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination.' "248
Another arguably analogous situation is impeachment use at trial of
testimony elicited at a suppression hearing. In Simmons v. United
as part of its own case, and held preclusion of the defendant's evidence improper. It stated that,
without condoning the failure of defense counsel to disclose the new defense, it could understand
why counsel might have been misinformed by the defendant.
[WMe can visualize a situation where a person, such as appellant, may lie to his
attorney and not tell the truth in prior court hearing because he is afraid he will never be
believed. If then, at trial, he finally tells his attorney the truth, absent prejudice to the
state, the defendant should not be precluded from presenting his defense.
121 Ariz. at 221, 589 P.2d at 464.
The court's analysis is appropriate in determining that preclusion of defense testimony is not the
proper sanction. This reasoning does not justify, however, preventing the prosecution from
impeaching the defendant with his prior willfully false statement. Use of the evidence to impeach is
a fair price to exact if the defendant chooses to take the stand since the probabilities are heavily
against a totally innocent explanation of his prior statement. Impeachment will be justified in the
vast majority of cases.
243. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
244. 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975).
245. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
246. 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980).
247. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26.
248. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238 (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)); see
also Stein v. United States, 346 U.S. 156, 177 (1953) ("The Constitution safeguards the right of a
defendant to remain silent; it does not assure him that he may remain silent and still enjoy the
advantages that might have resulted from testifying."); Note, supra note 83, at 305 (state's right to
cross-examine predominates over defendant's fifth amendment interests where he has affirmatively
benefited from his testimony and accordingly placed the state in a less advantageous position).
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States,2 49 the Court held that the defendant's testimony given on a
motion to suppress evidence on fourth amendment grounds could "not
thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt."25 Sub-
sequently, in United States v. Salvucci,251 though the Court declined to
decide explicitly whether testimony from a suppression hearing could be
used to impeach, it suggested such would be proper. It stated: "This
Court has held that 'the protective shield of Simmons is not to be con-
verted into a license for false representations .... , "252 Furthermbre, the
lower federal and state courts substantially agree that the Harris ration-
ale applies to Simmons and permits impeachment with the statement
made by the defendant at a suppression hearing.2"3
These cases appear to provide impressive support for the validity of
impeachment with discovery disclosures. Their analysis loses its force,
however, in the discovery context. The state's interest in pretrial discov-
ery is insufficient to overcome the adverse impact on a defendant's fifth
amendment interests.2 4  Curtailing a defendant's fifth amendment
rights must be justified exclusively on the basis that he will present the
249. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
250. Id. at 394.
251. 448 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1980).
252. Id. at 94 n.9 (quoting United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S, 239, 243 (1974)).
253. United States v. Quesada-Rosadal, 685 F.2d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 1982); People v.
Douglas, 66 Cal. App. 3d 998, 1003-06, 136 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361-63 (1977); State v. Vega, 163 Conn.
304, 306 A.2d 855 (1972); State v. Foraker, 446 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1982); People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d
211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975); Gray v. State, 43 Md. App. 238, 245,
403 A.2d 853, 858 (1979); State v. Buckley, 171 Mont. 238, 243-44, 557 P.2d 283, 286 (1976); State
v. Bracey, 303 N.C. 112, 120, 277 S.E.2d 390, 395-96 (1981), Nelson v. State, 607 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980); cf. State v. Boyd, 128 Ariz. 381, 625 P.2d 970 (Ct. App. 1981) (probation
revocation testimony may be used for impeachment); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d
1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975) (probation revocation testimony may be used for impeachment);
Ibn-Tamas v. United'States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) (testimony at prior mistrial may be used to
impeach). But see Commonwealth v. Bertram, 596 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (under state
constitution, testimony at suppression hearing may not be used to impeach trial testimony); cf.
United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 588-92 (2d Cir. 1983) (pretrial statements taken in violation
of right to counsel may not be used for impeachment); United States v. Nussen, 531 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.
1976) (suppression hearing statements may not be used to impeach testimony of alibi witnesses), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976); United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1974) (illegally obtained
evidence may be used to impeach only when focused on the truthfulness of defendant's direct
testimony); People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d 1362, 1366-67 (Colo.) (testimony by defendant at trial may
not be used to impeach at sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028 (1981); Blaisdell v.
Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 762-63, 364 N.E.2d 191, 197-98 (1977) (statements from court-
ordered mental exam may not be used for impeachment (dictum)); People v. Bland, 52 Mich. App.
649, 218 N.W.2d 56 (1974) (statements made in physician-patient relationship may not be used for
impeachment); Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (suppression hearing
silence may not be commented upon at trial).
254. One of the very few cases that has prohibited impeachment use outside of the pure
compulsion situation involved a withdrawn discovery notice. In United States v. Leonard, 609 F.2d
1163 (5th Cir. 1980), the court held that where a defendant withdrew his insanity defense notice
after submitting to an examination by a government psychiatrist his trial testimony could not be
impeached with his inconsistent statements to the psychiatrist. Without clearly articulating a theory,
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same information shortly and the state should have an adequate opportu-
nity to prepare without delaying the trial. The state can have no legiti-
mate interest in simply changing the balance of advantage between the
two sides by making the defendant's testimony more vulnerable to attack
through prior inconsistent statements. Such skewing would violate not
only the policies behind the fifth amendment2 5  but those underlying the
due process clause as well. 56 A state may be able to require a defendant
to provide an early statement of his defense25 7 as a neutral mechanism to
improve fairness and efficiency in litigation. But it would destroy the
legitimacy of the discovery procedure if the state used such statements to
help convict the defendant since they may include misstatements occur-
ring solely because the defendant was required to speak at an early
moment.258
the court found the result necessary to prevent infringement of the "defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights." Id. at 1166.
255. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
256. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1973).
257. If the goal is honesty, an early response may be the most valuable because the defendant
would not yet have perfected his fabrication. If the goal is accuracy, however, an early response will
be the most inaccurate because defense investigation and preparation of the case is not yet complete.
258. Take the example of a defendant who provides a notice of alibi that he was at a given
location at the time of the crime. He later uncovers a witness or documentary evidence that he was
at another location. If he promptly provides notice of that later alibi, there is neither clear indication
of willful falsehood nor independent justification for impeachment. Impeachment provides unfair
advantage to the state because, absent the discovery rule, the defendant would not "go on the
record" before trial.
Consider three responses to this argument. First, people are unlikely to be honestly in error
concerning their defense. A simple test shows the error of this claim. Ask yourself where you were
at 6:00 p.m. last Tuesday without checking any records. Then imagine that like most people who are
charged with crimes, rather than those who read law review articles, you have no records and
frequently live an unregimented life. Also assume, as often happens when an indigent defendant is
represented by appointed counsel, that your attorney speaks to you only once or twice about the alibi
and expects you to do all the investigation concerning it. You will quickly see how the honest,
innocent defendant simply trying to provide notice of his true whereabouts will often be in error.
Ironically, innocent defendants may be more likely to be uncertain about their alibi than guilty ones.
See Tucker, True Confessions: The Long Road Back from Miranda, NAT'L REV., Oct. 18, 1985, at
29 (recounting the technique of a highly successful detective who began his investigation with the
person who had the best alibi: "'The average person doesn't know precisely where he was every
minute of the day .... It is only someone who has carefully rehearsed his whereabouts who is likely
to have a good story.' ").
Second, the error can be explained and therefore it does little harm for the state to impeach the
defendant with the inconsistency. On the contrary, the very use of the statement refutes this claim.
If impeachment would do no harm, the state would not do it. See discussion of Innis and Miranda
supra at note 226. Furthermore, jurors may remain unconvinced of the difficulty of remembering
accurately. For example, no doubt some readers have been unwilling to accept that innocent
defendants frequently will not recall initially where they were at the time of the crime.
Finally, I offer data, anecdotal to be sure, from my seven years of criminal defense work. Three
of my clients were proven innocent through accidental events and charges were dismissed by the
government which was convinced to a moral certainty of their innocence. All three told me that
they were not at the scene of the crime, as was clearly correct. My assessment was that only one of
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The fifth amendment argument against allowing the state to
impeach with discovery disclosures is admittedly less formidable than the
argument against direct use. It rests on the premise that, when conscious
lies and abuses of the system are eliminated, the state has no legitimate
justification for obtaining a litigative advantage against the defendant.
Any such use offends the interests underlying the fifth amendment.
One counter-argument is that the damage to the policies behind the
fifth amendment is de minimis. The impairment is indeed considerably
less than when direct use of the disclosure is involved; a credible argu-
ment can be made that the impairment does not rise to a constitutional
level. Impeachment may be poorly justified on policy grounds without
being unconstitutional. A second argument is that the administrative
difficulties in distinguishing willful falsehoods from innocent mistakes
would make the system of litigation unworkable.259 This argument has
some limited validity; however, the question remains of how much
weight to accord it against the constitutional concerns. Finally, simply
as a matter of prediction, the present Supreme Court is unlikely to draw
the line suggested here. Motivated by a profound distaste for the possi-
bility of perjury escaping undetected, it has already eliminated most limi-
tations against impeachment in prior case law.260
Supreme Court propensities aside, I contend that each of these
counter-arguments is insufficient to overcome a clear lack of justification
for a practice that intrudes in a significant manner upon the fifth amend-
ment. Each of the Court's expansions of impeachment, with correspond-
ing restrictions on the fifth amendment, has been very attractive at some
level. The same is true with discovery developments. The sum total,
however, has had a profound impact on the balance of advantage in
criminal litigation. The Court's observation in Boyd v. United States261 is
entirely apt here: a constrained reading of the fifth amendment results
ultimately in its incremental demise.
3. Additional Issues Raised by Uses Beyond Impeachment
In the preceding hypothetical, the defendant was required to give a
deposition that could be used for impeachment but was assured that it
would not be used in the state's case-in-chief. The mechanism I sug-
the three actually remembered where he was. Worse yet, my investigation uncovered nothing that,
in my opinion, would have proved the alibi of any of the three to the satisfaction of skeptical jurors.
259. The trial court would presumably make such a determination without jury involvement.
See FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Currently, as part of sentencing, judges determine that a defendant's
testimony "contained willful and material falsehoods" without great apparent difficulty. United
States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 55 (1978). Probably the greater practical issue is whether judges
would make the finding too readily and vitiate any real protection for the defendant. See id. at 54.
260. See infra notes 395-99.
261. 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); see supra note 8.
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gested-taking the deposition outside the presence of the prosecutor and
sealing it until the defendant takes the stand-would effectively assure
such protection. The problem is that this mechanism would undermine
the purpose of discovery, that is, to avoid surprise to the prosecutor and
to permit preparation of rebuttal.262
The hypothetical might be changed so that the deposition was made
available to the prosecution from the beginning of trial but limited
expressly to impeachment use. But then the previously discussed inher-
ent conflicts between administrative feasibility and effective protection
against misuse would arise.2 63 Without effective assurance against mis-
use, if the disclosure may reasonably incriminate the defendant, not only
are his fifth amendment protections insufficient but his choice to give the
deposition would be strongly affected. He would not be free even at the
deposition stage to preserve his most appropriate defense. In the face of
potentially incriminating disclosure, a defendant would withhold notice
of his defense out of fear of its use beyond impeachment. The defendant
would give notice only if his need for the defense were great enough to
outweigh fear of incrimination.
As a result of the discovery rule, some defendants would either
choose an inappropriate but less incriminating defense or present no
defense at all. Others with an incriminating but essential defense would
not be similarly deterred. They would, however, be forced to pay the
extra price of incrimination to present their defense. Thus, in a real
world discovery situation where the prosecutor has discovery informa-
tion from the beginning of the case and where the disclosure may reason-
ably be used to prove guilt, impeachment use of discovery would only
add to the unconstitutionality of direct or derivative use of discovery.
When, however, the type of information discovered is not likely to
incriminate the defendant, impeachment use alone will determine its
validity. Discovery of the alibi defense illustrates this point. An alibi is
not directly incriminating, but its discovery may violate the fifth amend-
ment under my analysis if an amended or withdrawn notice is used to
impeach the defendant when he has neither abused the discovery process
nor provided a willfully false response.2
262. See discussion of Radford v. Stewart, 324 F. Supp. 826 (D. Mont. 1970), aff'd, 472 F.2d
1161 (9th Cir. 1973), supra note 214. The case demonstrates how the prosecution may avoid the
possibility of misuse of discovery, but the necessary safeguard renders the discovery rule useless for
its intended purposes. Radford does not provide a justification for the rule; rather, it shows that if the
rule operates consistently with the fifth amendment, it cannot achieve its stated purposes when the
required disclosures could incriminate the defendant.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 212-21.
264. In states holding the use of discovery statements valid under the fifth amendment, use of
counsel's statements must overcome a second protection-the attorney-client privilege. Typically,
assertions of the privilege are brushed aside with a passing reference to the doctrine of waiver.
Waiver is premised upon the voluntary disclosure, during discovery, of information to a party
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4. State Use of Discovery Statements to Impeach the Defendant
Nonetheless, a number of states permit discovery disclosures to be
outside the confidential relationship. See, eg. United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir.
1979); State v. Howell, 56 Or. App. 6, 10, 641 P.2d 37, 39 (1982); State v. Gay, 6 Utah 2d 122, 124,
307 P.2d 885, 885-86, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 899 (1957); State v. Dault, 19 Wash. App. 709, 716-18,
578 P.2d 43, 47-48 (1978).
Perhaps correct at some technical level, the analysis begs critical policy issues underlying the
privilege. The error can best be understood by reference to the original justification for elimination
of both the fifth amendment protections and the attorney-client privilege, Justice Traynor's decision
in Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 61-62, 372 P.2d 919, 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 882 (1962).
Justice Traynor concluded that, as to materials that the defendant would soon disclose at trial, the
attorney-client privilege was waived for the purpose of facilitating prosecutorial examination. Where
the defendant knows he will reveal the information at trial, advancing the time of waiver is sensible.
Where, however, the defendant is uncertain that he will reveal the information, there is no
justification for forcing him to waive the privilege. A discovery statute requiring an uncertain
defendant to provide the information or forfeit his right to testify and present evidence coerces
waiver of his privilege.
Two accommodations are possible. First, the state may require disclosure only when the
defendant is certain that he will present the confidential information at trial. Indeed, some authority
supports the proposition that no more is required. State v. Marchellino, 304 N.W.2d 252, 254-55
(Iowa Ct. App. 1981) ("Witnesses 'expected' to be called" is subjective concept.); People v. Green,
83 Misc. 2d 583, 595, 371 N.Y.S.2d 271, 281-82 (Crim. Ct. 1975) ("If counsel for the defendant is
genuinely undecided as to whether or not to introduce certain testimony, the court should refrain
from imposing any sanctions on his failure to disclose under these circumstances."); 1969-70 ABA
STANDARDS § 3.2 commentary at 98; 1969-70 ABA STANDARDS § 3.3 commentary at 5 (Supp.
1970); see also Blumenson, supra note 33, at 125, 139-50 (under due process, a defendant may be
compelled only to provide discovery of evidence he presently intends to introduce at trial and not
evidence he may potentially introduce). Most authorities, however, require the defendant to disclose
all information that he may introduce. State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1979)
("Defense counsel cannot now justify his lack of disclosure by claiming that the decision to call these
non-disclosed witnesses was not formally made until after the state had rested. Such an
interpretation of the discovery obligation would render [the rule] meaningless .... "); State v. Cox,
542 S.W.2d 40, 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("The Rule contemplates that the defendant be specific
whether he will or will not assert the defense of alibi. It does not permit equivocation."); People v.
Hampton, 696 P.2d 765, 776 (Colo. 1985) ("[O]nce the prosecutor serves a specification of time and
place [under notice of alibi rule], then as long as the defendant is aware of the alibi defense and alibi
witnesses and desires to preserve his option to present this evidence at trial, he is under a continuing
obligation to [provide the required information] ...within a reasonable time. ... (emphasis
added)); cf Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 395-96, 456 A.2d 29, 40 (strict enforcement of
preclusion sanction for noncompliance with notice requirements necessary to enforce discovery rules
so that trial disruptions and delay may be avoided), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 948 (1983).
The second possible accommodation is recognition that the privilege is waived only by the use
of the evidence at trial and that the tentative disclosure for discovery purposes does not void the
privilege. See infra note 345. This approach departs from traditional waiver concepts which find
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in any voluntary disclosure of confidential information. Id.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to harmonize the state's interest in vigorously enforcing timely
compliance with its discovery rules and the basic rationale of the waiver concept. Indeed, those who
argue for strict notice requirements, enforced by forfeiture of the right to introduce evidence not
disclosed, rely on the premise that the defendant suffers no irrevocable loss from compliance. Note,
supra note 25, at 269-70, 273-74. A two stage concept of waiver is necessary for that premise to be
correct. Only if revelation of the information at the first stage-discovery-does not waive the
privilege is it accurate to say that the defendant is not prejudiced by being required to provide
discovery. If, on the other hand, irrevocable waiver only occurs at the second stage-when the
information is disclosed at trial for the benefit of the defendant-discovery may properly be required.
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used to impeach the defendant when his trial testimony is inconsistent
with his pretrial notice.2 65  These disclosures are clearly testimonial
assertions under the fifth amendment, admitted and utilized for their
communicative content. Again, neither the fifth amendment nor the the-
265. Of the states permitting impeachment, few do so under express statutory authorization.
Only Pennsylvania explicitly authorizes impeachment in its discovery rules. PA. R. CRIM. P.
305(C)(1)(g) permits cross-examination of the defendant with his notice of alibi when he has either
failed to file a notice or gave information different from his subsequent testimony. Subsection (f) of
the same rule prohibits the prosecution from commenting upon, or any adverse inference being
drawn against the defendant for, failure to call a witness listed in an alibi or insanity notice unless he
or his counsel attempts to explain to the jury the failure to call the witness.
At the other end of the spectrum, only two states explicitly prohibit such impeachment use.
CONN. SUPER. Cr. R. 768, 772; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(b)(1)(F). Most states fall between these two
extremes. A substantial number of states prohibit impeachment with the failure of the defense to call
witnesses listed as supporting a specified defense. IDAHO CRIM. R. 16(h); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02
subd. 4; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.70(2) (Consol. 1982); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(3); R.I. R.
CRIM. P. 16(e); VT. R. CRIM. P. 16.1(c). Three states protect only against comment concerning alibi
notice or alibi witnesses. ME. R. CRIM. P. 16A(b); MASS. CRIM. P. 14(b)(1)(F); N.M. DIST. CT. R.
CRIM. P. 32(d). Typically these states make no provision for what, if any, use the prosecutor may
make of required disclosures concerning the nature of defense and its details.
The pattern of little explicit authorization of impeachment but few specific restrictions upon use
of discovery reflects the approach of the 1969-70 ABA Standards and the 1970 proposed Federal
Rules, upon which most jurisdictions relied. The 1969-70 ABA Standards as originally proposed
contained no provisions requiring the defendant to specify the nature of his defense or provide the
names and addresses of witnesses. Standard 3.3, which requires these disclosures, was added by
amendment in the House of Delegates. See 1969-70 ABA STANDARDS § 3.3, at 3-6 (Supp. 1970).
Even the amended standards were silent as to permissible prosecutorial use of the required
disclosures. The 1970 proposed federal discovery rules, required no specification of defenses but did
require a listing of defense witnesses. It prohibited prosecution comment upon the failure of the
defense to call any listed witness. Proposed Rule 16(b)(3), 48 F.R.D. 553, 592, 609-10 (1970), 62
F.R.D. 271, 306, 316 (1974). By contrast, the federal discovery rules for alibi and insanity defenses
as actually promulgated are much more protective of defense interests. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(f),
"Notice of Alibi," provides that "[e]vidence of an intention to rely upon an alibi defense, later
withdrawn, or of statements made in connection with such intention, is not, in any civil or criminal
proceeding, admissible against the person who gave notice of the intention." Rule 12.2(e) makes
similar provisions for notices provided for the insanity defense.
Neither the alibi nor insanity rules, as sent to Congress by the Supreme Court, contained such
limiting provisions, 62 F.R.D. at 292-93, 295, but Congress added this limitation before adopting the
notice of alibi rule. In 1983, a similar provision was added to the insanity defense discovery rule.
The Advisory Committee Note explained that the new provision
insures that the notice requirement ... will not deprive the defendant of an opportunity
later to elect not to utilize any expert testimony. This provision is consistent with Williams
v. Florida .... holding the privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by requiring
the defendant to give notice of a defense where the defendant retains the "unfettered
choice" of abandoning the defense.
97 F.R.D. 245, 296 (1983).
The 1978 ABA Standards reflect a similar set of restrictions concerning alibi and insanity, the
only two defenses for which the new standards permit discovery. 1978 ABA STANDARDS § 11-
3.3(b) provides, "Information disclosed pursuant to [this section] is not admissible in evidence at a
hearing or trial." The commentary explains only that "[t]he provision has been added to ensure that
the defendant who chooses not to call the named witness will not be penalized for changing strat-
egy." 1978 ABA STANDARDS § 11-3.3(b) commentary at 11-56. Few states have followed these
more restrictive provisions, however. But see CONN. SUPER. CT. R. 768, 772; MASS. R. CRIM. P.
14(b)(1)(F).
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ory upon which prosecutorial discovery is based justifies impeachment
except when the state is prejudiced in its ability to investigate an altered
defense, or when either the discovery disclosure or the trial testimony is
willfully false. Under this analysis, impeachment, as permitted in a
number of these states, is unconstitutional.
States that permit impeachment generally fall into three groups.
One group views impeachment of the defendant with his response to dis-
covery rules precisely like any other statement of a party or his counsel
contrary to the position he takes at trial. The statement is considered an
evidentiary admission;266 the attorney-client privilege is held to be
waived because the disclosure is knowingly made to persons outside the
scope of the confidential relationship;267 and the fifth amendment issue is
seen as resolved by Williams v. Florida since the defendant has
announced his intention to introduce the disclosed fact at trial.268
The second group of states permits impeachment as an appropriate
sanction for abuse of mandatory disclosure rules. 269 These states may
authorize impeachment rather than preclude his testimony if the defend-
ant fails either to file a notice of defense or to provide accurate details.
266. See supra note 160.
267. See supra note 264.
268. States following this basic analysis include:
MICHIGAN-People v. Nickopoulous, 26 Mich. App. 297, 302, 182 N.W.2d 83, 86 (1970)
(prosecution allowed to introduce first of two alibi notices filed by defense counsel for impeachment
purposes, applying general rule that party may be impeached with "a superseded pleading
containing an admission against the interest of the pleader").
OHIO-State v. Sims, 3 Ohio App. 3d 321, 445 N.E.2d 235 (1981) (defendant may be cross-
examined with failure to file alibi notice until eighteen months after arrest where notice was timely
but had not been filed before two previous trial dates that were at the last moment postponed). But
cf State v. Sims, 3 Ohio App. 3d 331, 445 N.E.2d 245 (1982) (defendant may not be impeached with
delay between the arrest and date of a timely filed notice of alibi if no prior trial dates have passed).
OREGON-State v. Howell, 56 Or. App. 6, 9-10, 641 P.2d 37, 38-39 (1982) ("Pretrial
Disclosure" made during pretrial conference that listed "alibi" as defense properly used to impeach
defendant's trial testimony in rape case that he had consensual sex with the victim).
TENNESSEE-State v. Meadows, 635 S.W.2d 400, 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)
(impeachment with failure to call witness listed in defendant's notice of alibi permitted even though
rule prohibits admission of "an intention to rely upon an alibi defense, later withdrawn, or of
statements made in connection with such intention" because, unlike state's general discovery rule,
this rule does not explicitly prohibit comment on failure to call a listed witness).
UTAH-State v. Gay, 6 Utah 2d 122, 123-24, 307 P.2d 885, 885-86 (defendant properly
impeached with alibi notice stating that at time of crime he was at his grandparents' farm when he
testified at trial he was at "his mother's place"), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 899 (1957).
269. While exact classification is difficult, the states falling into this category include:
ARIZONA-ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.4(c) provides that the prosecution cannot comment on
information in notice of defenses and witness lists unless the court finds that "the inclusion of the
witness' name or defense constituted an abuse of the applicable disclosure rule." The commentary to
Rule 15.2, describing this provision, states cryptically: "Furthermore, the disclosure of a defense
will not serve to alter the proceedings at trial." This language suggests that the discovery rules
should not alter the defendant's choice of defense.
Apparently, this rule prohibits impeachment if the defendant changes his defense but the
change does not prejudice the state's preparation. It is uncertain whether impeachment would
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Impeachment is treated as a less extreme penalty than preclusion and an
appropriate sanction because it is more solicitous of the defendant's right
to testify or present a defense.27°
A third group of states does not permit impeachment at all. For
some the restriction is found in the language of the rule;2 71 for others it
has constitutional underpinnings; 2 72 for still others the basis is unclear.
2 73
The courts in Montana and, to some degree, Illinois have correctly
constitute an abuse under the rule if the first notice was willfully false but the state's preparation was
not hampered.
MINNESOTA-State v. Graffice, 294 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Minn. 1980) (prosecutor properly
established that defendant omitted specific details of his alibi from pretrial notice because with
adequate notice state could have interviewed person allegedly with defendant at time of crime). But
see State v. Billups, 264 N.W.2d 137 (Minn. 1978) (in case tried before effective date of the alibi rule,
questioning defendant concerning failure to reveal alibi prior to trial held improper under Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)).
PENNSYLVANIA-Pennsylvania by rule permits cross-examination of the defendant
concerning the alibi notice where the defendant falls to provide any notice of alibi or testifies
contrary to the notice provided. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305 (C)(1)(g). See supra note 265.
270. In Commonwealth v. Bey, 294 Pa. Super. 229, 439 A.2d 1175 (1982), however, the court
used a much broader rationale. It approved impeachment of a defendant with discrepancies between
his trial testimony and his alibi notice. The court found the questioning to be "valid cross
examination" and "the risk a witness assumes when he takes the stand." Apparently, the defendant
had argued that such impeachment went beyond the rule's purpose of permitting preliminary
investigations by the state. The court rejected this limiting rationale, concluding that the procedures
produced a fair trial in this case. Id. at 240-41, 439 A.2d at 1180-S1.
WASHINGTON-State v. Acosta, 34 Wash. App. 387, 391-92, 661 P.2d 602, 604-05 (1983)
(defendant properly impeached with change of defense-self-defense instead of alibi-where counsel
did not notify court or opposing counsel of change in defense plans), rev'd on other grounds, 101
Wash. 2d 612, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984)(en banc). Acosta cited Dault, 19 Wash. App. 709, 718-19, 578
P.2d 43, 47-48 (1978), which authorized impeachment on the theory that the prior representation
was "[a] 'quasi-admissionnl' of the client admissible to discredit and impeach the client's testimony."
The Acosta court reached the same result but noted it "would state the reasons somewhat
differently"; it adopted the rationale that impeachment is a proper sanction for failure to comply
with discovery requirements.
The states in this second category, except perhaps Arizona, see supra note 268, have not clearly
indicated whether they will permit impeachment where the notice is changed, but early enough that
the prosecution can investigate adequately the merits of the defense case. If the defendant provides
notice in time for state preparation, the rationale of lesser sanction cannot justify impeachment.
271. The rules of Connecticut and Massachusetts contain limiting language similar to that used
in the federal alibi statute. CONN. SUPER. Cr. R. 768, 772; MAss. CRIM. P. 14(b)(1)(F).
272. Missouri and Montana have given a constitutional basis to the restriction:
MISSOURI-In State v. Curby, 553 S.W.2d 566, 568-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977), the court held it
improper for the prosecutor to alert the jury that the defendant provided a notice of alibi but his
counsel's opening statement presented a new defense. The state court, citing Williams, rejected the
argument that once the defendant has provided notice of alibi he may not shift to another defense.
The Missouri rules do not require specification of all defenses. Therefore, a defendant may abandon
his alibi defense, which he must specify, and present a number of other defenses without violating
any independent notice requirement. In Curby, the state court of appeals used constitutional
principles to prohibit prosecutorial use of the notice of an abandoned alibi defense.
In State v. Brooks, 567 S.W.2d 348, 352-53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), the defendant delayed filing a
notice of alibi until shortly before the trial date. The notice was accepted and the trial delayed,
presumably to enable the prosecutor to investigate the alibi. The court found improper the
prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant for not providing a notice of alibi until the eve of
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identified the reason for generally prohibiting impeachment of a defend-
ant with his discovery disclosures. 274 The purpose of discovery is to per-
mit preparation by the state, not to lock the defendant into a specific
defense. Also, states correctly permit impeachment as a remedy where
the defendant abuses the rules, thereby preventing the state from ade-
quately preparing for the defense.27- Failure to give adequate notice
affects the quality of the opponent's case and justifies a remedy, such as
trial, citing the prohibition in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), against impeaching a defendant
with his post-arrest silence.
MONTANA-In State ex rel Sikora v. District Court, 154 Mont. 241, 252, 462 P.2d 897, 903
(1969), the Montana Supreme Court emphasized the limited use of discovery under MONT. R. CRiM.
P. § 46-15-301(2) (current version at MONT. R. CRIM. P. § 46-15-323(3): "[The statute] very
carefully uses the language 'For purposes of notice only and to prevent surprise * * *'.... Such
notice would in no way affect the defendant's presumption of innocence, nor would such information
ever be available to the jury."
The court found that the statute prohibits direct use of the defendant's notice to establish his
guilt because such use would violate the fifth amendment. The court also suggested that the statute
prohibits any direct use of the notice against the defendant. In State v. McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481,
500-01, 608 P.2d 428, 441, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1050 (1980), the court explicitly prohibited direct
use of an "insanity" notice:
It should be emphasized that the purpose of the statute is for notice, to prevent surprise,
and to eliminate the necessity for a continuance of a trial when the defense is raised. The
fact of notice does not amount to a plea, and it could not be used in any way as evidence in a
trial on the merits. The provisions merely provide for advance notice of the intent to rely
on such defense so that the State may be prepared to meet this defense.
(Emphasis added).
273. The Colorado Supreme Court recently decided, without clearly articulating the basis for its
decision, that where a defendant decides not to offer alibi evidence at trial, he may not be impeached
with his notice of alibi. People v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 765, 777 (Colo. 1985). The opinion may be
read to link the requirement that the defendant furnish notice of alibi before he is completely certain
that he will utilize the defense with a prohibition against any use by the state of the notice where he
decides not to offer alibi evidence at trial. See supra note 264. The court did not rule whether
impeachment would be permissible if the defendant offered an alibi that differed from the one
described in the notice.
In addition, Illinois prohibits impeachment on a theory that combines limitations to avoid
unfair surprise and to permit adequate prosecutorial preparation without delaying the trial with
language of the law of evidence suggesting that the disclosures should not be classified as admissions.
In People v. McFarland, 93 Ill. App. 3d 136, 142-43, 416 N.E.2d 769, 775 (1981), the court held
improper cross-examination of the defendant with inconsistencies between his trial defense and the
notice of intoxication defense. The court found no explicit restriction in the statutory language
which authorized use of discovery materials for" 'the purposes of conducting his side of the case.'"
See ILL. S. CT. R. CRIM. P. 415(c). It recognized that the purpose of discovery is "to prevent
surprise or unfair advantage and to aid in the search for the truth." McFarland, 416 N.E.2d at 775.
It emphasized that the selection of a defense was within the province of counsel, that it was subject
to change, and that the requirement of disclosure of defenses to be used at trial was not intended to
limit counsel's discretion in conducting the trial. On this basis, the court ruled that the notice
amounted only to tentative theories of counsel and were not admissions of the defendant.
This decision is indefensible on strictly evidentiary grounds. Even if tentative, a statement of
counsel that reflects an affirmative statement of fact by the defendant constitutes an admission under
traditional evidentiary analysis. See supra note 160. On policy grounds of limited justification for
discovery, the case is correctly decided, however.
274. See supra notes 272-73.
275. See, eg., supra note 269, for discussion of Arizona rule.
1652
DISCOVERY AGAINST THE DEFENSE
impeachment, which explains to the jury why the state's response is
weak.27
6
As developed above, not all discovery rules threaten the defendant's
fifth amendment rights. Williams supports the constitutionality of some,
but not all, discovery rules. By carefully examining the impact of such
rules on the rights of the defendant and by applying the second model of
compulsion, the limits imposed by the fifth amendment on discovery
practices become clear.
Up to this point I have focused on the fifth amendment limitations
on discovery practices, reflecting my evaluation of the fifth amendment
as the most important and comprehensive source of protection available
to the defense. The implications of expanded criminal discovery against
the defense go further, however. In Part IV, I will examine other consti-
tutional and statutory restrictions on discovery practices.
IV
THE COLLAPSE OF OTHER DOCTRINES PROTECTING
DEFENSE CONFIDENCES
One commentator has described the fifth amendment, the attorney-
client privilege, and the work product doctrine as together creating a
"shield of confidentiality" for the criminal defendant.277 These three
doctrines rest on somewhat different conceptual bases and provide some-
times overlapping and sometimes unique protection against discovery by
the prosecution. I will now turn my discussion to types of discovery to
which the fifth amendment is largely or wholly inapplicable. Here the
work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege, supported by the
276. As discussed earlier, several states, with little or no analysis, permit the prosecution to
impeach the defendant at trial with notice of a since-discarded defense-as if it were a prior
inconsistent statement. If lack of compulsion makes fifth amendment protections inapplicable to
these disclosures, then the prosecution need not stop with impeachment but could use them in its
case-in-chief.
For example, in United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit held
that the government could use in its case-in-chief an opening statement made by the defense at a
previous trial to show consciousness of guilt. The defense had carefully altered its subsequent
opening statement to assert new facts compensating for changes in the government's evidence. The
court found that the factual assertions of an attorney qualified as party admissions since he acted
within the scope of his duties as defendant's agent. Under the facts of the case, circumstances
corroborated the conclusion that the defendant provided the information himself.
Similar conclusions are generally warranted for many discovery representations. In the states
permitting broad impeachment with discovery notices there is no articulated doctrinal reason why in
a homicide case, for example, notice of self-defense should not be admissible to prove the defendant
was the person who committed the killing. Such use of discovery to establish guilt would be clearly
unconstitutional, however, as demonstrated in the first three hypotheticals. See supra text
accompanying notes 125-221.
277. Allis, supra note 1, at 483.
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sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, offer the most
important sources of protection.
During the 1970's, as courts and legislatures cut away critical fifth
amendment protections at the center of the "shield," the work product
doctrine and the attorney-client privilege might have retained their vital-
ity. Instead, they too fell victims to general concepts of litigative fairness
applied in a vague and uncritical manner. As a result, states have dimin-
ished the protections for the criminal defendant under both these
doctrines.
I will here describe and analyze those developments. I will focus on
two areas where expansion of prosecutorial discovery has been most
prevalent. These are the use of defense experts and, to a lesser degree,
the statements of defense witnesses. In Section A, I address discovery of
the identity and the reports of defense experts. In Subsection 1, I discuss
the limited role of the fifth amendment, which arbitrarily protects
defendants who act without counsel yet provides no protection for the
represented defendant. I then turn, in Subsection 2, to the work product
doctrine. Here I argue that the doctrine's basic purpose of protecting
diligence and innovation in litigation requires the invalidation of many
developments permitting discovery of defense experts. Furthermore,
prosecutorial use at trial of defense expert investigation implicates work
product values where the prosecution learned of such investigation fortu-
itously rather than through formal discovery. This is particularly so if
such knowledge resulted either from the state's physical possession of the
evidence or from the defendant's indigency. In Subsection 3, I argue that
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel also forbids
requiring the defense to disclose unsuccessful investigatory efforts that
may incriminate. In Subsection 4, I describe a conditional concept of
waiver, applicable both to work product and sixth amendment protec-
tions, that would permit discovery to proceed, but allow prosecutorial
use at trial only if the defense actually follows through on its intent to
introduce the witness or defense in question.
In Section B, I discuss the requirement in several states that the
defense create statements of its own witnesses. Other states require the
defense to provide the prosecution with statements it has created of pros-
ecution witnesses, even if the defense does not use the statements to
impeach adverse witnesses. I argue that these practices seriously threaten
sixth amendment values.
In Section C, I examine prosecutorial use of the defendant's state-
ments to defense experts used to prepare an insanity defense. Though
such statements are within the ambit of attorney-client privilege, state
courts have increasingly broadened the concept of waiver to the point of
being triggered by the defense's decision to present an insanity defense.
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This development, if carefully limited to situations in which the prosecu-
tion has an extreme need to obtain and use the defendant's statements, is
constitutionally acceptable but nonetheless disturbing. More serious
constititional concern arises from expansion of the concept of waiver
beyond situations of extreme need. The courts doing this justify expan-
sion under a general notion of litigative fairness. This expansion
tendency seriously threatens the basic protections of the attorney-client
privilege.
A. Disclosure of the Identity of Expert Witnesses and Their Reports
Preparing for trial, the defense may generate expert opinions detri-
mental to its own cause if made available to the prosecution through
unrestricted discovery. For example, assume that the defendant is
charged with rape. He denies having had sexual intercourse with the
victim. The victim's medical examination reveals the presence of neither
live sperm nor a foreign blood type. The prosecution requests no tests of
the defendant." 8 For defendant to establish that he did not commit the
rape, defense counsel obtains court approval to hire an expert to perform
tests on the detained, indigent defendant. The tests reveal that the
defendant is sterile and that his blood type is not observed in his bodily
fluids. As a result, his semen would contain neither live sperm nor any
indication of his blood type. Naturally, the defense does not intend to
introduce these tests at trial: they would help the prosecution by provid-
ing an explanation for the otherwise troubling absence of corroborating
physical evidence. The issue is whether the state may formally discover
these results and use them at trial, or whether the work product rule or
constitutional doctrines prohibit such discovery and use.
L The Limited Scope of Fifth Amendment Protection
The fifth amendment prohibits the state from requiring our hypo-
thetical defendant to disclose personally the hypothetical tests yet would
allow the state to obtain the same disclosure from defense counsel.
Because the fifth amendment applies only to the defendant's own disclo-
sures, its protections are of no practical consequence in the majority of
cases in which defendant's counsel is aware of expert investigations from
sources independent of any confidential communication with his client.
278. The fifth amendment would not apply if the state had requested these tests, since the tests
require no testimonial conduct by the defendant. Depending upon the procedures employed,
however, the state may be required to justify the testing under the fourth amendment. See generally
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (because not communicative, withdrawal of blood from
defendant's body is outside protections of fifth amendment, but requirement that defendant submit
to test and procedures employed must satisfy reasonableness standard of fourth amendment).
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Clearly, however, the defendant's interests in preventing disclosure are of
equal importance whether represented by counsel or not.
Under Fisher v. United States,279 the prosecution cannot demand
that the defendant produce the names and addresses and reports of
experts he will not be introducing at trial. The fifth amendment prohibits
a requirement, accompanied by the threat of a direct sanction for failure
to respond, that he provide discovery of incriminating information other-
wise unknown to the state. The fifth amendment violation occurs when
the defendant is required to reveal the existence of the incriminating
information, not when he or others create it.280 Discovery from the
defendant is prohibited whether or not he participated in the expert's
effort and irrespective of the confidentiality of the report's contents.28'
In contrast to its protection against disclosure of expert investiga-
tion when the demand is directed to the defendant, the fifth amendment
offers no protection from demands directed at defendant's counsel. 212 It
does not protect against such disclosures because the lawyer, not the
defendant, is compelled to respond. The defendant is not personally sub-
ject to any compelled testimonial incrimination. Because the fifth
amendment allows discovery from counsel that cannot be had from the
defendant, defendants without counsel or defendants who take personal
charge of certain parts of the investigation have protections others do
279. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
280. Id. at 410-11 (while contents of pre-existing, voluntarily created documents not protected
by fifth amendment, act of producing them in response to governmental demand may be
communicative and protected by privilege against self-incrimination).
281. For a general examination of these issues, see supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
282. While the fifth amendment offers no protection from discovery demands directed at
defendant's counsel, it may suggest complimentary protection under a state's attorney-client
privilege. In Fisher, the Court interpreted attorney-client privilege to protect information in the
attorney's hands that would have been protected by the fifth amendment if retained by the
defendant. See Mosteller, supra note 165, at 86 n.286 (discussing application of attorney-client
privilege operating in conjunction with Fisher's act of production doctrine). Such an interpretation
would make no difference in our hypothetical, however, since the attorney knows of the expert's
finding without a confidential communication from the defendant.
Therefore, under established fifth amendment and attorney-client privilege principles, a state
could promulgate a rule that authorized discovery of scientific reports from the defense attorney
unless she learned of the report through a confidential communication with her client or the reports
were based on communications from the defendant. In People ex rel. Bowman v. Woodward, 63 I11.
2d 382, 349 N.E.2d 57 (1976), the Illinois Supreme Court held that such a rule would be
unconstitutional. Relying on Fisher, the court ruled that the state could not order the defendant to
disclose all scientific tests regardless of his intention to introduce them at trial when the state did not
know what tests existed. The court viewed the discovery demand as running directly against the
defendant, even though the discovery rule and the trial court order were directed to defense counsel
rather than to the defendant. The Illinois rule clearly contemplates discovery of test results from
defense counsel. ILL. Sup. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 413(c) (discovery permitted of reports or statements that
"defense counsel has in his possession or control"). Neither the fifth amendment nor the attorney-
client privilege applies to test results obtained by counsel without the defendant's participation,
whether or not the state knows which tests had been performed.
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not. But it is entirely without rational justification to shield one defend-
ant's investigative efforts while denying protection to another. Accord-
ingly, a doctrine other than the fifth amendment must provide
meaningful protection. 83
2. The Limited Scope of the Work Product Doctrine
As prosecutorial discovery has been expanded, the work product
doctrine has only weakly protected defense expert witnesses and their
opinions. First, explicit work product considerations have played little
or no role in the formulation of formal discovery rules in those states that
have broadly expanded prosecutorial discovery. Second, the work prod-
uct doctrine, where explicitly recognized as applicable to discovery, has
been narrowly defined as a limitation on what the prosecution may intro-
duce at trial. I will argue that the values underlying the work product
doctrine justify protecting the defense against expanded discovery of
expert preparation not ultimately introduced at trial.
The prosecution may learn of defense experts either formally
through discovery or informally and fortuitously. In some states, discov-
ery rules explicitly address the right of the prosecution to learn the iden-
tity of defense experts: some of these states prohibit discovery, others
permit it. Courts in two states have proscribed under their discovery
rules discovery of the names or reports of experts whom the defense does
not intend to call.284 On the other hand, rules in two states specifically
authorize disclosure of expert reports, such as the hypothetical one.285
General discovery provisions in several other states also may be inter-
preted to permit such disclosure. Under these general provisions, trial
courts may order "reasonable" discovery of information relevant to the
283. The attorney-client privilege may provide protection against discovery of the subclass of
expert investigation involving communication from the defendant to the expert. See infra Part IV,
Section C. Such protection would not extend to expert investigation not requiring defendant's
participation, except in the extraordinary situation in which the attorney learns of the expert report
through a confidential communication from the client, as would occur where the defendant has tests
conducted and subsequently informs counsel of the results.
284. Gipson v. State, 609 P.2d 1038, 1043 (Alaska 1980); Tafoya v. Baca, 103 N.M. 56, 702
P.2d 1001 (1985).
285. Illinois authorizes broad discovery of defense experts and their reports, subject only to an
exception for statements taken from defendant that the defense does not intend to introduce at trial,
and subject to "constitutional limitation." ILL. SUP. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 413(c). In People ex rel.
Bowman v. Woodward, 63 IlL. 2d 382, 349 N.E.2d 57 (1976), the Illinois Supreme Court construed
this rule to prohibit discovery of experts and their reports that the defendant did not intend to
introduce when the state was ignorant of that information. New Jersey discovery rules once
required that the defense permit the state to discover expert test results or reports regardless of the
defendant's intention to introduce them. N.J.R. GOVERNING CRIM. PRAC. 3:13(b)(1). The New
Jersey Supreme Court declared the rule unconstitutional as applied to reports that the defense does
not intend to introduce at trial. State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978); see infra notes
336-38 and accompanying text.
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state's case if such discovery would not violate the defendant's constitu-
tional rights.286
As far as trial use of the discovered expert or report, the work prod-
uct doctrine plays only a minor role in most states that permit broad
prosecutorial discovery. These states modeled their rules on the 1970
ABA Standards,287 which define work product to exclude all nonlegal
opinions.2 8  As a result, the narrowly defined work product doctrine
286. These states include Arizona, Illinois, Missouri, Montana, and Utah. See supra note 47.
The proposed Michigan rules include a similar provision. See supra note 34. In addition, New
Hampshire rules permit the court to order an exchange of all scientific tests and does not explicitly
limit disclosure to those tests the defendant intends to introduce. N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 99. The
Missouri courts have interpreted their provisions in various ways. Compare State ex rel. Richardson
v. Randall, 660 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1983) (en bane) (discovery of identity of handwriting expert whom
defense did not intend to call at trial held "unreasonable" under Mo. Sup. CT. R. 25.06(A), which
permits extensive prosecutorial discovery if found "reasonable") with State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54
(Mo. 1982) (en bane) (discovery of nonwitness defense psychiatrist approved under same provision
where defendant raised insanity defense), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
287. See, eg., ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.4(b)(1) comment ("Following the suggestion of § 2.6 of the
ABA, Standards,. . . and the example of [the Illinois and Washington rules]... this rule adopts a
limited work product standard... protecting documents only to the extent that they constitute legal
research or the 'theories, opinions and conclusions' of the parties and their agents."). While most
states do not reveal so directly the impact of the ABA Standards on their work product provisions,
the profound impact of the Standards is clear. First, the three limiting elements of the Standards, see
infra note 288, characterize the work product provisions of a number of newly promulgated state
rules, see infra note 289. Second, 1969-70 ABA Standards inspired many of these states' entire
discovery systems. See, eg., People v. District Court, 187 Colo. 333, 338, 531 P.2d 626, 629 (1975)
(en bane) ("Colorado, in adopting liberal discovery procedures, followed the procedures
recommended by the American Bar Association in the ABA Standards.").
288. The 1969-70 ABA Standards define a narrow work product privilege, only for the
prosecution, that is limited to "legal research" or "records, correspondence, reports or memoranda"
of the "prosecuting attorney or his legal staff. . . to the extent that they contain . . . opinions,
theories or conclusions." 1969-70 ABA STANDARDS § 2.6. The commentary clarifies that the
concept is narrowly limited to "the thought processes of the prosecuting attorney" and does not
include facts. Id. commentary at 90.
Second, under the Standards, the work product doctrine does not protect experts outside the
legal staff of the prosecutor's office. Id. commentary at 91. According to the commentary, this
narrow definition facilitates maximum disclosure of information while preserving protection for the
most sensitive information of the advocate-his thought processes. Id. commentary at 88-90. The
commentary notes that balance of advantage, presumption of innocence, and the constitutional
requirement to disclose exculpatory material to the defense supports the maximum disclosure
requirement. Id.
Third, the Standards define no work product protection for the defendant. Id. § 3.1-.2.
Apparently, the Standards omitted this protection because even arguably discoverable defense
materials would not have fallen within the Standards' narrow definition of the work product
privilege. As originally proposed, the Standards provided for discovery of only nontestimonial
evidence from the defendant, such as appearance in a lineup and handwriting exemplars, and of
medical and scientific reports. The only discoverable documents were to be medical or scientific
reports, which would have been clearly outside the work product doctrine since they would be
prepared by experts not on the defendant's staff.
Additional work product issues for the defense arose when the House of Delegates modified the
proposed Standards to permit the trial court to order disclosure of the nature of defenses and defense
witnesses. Id. § 3.3. When states adopted modified versions of the ABA model, the provision was
expanded to require defense disclosure of statements of its witnesses. Because initial developers of
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provides no protection against prosecutorial use of such experts or
reports at trial.28 9
In both state and federal law, the work product doctrine stems from
public policy considerations. The concern is to protect materials pre-
pared for litigation purposes from adversary access.2 90 The doctrine is
most clearly applicable at the discovery stage, where the impact of disclo-
sure poses the most direct threat to vigorous case preparation. As such,
the doctrine is often formally embodied in the jurisdiction's discovery
rules. As a general matter, such rules are by their own terms inapplica-
the Standards foresaw no need for a defense work privilege, they obviously did not consider whether
values different from those noted above, which supported a narrow privilege for the prosecution,
should shield defense trial preparation efforts from disclosure.
289. Illinois and Missouri define work product to cover both defense counsel and his
investigative staff but do not extend it beyond legal theories and conclusions to include scientific
opinions. ILL SuP. CT. R. GRIM. P. 412(j)(i); Mo. SUPER. CT. R. 25.10(A). Alaska provides work
product protections only for the prosecution and confines it narrowly to legal opinions, theories, or
conclusions. ALASKA CRIM. R. 16(b)(8). New Mexico, which provides for broad, independent
prosecutorial discovery patterned on the proposed federal rules, defines work product to include
most documents produced by counsel or his agents, but excludes scientific or medical reports. N.M.
DIST. CT. R. GRIM. P. 28(b)(1).
Some states fail to define any work product rule for the defense. E.g., Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorada, Iowa, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, and Utah. But see People v. District Court, 187
Colo. 333, 342-43, 531 P.2d 626, 631 (1975) (en banc) (state supreme court creates work product
privilege for defense similar to statutory privilege provided for prosecution, finding constitutional
foundation for its action). Other states limit the persons covered by the rule to the party's legal staff
in accordance with the 1969-70 ABA Standards, See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM P. 3.220(c)(1); ME. R.
CRIM. P. 16A(c); MASS R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(5). A third group includes members of the investigative
staff within the scope of the rule but shows no inclination to extend the protection beyond legal
theories or case analysis to "factual" opinions of experts. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.4(b)(1);
ILL. Sup. CT. R. CRIM. P. 412(j)(i); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02 Subd. 3; Mo. Sup. CT. R. 25.10(A);
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.855(1)(a).
By contrast, the federal work product privilege as enacted in 1975 in FED. R. GRIM. P. 16(a)(2),
is expansive. It shields all "reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by
the attorney for the government or other government agents in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of the case" from discovery by the defendant, except as specifically provided by other
provisions of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. The privilege is similarly defined in subsection (b)(2) for the
defense.
The legislative history of the federal rule shows that adoption of this broad privilege was not
motivated by a desire to protect the defense. Congress adopted the Senate's version of the privilege,
which had as its primary goal the protection of the names of government witnesses and persons
interviewed but whom the government did not intend to call. See 8 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 16.01[4], at 16-32 (2d ed. 1986); Act of July 30, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (89 Stat. 370) 713, 717.
290. See generally United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (work product doctrine
has vital role in "assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system"); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (disclosure of materials within work product protection violates public
policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims); People v. Small, 631 P.2d
148, 158-59 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (describing state work product polices as similar to those
reflected in Nobles and Hickman), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1101 0981); Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391
Mass. 164, 187-88, 461 N.E.2d 222, 236-37 (1984) (work product doctrine is creature of public
policy and MAss. R. CRIM. P. 14 preserves its "core" but excludes witness statements and nonlegal
reports to further interest in liberal discovery).
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ble once discovery is completed and the trial begun.29' Some jurisdic-
tions recognize a work product doctrine beyond this point.292 Although
derived from the same policy concerns, the privilege available at trial
may well be narrower in scope. The demands of the fact finding process
support greater disclosure of investigative efforts after pretrial prepara-
tion has been completed. At this phase disclosure is less likely to inhibit
witness cooperation or thorough preparation.293
Where discovery rules embody the work product doctrine, work
product is sometimes interpreted to include protections supplemental to
explicit discovery prohibitions in order to avoid subverting their protec-
tion. For instance, while Rule 26(b)(4)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure explicitly restricts only access to the opinions of experts, some
courts also require a showing of "exceptional circumstances" to learn the
expert's identity. Otherwise, the courts reason, once the identity is
revealed the expert's opinion may be obtained informally or he may be
called as a witness at trial.294 In addition, where the expert is located
inadvertently, use at trial may be prohibited under the theory that other-
wise parties will be tempted to let "happenstance" replace formal
discovery.295
291. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234-36 (1975); Morris v. State, 59 Md. App.
659, 669, 477 A.2d 1206, 1211 (1984) (work product doctrine not intended to create evidentiary
privilege at trial but only limitation on pretrial discovery); accord People v. Grier, 90 Ill. App. 3d
840, 847, 413 N.E.2d 1316, 1322 (1980); State v. Turner, 97 N.M. 575, 582, 642 P.2d 178, 185 (Ct.
App. 1982); State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 125-26, 235 S.E.2d 828, 840 (1977); see also Feldman,
supra note 1, at 506; cf. Note, Proposed 1967 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 271, 282 (1968) (special protection for nonwitness experts under FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4)(B) based on theory that discovery of all expert efforts would deter thorough preparation,
but discovery of only that information favorable enough actually to be used at trial will not deter
preparation).
292. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239; People v. Grier, 90 Ill. App. 3d 840, 847, 413 N.E.2d 1316, 1322
(1980).
293. State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 125-26, 235 S.E.2d 828, 840 (1977) (identity of state's
witnesses already known at trial and disclosure subjects them to no additional risks; major concern
at this point is accurate development of facts); accord Grier, 90 Il1. App. 3d at 841, 413 N.E.2d at
1322; cf. Morris v. State, 59 Md. App. 659, 669, 477 A.2d 1206, 1211 (1984) (work product doctrine
creates no evidentiary privilege but limits pretrial discovery).
294. Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496, 502 (10th
Cir. 1980); see also In re Sinking of Barge Ranger I, 92 F.R.D. 486, 488-89 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Guilloz
v. Falmouth Hosp. Ass'n, 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1367, 1371 (D. Mass. 1976); Nemetz v.
Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66, 68 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278, 280 (E.D. Wis.
1971); Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 201-02 (1977). But see In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 256, 259-60 (N.D. Il1. 1979); Arco Pipeline Co. v.
S/S Trade Star, 81 F.R.D. 416, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Baki v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D.
179, 181-82 (D. Md. 1976); Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.R.D. 113, 114 (D. Del.
1974); Note, Discovery of the Nonwitness Expert Under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B),
67 IowA L. REv. 349 (1982)
295. Ager, 622 F.2d at 503. But see Granger v. Wisner, 134 Ariz. 377, 656 P.2d 1238 (1982)
(defendant allowed to call plaintiff's expert after inadvertently discovering identity). Where the
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On the other hand, where the formally embodied work product doc-
trine determines that a class of reports is outside the doctrine's protec-
tions, there is no logical extension of the doctrine to inadvertent
disclosures. Some states exclude reports of expert opinions from the
work product doctrine because they contain factual conclusions rather
than case analysis. These states, then, have no basis for excluding the
reports from evidence at trial or protecting the doctrine from indirect
subversion by "inadvertent" disclosure. The work product doctrine is, as
a policy matter, simply inapplicable to this entire class of information.
As a consequence, if the state's rules permit the prosecution to obtain the
expert's identity directly through discovery, admissibility at trial follows.
But even if the rules do not explicitly permit discovery, the work product
doctrine creates no bar against use at trial if the prosecution obtains the
information through other means.296
In a situation such as the present hypothetical, the state may learn
of the expert examinations even if formal discovery rules do not require
disclosure. Because the defendant is indigent, the prosecution may learn
of the examination when his counsel seeks court approval to hire an
expert. Any applicable work product protection for the expert opinion
should remain even if the state learns of the examination due to the
defendant's indigency. The fact that the state is paying for the examina-
tion is no justification for it to obtain the results of the tests regardless of
opponent attempts to use informal contacts in order to avoid the restrictions of the rules, the expert's
testimony may be excluded from trial as a sanction for violation of discovery rules. Durfinger v.
Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984); Campbell Industries v. M.V. Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 27
(9th Cir. 1980); see also Note, supra note 294, at 365-66 (party who contacts nonwitness expert
without first establishing exceptional circumstances could be subject to contempt).
296. In Morris v. State, 59 Md. App. 659, 477 A.2d 1206 (1984), the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals ruled that the state in its case-in-chief properly called a defense expert who analyzed stains
on the defendant's shirt. It ruled broadly that the work product privilege provided protection only
against pretrial discovery and afforded no evidentiary privilege at trial. The court relied on the
discovery rules, which permit pretrial discovery of the reports of experts whom the defendant
intends to call at trial. The court also justified the denial of work product protection on a narrower
factual basis. The defense expert destroyed the stain in the process of testing it, making impossible
further tests by the state expert. Id. at 669-70, 477 A.2d at 1211-12.
In Illinois, while the courts have not squarely addressed the issue, it is clear that the work
product doctrine does not protect experts or their reports from indirect discovery. A number of
cases have permitted the prosecution to use defense experts in situations in which the doctrine, if
applicable, would have created a barrier to disclosure. See People v. Garza, 92 111. App. 3d 723, 734,
415 N.E.2d 1328, 1338 (1981) (defense expert who examined hair sample in state's possession
ordered to provide report to state regardless of defense intention to introduce the results at trial); see
also People v. Childers, 94 Ill. App. 3d 104, 418 N.E.2d 959 (1981) (psychiatric examination
revealed to state through motion for appointment of expert admissible), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 947
(1982); People v. Fowler, 72 Ill. App. 3d 491, 390 N.E.2d 1377 (1979) (handwriting expert retained
by defense permitted to testify for state); People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 199-201, 242 N.E.2d 208,
220-21 (1968) (fingerprint expert employed by defense called by government), death sentence
vacated, 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
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their outcome.297 Similarly, though the state controls the evidence to be
tested, that control provides no justification for eliminating any privileges
that would otherwise exist. 298 The state has legitimate interests in assur-
ing preservation of the evidence and in guaranteeing its admissibility for
the state;299 but those interests can be protected by conditioning defense
access to the evidence-without requiring disclosure of its test results. 30°
Disclosure of the hypothetical test results, which I contend is
improper, could be avoided simply by redefining work product in the
criminal context to include the identity and the opinions of nonwitness
defense experts absent extraordinary prosecutorial need or defense
waiver of the privilege.3 °1 One of the purposes of the work product doc-
trine is to protect innovative case preparation. When the expert's opin-
297. In re Mulvaney v. Dubin, 80 A.D.2d 566, 567, 435 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (1981) (discovery of
defense psychiatric expert-an essential service for effective assistance of counsel-cannot turn on
fact that he was paid by the government), rev'd on other grounds, 55 N.Y.2d 668, 431 N.E.2d 292,
446 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1981); cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1985) (indigent defendant must
be provided materials essential to building an effective defense and, with respect to those materials,
discrimination between indigents and those able to pay is improper); Marshall v. United States, 423
F.2d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir. 1970) (by proceeding under federal statute to obtain expert services,
defendant does not waive "disclosure of his case and his concomitant rights against self-
incrimination and to due process").
Clearly, actions by the defense, intended to overcome the restrictions of confinement or
indigency but which reveal the existence of an expert examination, should not be construed as waiver
of any work product protection otherwise available. See infra note 345. Similarly, information
obtained in this manner is not excluded from fifth amendment protections by the Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (holding that the state may compel production of documents only if it
has prior knowledge of their existence).
298. It is an entirely different situation where the discovery rule conditions the defense's
discovery of prosecution evidence upon reciprocal defense disclosure. See State v. Mingo, 77 N.J.
576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978); People v. Coleates, 86 Misc. 2d 614, 376 N.Y.S.2d 374 (County Ct. 1975)
(discovery of photographs in state's possession necessary for defense expert to perform "blood
splatter analysis" made contingent upon defendant's providing results to state). Whether the
discovery rule is constitutional turns on issues related to the validity of "conditional" discovery. See
supra note 141.
299. See People v. Garza, 92 Ill. App. 3d 723, 415 N.E.2d 1328 (1981); Morris v. State, 59 Md.
App. 659, 477 A.2d 1206 (1984), discussed supra note 296. In both cases, the state had a legitimate
interest in supervising the transfer of its evidence to the defense expert and protecting the integrity of
the evidence to assure admissibility at trial. Moreover, since the defendant in Morris refused to
stipulate to the chain of custody of the shirt being tested, the trial court correctly ordered that the
state could deliver the evidence directly to the defendant's expert and could remain during testing.
Since the evidence was destroyed as a result of the testing procedure, the court had a clear
justification for denying work product privilege. Obviously, the state could not replicate the
examination.
300. For instance, the court could require the defense to stipulate to the authenticity of evidence
delivered into its possession. Also, the state could escort the evidence to the expert and supervise its
care while in her possession. Nothing in these procedures requires that the defense expert's identity,
if learned by the custodian, be disclosed to, or used by, the prosecution.
301. If work product is defined more broadly, then it becomes important how the state learns of
the information. It must be determined whether the state's methods constitute a subterfuge or threat
to the policies of the doctrine. See supra note 295. Principles of waiver also apply. For a discussion
of waiver, see infra notes 344-56 and accompanying text.
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ion will not be used at trial and other available experts could perform
similar tests, the justifications for allowing broad discovery-allowing
adequate preparation by the adversary and true litigative unfairness-are
absent.
In many states, the rules' limited defense work product protection
apparently derives from a mechanistic extension of the narrow
prosecutorial work product doctrine of the 1970 ABA Standards,302 as
well as from the belief that a narrow construction is critical to prevent
discovery from being routinely thwarted by each side.3 °3 Careful policy
analysis suggests that this result is misguided.
The work product doctrine, as applied to defense preparation, rests
on values that support broader protections for the defense than to the
prosecution. These include the constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel, the absence of a due process responsibility to provide infor-
mation helpful to the prosecution, and the practical justification that the
state generally enjoys substantially superior investigative resources.
Examination of the protections available under federal civil discov-
ery principles underscores the general inappropriateness of defense prep-
aration discovery when the defendant does not intend to call the witness
at trial. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B) pro-
vides that where an expert has been "retained or specially employed" by
the opponent "in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial," but is
not expected to be called as a witness, a party may discover facts known
by that expert or opinions held by him "only . . . upon a showing of
exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other
means." Discovery is limited for nonwitness experts because
fear of discovery may deter thorough preparation in cases where an
expert's work is not indispensable .... However, when an expert's work
302. See supra note 287.
303. The Massachusetts Supreme Court explicitly linked the expansion of discovery and a
limited work product privilege:
Rule 14 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure preserves the "core" of the
work product doctrine by "shelter[ing] the mental processes of the attorney," . . . but
unlike the Federal doctrine, favors liberal discovery by excluding statements of witnesses
other than the defendant and nonlegal reports from the definition of work product. The
policy of our rules is that the availability of statements of nonparty witnesses gathered by
an adversary serves a truth-enhancing function . . . that outweighs any resulting
inconvenience or potential disincentive to lawyers who obtain and preserve such statements
in written form.
Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164, 187-88, 461 N.E.2d 222, 237 (1984) (quoting United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975)) (footnote and citations omitted).
304. Cf. In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Mikva, J., concurring)
(attorney-client privilege has broader protection because of sixth amendment concerns in criminal
litigation); see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (work product doctrine is
"intensely practical" doctrine that recognizes reality that attorneys must often rely on agents whose
product must be protected).
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is indispensable-when the expert will be called as a witness-the danger
of surprise and the possible introduction of new issues justify the aban-
donment of high standards for discovery, especially since the threat of
disclosure of the information favorable enough to be used at trial proba-
bly will not deter preparation of a case.30 5
The policies behind the civil discovery rules further vigorous litiga-
tion "by precluding unreasonable access to an opposing party's diligent
trial preparation. '3 6 If these policies prohibit access to experts whom
the civil litigant does not intend to call at trial, analogous policies should
even more certainly extend the same protection to the nonwitness expert
of the criminal defendant. The interests in civil cases gain additional
vigor in criminal litigation from the strength of the defendant's constitu-
tional right to due process, his privilege against self-incrimination, and
the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. 3 7 Furthermore, if waiver
is appropriately defined, legitimate defense interests can be protected
while maintaining discovery for information that may be presented at
trial as to which advance notice is critical.
3. The Effective Assistance of Counsel Guarantee
of the Sixth Amendment
The sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel should
independently provide protection for defense experts in appropriate situ-
ations. Sixth amendment protection should not turn on the availability
of work product doctrine or fifth amendment protections. I contend that
the sixth amendment prohibits the prosecution from using the investiga-
tive efforts of defense experts that are significantly damaging to the
defense, unless the defense itself uses some aspect of the work to its
advantage. In requiring disclosure and permitting use of such efforts, the
state significantly interferes with counsel's ability to decide indepen-
dently how best to defend her client. This interference violates the sixth
amendment.
In United States v. Cronic,308 and Strickland v. Washington,309 the
United States Supreme Court attempted to provide something of an inte-
305. Note, supra note 291, at 282.
306. Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984).
307. Ironically, under current criminal discovery practices, the results may be just the opposite.
See, e.g., State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 64 (Mo. 1982) (en bane) (Seiler, J., dissenting) (discovery of
nonwitness defense psychiatrist approved under criminal discovery rule permitting discovery of
information relevant and material to state's case would not have been possible under state's civil
discovery rules which do not authorize discovery of either identity or opinions of nonwitness
experts), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
308. 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (inexperience of counsel or complexity of case not basis for ineffective
assistance where such characteristics did not affect ability of defendant to receive fair trial).
309. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance not found where attorney's strategy was
reasonable and defendant failed to show that counsel's performance had likely impact on outcome).
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grated system for analyzing effective assistance of counsel issues. Unfor-
tunately, the Court did not clearly indicate in these cases the mode of
analysis it would use regarding discovery of defense experts or how it
would resolve the issue raised by such discovery. The Court stated in
Washington that the "[g]overnment violates the right to effective assist-
ance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make
independent decisions about how to conduct the defense."310 Such sixth
amendment violations include a bar on consultation between attorney
and client during an overnight recess, 311 a bar on defense summation at
judge trials, 312 a bar on direct examination of the defendant,313 and the
requirement that the defendant testify as the first defense witness if he is
to testify at all.314 The Court observed that in cases in which the state
directly interfered with the defendant's right to counsel, harm to the
defendant was so likely that prejudice should be presumed.3 5 The Court
also observed that such impairments of counsel were easy to identify and
simple to prevent because the government was directly responsible for
them.
3 1 6
State rules that require disclosure of damaging defense experts deter
vigorous defense investigative efforts generally and thereby deny effective
assistance of counsel. Such rules appear similar to previously discussed
restrictions that courts have held automatically to violate the sixth
amendment. Nevertheless, it is far from clear whether rules requiring
such disclosure involve per se violations of effective assistance of counsel.
One reason for this lack of clarity is that in those cases in which the
Supreme Court has recognized a sixth amendment violation, the state
interference with counsel's conduct has been certain. Here, whether the
defense will in fact be deterred is to some degree a matter of conjecture.
A second reason is that the Court has yet to give any adequate systematic
guidance on what restrictions upon defense conduct are permissible. In
its ineffective assistance cases, the Court has only said that once the
restriction has been found within an impermissible class, prejudice will
be presumed.317 These cases fail to clarify whether requiring the defense
to make its investigative efforts available to the state is impermissible or
is instead an appropriate method of furthering the state's interest in hav-
310. Id. at 686.
311. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976).
312. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975).
313. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961).
314. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (alternative holding).
315. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984); see also United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984).
316. Washington, 466 U.S. at 692.
317. Id.; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25.
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ing all probative information presented to the finder of fact.318
One important feature of the sixth amendment analysis apparent
from the cases is that the government's interference with counsel's
actions must be purposeful. This feature is clearly present in discovery of
unsuccessful investigative efforts. Purposefulness alone, however, does
not produce a constitutional violation. In United States v. Morrison,319
the Court assumed without deciding that the sixth amendment was vio-
lated when federal investigators disparaged counsel and unsuccessfully
attempted to convince the defendant to change lawyers and cooperate
with the prosecution. Since the defense alleged no adverse effect upon
counsel's effectiveness and showed no prejudice, the Court ultimately
held that no remedy was appropriate.32 ° It also found no violation of
right to counsel in Weatherford v. Bursey,321 where an informant partici-
pated in conversations between a defendant and his attorney. The Court
emphasized that the intrusion was not purposeful and that the informant
neither told the prosecution what he had heard nor testified about it at
trial.
3 22
As these two cases demonstrate, reversal of a conviction is required
only when the prosecution obtains some arguable advantage as a result of
governmental intrusion. 23 While these cases do not describe the extent
of the prejudice necessary for reversal, they suggest a lesser degree of
prejudice would lead to reversal when the state caused the incompetence
of counsel than when it did not.324
In addition to prejudice to the individual defendant, courts are con-
cerned about a potential "chilling" effect upon counsel's efforts in general
when the government purposefully interferes with counsel's actions. In
Weatherford, the government conceded the validity of a similar argu-
ment: "the Sixth Amendment's assistance-of-counsel guarantee can be
meaningfully implemented only if a criminal defendant knows that his
318. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978) (sixth amendment right to counsel
does not invalidate an otherwise substantively proper but restrictive procedural rule simply because
that rule limits counsel's advice, since such advice is appropriate only for substantively valid
practices); see also 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 164, § 11.8, at 71
(1984) ("In each of these cases, [Geders, Herring, Brooks, Ferguson] it should be noted, the Court
might also have found the particular restriction unconstitutional on the ground that it imposed an
undue burden on the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.").
319. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
320. Id. at 366-67.
321. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
322. Id. at 558.
323. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 164, § 11.8, at 75 (1984)
(in absence of adverse impact on criminal proceeding, no reason not to allow proceeding to go
forward despite constitutional infringement).
324. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (where ineffective assistance was not
caused by state action, the relevant standard for prejudice is "reasonable probability" that absent
counsel's errors result would have been different).
1666 [Vol. 74:1567
DISCOVERY AGAINST THE DEFENSE
communications with his attorney are private and that his lawful prepa-
rations for trial are secure against intrusion by the government, his
adversary in the criminal proceeding." '325
In other words, the government acknowledged that even if the infor-
mation obtained through an intrusion into the attorney-client relation-
ship would not itself have been so prejudicial as to warrant reversal,
reversal would be required due to the overall chilling effect such practices
would have upon defense efforts. Similarly, even if state use of the results
of defense investigative efforts were not inherently prejudicial in a partic-
ular case, the potential impact on defense efforts in general might have
been so great as to deny effective assistance of counsel. Though counsel
was not deterred from undertaking the effort which proved unsuccessful,
he may have been deterred from making other appropriate, but perhaps
even more dangerous, inquiries.
This analysis does not mean that a sixth amendment violation would
occur in each instance where a discovery rule authorizes the state to
receive disclosures of unsuccessful defense investigative efforts. The issue
is the permissible scope of such a discovery rule. If discovery is confined,
for example, to disclosures of a type that would not cause substantial
harm to the defense, then the rule would not logically deter vigorous
defense efforts. The threat of disclosure would simply be too insignificant
to "chill" the exercise of the constitutional right.32 6 If the rule would
permit disclosure of substantially damaging information, however, the
fact that the actual disclosure was of relatively minor importance should
not be dispositive. Prejudice flows not only from the direct detrimental
impact of the rule on the specific defendant, but also from its deterrence
of other possible defense efforts by the specific defendant's attorney and
those similarly situated.327
325. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n.4 (1977) (quoting Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae at 24 n.13 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 71, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966))).
326. See State v. Ortega, 198 N.J. Super. 161, 165, 486 A.2d 904, 906 (1985) (impact of
permitting prosecution to use tape recording of lineup proceedings made by defense investigator
insignificant given ability of other witnesses present to testify to events recorded).
327. Whether the harmless error doctrine of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) should
apply to such violations is less clear. The state may argue harmless error by showing not only that
disclosure of the defense's unsuccessful effort did not influence the case's outcome, but also that no
other, possibly deterred, effort could have made a difference. Cf Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence
Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1169 (1982)
(when ineffective assistance was not produced by state interference, prosecution could conceivably
demonstrate harmless error by showing steps omitted by counsel would not have aided defense, but
government's burden would be very difficult to meet).
On the other hand, a showing of harmless error in the instant case leaves undisturbed the
chance that other defense counsel will be inhibited by the prospect of government access to
unsuccessful efforts. Resolution of the issue turns on the relative importance placed upon the
prejudice in the specific case versus the damaging impact of the practice in general. Cf Note,
Attorney-Client Communications of Criminal Defendants: Evidentiary and Constitutional Protections,
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In sum, the Court's ineffective assistance cases give no direct
guidance for the resolution of the issues posed here. The outcome in any
particular case will depend upon the Court's evaluation of the likelihood
that the threatened disclosure will substantially deter vigorous defense
efforts and the willingness of the Court to focus on systemic effects rather
than on the harm in the individual case. Such willingness is not yet
apparent. Cronic and Washington reflect a case-specific focus and ignore
arguments that requiring specific proof of substantial prejudice leaves
untouched the major problem of widespread, inadequate representation
for indigent defendants.328 These cases suggest, then, that a "chilling
effect" would not warrant declaring a discovery rule unconstitutional.
Nor would such a general effect warrant reversing a conviction unless the
particular defendant suffered substantial, specific prejudice from the
application of a rule that the Court also finds substantively unfair.
I contend that a discovery rule's constitutionality under the sixth
amendment should be evaluated by its impact on provision of defense
services generally.329 -A rule allowing any incriminating information
developed during defense preparation to be used against the defendant
would impair both a vigorous defense effort, which is central to the
adversary system, and the defendant-counsel relationship. 3 ° Moreover,
the inexperience and poor quality of defense counsel typically involved in
62 WASH. U.L.Q. 739, 745-46 (1985) (costs of attorney-client privilege can only be justified at
systemic level, not in a particular case; requiring case-specific prejudice inevitably dilutes the
privilege).
328. See Babcock, supra note 327, at 1163-74 (once serious incompetence is shown, no prejudice
should be required because operation of entire adversary system, including ability to detect errors,
depends upon relative equality among opponents).
329. This is not the standard typically applied to inadequate representation by counsel absent
specific state interference with his efforts. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694
(1984) (two-part test: first, counsel's representation must fall below an objective, reasonable
standard and second, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors,
the result would have been different); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. 366, 371 (1985) (specific
prejudice must be shown that would have altered outcome of case where counsel gave erroneous
information that induced defendant to plead guilty).
Indeed, given the Court's restrictive treatment of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a
reasonable observer would predict that, regardless of the strength of the arguments to the contrary,
the Court will require specific prejudice and will decline to invalidate rules for their "chilling
impact" on vigorous investigation and case development. See Weiner, Federal Grand Jury
Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposalfor Reform, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 95, 124 (1985) (unlikely that
Supreme Court would rely on chilling impact of subpoenaing lawyers upon candid lawyer-client
exchanges rather than requiring specific showing of prejudice).
330. The consequences would be similar to those that would result from eliminating aspects of
the attorney-client privilege. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("[I]f the client
knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following
disclosure than from himself in the absense of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in
his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.").
For many reasons, client mistrust of counsel is especially great in criminal cases, and
particularly so for publicly appointed counsel. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional
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criminal cases, the general lack of adequate resources to support the
defense, and the structural impediments to effective representations have
frequently been noted.33' Any procedure that further impedes such
efforts must be viewed with alarm.
For example, the defense attorney often faces difficulty in obtaining
accurate information regarding the case. She often begins with a murky
picture of what occurred and few ideas about how the case should be
defended or on what terms it should be bargained. She must be permit-
ted to explore the facts without fearing potential creation of evidence for
the state. If each failure adds to the considerable advantage typically
enjoyed by the prosecution, prudent counsel may investigate only when
she believes the likelihood of producing favorable results is very substan-
tial. As a consequence, she may lose important opportunities.332
Also, many, if not most, relations between attorney and criminal
defendant begin with distrust. 333 The right of the prosecution to obtain
unfavorable results and witness statements from the defense would inevi-
tably exacerbate these tensions. Few defendants would not retain a law-
Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 473, 474 & n.l. These tenuous
relationships cannot easily survive the impact of "betrayal" of unsuccessful investigative efforts.
Even though the proposed treatment of ineffective assistance focuses on the impact of disclosure
on the system as a whole, its impact on the state's legitimate interests in discovery should be
relatively minor. As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 343-56, a properly limited
waiver concept will protect those interests when the need for disclosure is most pressing.
331. See Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811, 812-16 (1976)
(indigents "represented all too often by 'walking violations of the Sixth Amendment' "); see also
United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3390 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Many, perhaps
most, criminal defendants in the United States are represented by appointed counsel, who often are
paid minimal wages and operate on shoestring budgets."); Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent
Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633, 634 & nn.7-8 (1980) ("staggering case
loads and limited resources" lead to a less-than-adequate performance by approximately one-tenth of
criminal lawyers); Comment, Representation for Indigent Criminal Defendants in American Courts, 7
CRIM. JUsr. J. 417, 430-31 (1984) (author notes problems concerning inexperienced counsel,
continued acquisition of cases regardless of professional reputation, and inadequate and uneven
funding for defense attorneys and experts); Comment, Liberal Review of Defense Counsel's
Performance: The Normal Competency Test, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 407, 408-11 ("All three branches of
the criminal justice system as well as the system itself presently contribute to the lack of effective
defense counsel.").
332. Many of these same arguments were advanced against enactment of FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1
and against similar rules in the states that require defense counsel to provide written statements of
defense witnesses to the prosecution after those witnesses have testified. See generally Pulaski, supra
note 44 (rule 26.1 is probably unconstitutional and certainly imposes unnecessary burdens on the
efforts of defense attorneys expeditiously to prepare cases for trial). I need not reargue the issue.
The balance between the detrimental impact upon the defense and the legitimate interest of the state
is substantially different in the case of discovery of defense experts, thus rendering these discovery
rules unconstitutional.
333. See Wice & Suwak, Current Realities of Public Defender Programs: A National Survey and
Analysis, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 161, 171 (1974) (initial meetings between lawyer and criminal
defendant "occural in an atmosphere of suspicion and bitterness" with clients fearing that counsel is
tool of prosecution); Mounts, supra note 330, at 474 & n. 1 (clients generally suspicious and hostile
toward public defenders).
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yer because of the danger that investigative efforts would be revealed to
the prosecution.334 The lawyer's notice to the defendant, however, that
her latest investigative effort will be used to establish the client's guilt
would devastate the typical tenuous relationship.335
Cases decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey provide useful
illustrations of the analysis I advance here. In State v. Mingo,336 defense
counsel moved under the state's discovery statute for access to a note
written by the assailant in order to have an expert perform a handwriting
analysis. Under the state's conditional discovery rule, counsel's request
for the note triggered an obligation to provide extensive discovery to the
state.337  Furthermore, the trial court specifically conditioned access
upon counsel's agreement to disclose the handwriting expert's report to
the state regardless of its outcome. The examination showed that the
defendant wrote the note. When the expert's report was provided, as
ordered, to the state, the prosecution subpoenaed the expert and called
him in its case-in-chief. The court observed that:
To safeguard the defense attorney's ability to provide the effective assist-
ance guaranteed by these constitutional provisions [right to counsel
under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions], it is essential that
[counsel] be permitted full investigative latitude in developing a meritori-
ous defense on his client's behalf. This latitude will be circumscribed if
defense counsel must risk a potentially crippling revelation to the State of
334. For discussion of the ways in which discovery of defense experts and their results varies
depending upon whether the defendant is represented by counsel or is proceeding pro se see supra
text accompanying notes 279-83.
335. Cf Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). The Court recognized that clients
would be reluctant to provide information to counsel without an attorney-client privilege since such
information could more readily be obtained from counsel than defendant. The result would be
restricted communication and less informed legal advice. Because the privilege withholds relevant
information from the factfinder, however, it is limited to disclosures that "might not have been made
absent the privilege." Id.
The attorney-client privilege theoretically protects only communications. Nevertheless, it also
shields the contents of the privileged communication. Clearly the facts contained in the
communication are not themselves protected as a direct consequence of being communicated to an
attorney. The protection afforded to the communication may, however, deny the opponent access to
those facts if she finds no alternative source of the information.
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Court recognized that the attorney-
client protection of communication imposes little real cost on the adversary. Though the adversary
loses the convenience of using the communication, she is in no worse position than if the
communication had never taken place. Id. at 395-96. Indeed, under the general theory of the
privilege that its purpose and effect is to encourage frank communications between lawyer and client,
id. at 389, there is good reason to believe that no communication would have been made absent the
privilege's protections.
A similar argument applies here. If discovery is freely allowed, expert examinations are not
likely to be completed in many situations. Thus, either with or without a discovery right, the state
would not receive the expert opinion. Without the protection, however, the defense effort will be the
poorer, and the adversarial goal of a vigorous development of both sides of the issue will suffer.
336. 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978).
337. N.J. R. GOVERNING CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-3(b).
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information discovered in the course of investigation which he chooses
not to use at trial....
.. "The attorney must be free to make an informed judgment with
respect to the best course for the defense without the inhibition of creat-
ing a potential government witness." 33 8
From this analysis, the court found that the state's conditional dis-
covery rule as applied in the case violated the defendant's constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel.339
In State v. Williams, 3' defense counsel and his investigator asked
the victim to identify her attacker from a group of photographs that
included a picture of the defendant. She selected the defendant's photo-
graph. The state moved for discovery of the pictures shown to the victim
and memoranda of the interview. Defense counsel objected, asserting,
not unexpectedly, that he did not intend to use the unfavorable material
at trial. Under the discovery rules,341 the trial court ordered discovery of
those items, and the state used them in its case-in-chief.
32
The state supreme court held that the defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel had been violated under the basic theory of Mingo,
as well as under an explicit work product rationale.
The investigative course selected by an attorney in order to prepare a
proper defense for his client frequently entails a high order of discretion.
This often calls for more than simple fact gathering. Evidential materials
obtained in the exercise of this professional responsibility are so interwo-
ven with the professional judgments relating to a client's case, strategy
and tactics that they may be said to share the characteristics of an attor-
ney's "work product." Blanket discovery of the fruits of this kind of
legal creativity and preparation may impact directly upon the freedom
and initiative which a lawyer must have in order to fully represent his
client. Curtailment or inhibition of this attorney function by discovery,
not otherwise justified to avoid trial surprise, would permit the State to
338. Mingo, 77 N.J. at 581-82, 392 A.2d at 592-93 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d
1036, 1047 (3d Cir. 1975)).
339. Mingo, 77 N.J. at 587, 392 A.2d at 595. Nevertheless, the court found the error
constitutionally harmless on the ground that it had not prejudiced the defendant's case. Id. at 588-
89, 392 A.2d at 596. In declining to reverse the defendant's conviction, the court had no need to fear
a chilling impact of the discovery practice on other defendants because it declared that "henceforth
[such discovery] by the State will be impermissible by reason of our ruling herein." Id; see also supra
note 324.
340. 80 N.J. 472, 404 A.2d 34 (1979).
341. N.J. R. GOVERNING CRIM. PRAC. 3:13-3(b)(4) requires that the defendant permit
discovery of "written statements, if any, including any memoranda reporting or summarizing the
oral statements, made by any witnesses whom the State may call as a witness at trial" if the
defendant seeks any discovery under the statute. In Williams, the defense triggered the reciprocal
requirement by obtaining discovery from the prosecution of the names and addresses of its witnesses.
Williams, 80 N.J. at 484, 404 A.2d at 40 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
342. To avoid testifying, defense counsel stipulated that the victim selected the defendant's
photograph during his interview with her. Williams, 80 N.J. at 476, 404 A.2d at 36.
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undermine the effectiveness of an attorney in serving his client.3 43
Following this analysis for the hypothetical rape case set out earlier,
a discovery rule that would require the defense to divulge unsuccessful
test results should be declared unconstitutional. The rule would stifle
legitimate investigation and lacks justification on the basis of substantial
state interests.
4. Waiver as a Conditional Concept
Because state courts have not treated the work product doctrine and
the sixth amendment as serious protections against improper discovery,
they have not analyzed the appropriate scope for the waiver doctrine
regarding these protections. If applied rigidly, waiver concepts may
force the defendant to choose between forfeiting these protections or
complying with discovery rules requiring disclosure of anticipated
defenses. Waiver should instead be interpreted to promote the protec-
tions provided under the sixth amendment and the work product doc-
trine while reconciling them with legitimate state concern over unfair
surprise.
Whether applied to the work product doctrine or to the constitu-
tional right of effective assistance of counsel, waiver should be found only
after careful analysis. 3" The defense has an important and legitimate
343. Id. at 479, 404 A.2d at 38 (citation omitted).
In subsequent cases, the New Jersey courts have explored the limits of this doctrine. In State v.
Doe, 161 N.J. Super. 187, 391 A.2d 542 (1978), the court reversed on sixth amendment grounds a
trial court's order prohibiting a defense polygraph expert from examining a jailed defendant. The
visit was barred because defense counsel refused to comply with a standing judicial order that the
prosecutor be notified of any visits of experts to confined defendants. The court found it "entirely
conceivable that if the prosecutor had to be notified every time a confined defendant had need for a
visit from an expert, whether or not the expert's report was to be used at trial, a chilling effect on the
conduct of effective and complete defense investigations could occur." Id. at 189, 391 A.2d at 543.
In State v. Ortega, 198 N.J. Super. 161, 486 A.2d 904 (1985), the court found no constitutional
violation where defense counsel was ordered to give the prosecution a tape recording of a lineup.
The tape had been made by a defense investigator, but the defense did not intend to use it at trial.
Apparently, the court found no violation of effective assistance of counsel because the impact upon
defense efforts would be de minimis. Had discovery been denied, prosecution witnesses present at
the lineup could have testified concerning what had occurred.
344. In some jurisdictions where the work product privilege covers defense expert reports,
courts have held that voluntary disclosures made during efforts to plea bargain waive the privilege.
State v. Jackson, 97 N.M. 467, 469, 641 P.2d 498, 500 (1982) (psychiatric examination of victim by
defense expert introduced by state after defendant instructed expert to reveal findings to prosecution
and then suggested plea agreement; voluntary disclosure held to waive any privileges available,
although opinion may be read to indicate that work product doctrine covered only discovery stage
and was inapplicable at trial); State v. Malzac, 309 Minn. 300, 308-09, 244 N.W.2d 258, 263 (1976)
(deposition of defense ballistic expert admitted at trial over work product claim because defense
disclosed report during "process of willing compromise and negotiation" that "waived any work-
product-privilege claim that [defense] might have asserted").
Finding waiver in the plea-bargaining situation may be tolerable since it leaves the defense the
choice, although a difficult one, of whether to waive the privilege in order to gain a litigative benefit.
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interest both during discovery and at trial in protecting the fruits of its
investigative efforts. Unless it intends to, and does, use such information
at trial, the principal justification for prosecutorial discovery-avoidance
of unfairness through surprise-has no application. Thus, waiver of the
right to protect such information at trial should occur only when the
defense actually introduces information developed by the expert.
In this area, waiver should be defined as a two-stage, or conditional,
concept. 34 5  By indicating its intention to use the expert, the defense
But waiver should be found only when the defense seeks to make affirmative use of the protected
materials. See Note, Waiver of the Work Product Immunity, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 953, 968-69
(1981) (work product should be held to be waived only where information voluntarily revealed to
adversary). The wisdom of finding waiver in the voluntary plea-bargaining situation is questionable,
however. Imposing possible costs contravenes the policy favoring negotiated pleas, see, e.g., FED. R.
EvID. 410, FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e), and may conflict with the broader purpose of the work product
privilege to facilitate efficient operation of the adversary system, which depends heavily upon such
bargaining. See Feldman, supra note 1, at 539-40 (plea negotiations are to be encouraged and should
not be inhibited by fear that disclosures will waive privilege).
A more troublesome concept of waiver permits the government to call a defense expert where
the defendant's testimony is inconsistent with the results of the examination. In State v. Harrison,
90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977), superseded by rule change, see Tafoya v. Baca, 103 N.M. 56, 702
P.2d 1001 (1985), an indigent defendant took a polygraph examination at state expense. Under state
law the test was admissible. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 138, 560 P.2d 925, 929 (1977); State
v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 184-85, 539 P.2d 204, 204-05 (1975); N.M. R. EVID. 707 (effective 1983).
Thereafter, defense counsel informed the state that he would not disclose the test results. Although
the rules clearly did not authorize discovery, see N.M. DisT. CT. R. CRIM. P. 28(a)(2), since the
defense did not intend to introduce the report or call the polygraph examiner, the state moved for
production.
The trial court ruled that the state could not call the polygraph examiner to testify in its case-in-
chief. After the defendant testified, however, the court permitted the examiner to be called and
questioned about both his conclusion that the defendant's test responses were untruthful and the
statements made by defendant during the examination. The state supreme court affirmed. It
rejected work product and attorney-client objections as well as claims of due process and equal
protection protections. The court simplistically rested its conclusion upon a "waiver" rationale
supported solely by Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see also U.S. v. Milano, 443 F.2d
1022, 1027-28 (10th Cir.) (testimony of defense handwriting expert admitted under similar rationale
to impeach defendant's claim that handwriting on bank robbery note was not his), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 943 (1971).
Harrison and Milano give an entirely untenable meaning to waiver of work product doctrine.
Under their rationale, waiver occurs if the defendant's testimony contradicts the results of a test even
if the defense makes no affirmative use of that test. Such a broad view of waiver could logically apply
to any expert opinion inconsistent with evidence offered by the defense.
345. Protection under both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine is
generally considered inconsistent with any purposeful disclosure to the adversary. Waiver of
attorney-client privilege occurs when the client or the attorney, acting under the -client's
authorization, voluntarily reveals the confidential communication to anyone outside the confidential
relationship. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (any voluntary disclosure to
third party constitutes waiver); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 93 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). Waiver of
work product privilege is more narrowly construed; it occurs when information is voluntarily
communicated to the adversary. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2024, at 210 (1970); Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71
GEO. L.J. 917, 936-38 (1983); Feldman, supra note 1, at 538-39.
Nevertheless, because new contexts with competing interests require a more flexible concept, a
conditional waiver concept has gained recognition with some courts and commentators. See State v.
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waives confidentiality for discovery purposes. Disclosure should not
waive the defendant's right to control testimonial use of the expert. If
the defense never calls the expert, disclosure of his report should not
entitle the state to call him. The prosecution has suffered no affirmative
harm, and absent such harm, the defense should be able to preserve its
exclusive right to call the expert. By providing discovery of the expert,
the defense enables the state to prepare its response. Discovery would
not, however, operate to waive the defense's right to prevent admission of
the expert's testimony. 46
B. Discovery of Statements Made by Witnesses to the Defense
The foregoing discussion has focused on discovery of defense expert
witnesses. In this section, I discuss discovery rules that require the
defense to provide statements of any witnesses from whom it has taken
written statements. In some instances the rules require the defense to
create statements of its witnesses specifically for discovery.
The 1970 ABA Standards, even in final form, required that only the
prosecution provide witness statements. As noted above, fifteen states
wrote rules that mandate that the defense also provide witness state-
ments.34 Two of those went further, and their rules require the defense
to generate statements even when counsel would not choose indepen-
dently to do so.3 4 In addition, rules in three states require the defense to
provide the prosecution with witness statements, not only of defense wit-
nesses, but also of witnesses. whom the state will call, regardless of
whether the defense intends to use the statements to impeach the govern-
ment's witnesses at trial.3 49
Those states that require the broad production of witness statements
Jones, 99 Wash. 2d 735, 750, 664 P.2d 1216, 1224 (1983) (disclosure to prosecution of defense
psychiatric examination that contained communications within attorney-client privilege does not
waive privilege; waiver occurs only where evidence is used at trial to prevent defense presenting
"'one-sided account of the matters in dispute,'" using "privilege as a sword rather than a shield")
(quoting State v. Pamn, 98 Wash. 2d 748, 764 n.7, 659 P.2d 454, 462 n.1 (1983) (quoting Brown v.
United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155 (1958))), Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and
Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 647 (1980); see also State v. Mines, 35 Wash. App. 932, 937-39,
671 P.2d 273, 277 (1983); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-
client privilege not waived by compliance with discovery rule that compelled advance disclosure of
one expert's opinion on defendant's sanity where defense chose to introduce contrary reports by
another expert at trial).
346. In State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 587, 392 A.2d 590, 595 (1978), the Supreme Court of New
Jersey defined precisely the type of two-stage waiver proposed here.
347. See supra notes 40-41.
348. Rhode Island and Washington, see supra note 43.
Such rules may run afoul of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel under
the analysis set out slupra in text accompanying notes 308-342.
349. Minnesota, New Jersey, Wisconsin, see supra note 44. The New Jersey Supreme Court,
however, declared the rule unconstitutional when applied in this fashion. State v. Williams, 80 N.J.
472, 404 A.2d 34 (1979). See supra notes 340-43 and accompanying text.
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define the work product doctrine to exclude entirely the factual state-
ments of witnesses from its protections.350 When states combine such a
restrictive definition with requirements that defense counsel create state-
ments that she would not have otherwise generated, or provide state-
ments taken from the prosecution's witnesses that she did not intend to
use at trial, two results follow. First, defense counsel loses the ability to
make tactical judgments concerning how the taking of witness statements
may affect her case. She is required to create evidentiary materials that
may aid her adversary. Moreover, this rule does not correct any unfair
defense advantage but serves merely to enhance the general accuracy of
the fact-finding process. Second, the defense counsel loses the ability to
control her adversary's access to damaging information by choosing trial
tactics and strategy that would avoid reliance upon witness statements.
While the number of states with practices that pose these threats is
not large, their challenge to values critical to the adversarial process is
substantial. In United States v. Nobles,351 the Supreme Court, relying on
policies applicable in both state and federal courts, found that work
product principles were even more vital to the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system than to civil litigation. 5 2 In contrast to a number
of the states described above, the Court, under its own policy analysis,
suggested that statements taken from witnesses were within the federal
work product doctrine.353 The Supreme Court did not further delineate
the scope of the doctrine because it concluded that defense counsel had
waived the work product privilege by making testimonial use of the wit-
ness statement for impeachment purposes. 4
Surely states may properly judge whether the policy interest in
encouraging broader discovery warrants the elimination of work product
protection for statements of witnesses the defense calls or impeaches at
trial.355 As to those witnesses, the waiver doctrine embodied in Nobles
and the narrow definition of work product as defined in the ABA stan-
dards reach the same result. But, where the defense would not indepen-
dently produce such witness statements in the absence of the rules, and
350. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Paszko, 391 Mass. 164, 187-88, 461 N.E.2d 222, 236-37 (1984)
(asserting that availability of nonparty witness statements gathered by adversary serves to enhance
the truth-seeking function); State v. Hardin, 558 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (witness
statement taken by defense investigator not within work product because it contained recollections
of witness rather than impressions of investigator); see supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
351. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
352. Id. at 238 & n.12.
353. Id. at 239.
354. Id. at 239 & n.14.
355. Although the issue is difficult, I do not question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
the production of statements by witnesses whom the defense calls or impeaches at trial. Cf Pulaski,
supra note 44, at 16-39 (discussing validity of FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1 which requires defense counsel
to provide statements of defense witnesses at completion of their testimony).
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where statements of prosecution witnesses must be provided regardless of
whether they are impeached, the results will differ. When the statements
produced either affirmatively harm the defense's case or corroborate the
state's case, the difference could have a significant impact beyond matters
of public policy, upon which jurisdictions may freely differ. These results
would raise substantial issues under the sixth amendment analysis set out
above.356
C. Prosecutorial Use of Defendant's Statements Within the
Attorney-Client Privilege
In the past ten years, major developments in the attorney-client
privilege have permitted the state to introduce at trial statements made
by a defendant to agents of his attorney. These statements principally
involve communications between the defendant and defense experts
secured to present the insanity defense. Cases both approving and disap-
proving the prosecutor's right to call such experts often agree that state-
ments by the defendant to an agent of the attorney for the purpose of
securing legal services are within the attorney-client privilege.3 7 Many
courts have held, however, that presentation of the insanity defense
"waives" the privilege. Also, most courts have ruled that the right to
effective assistance of counsel is not violated by prosecutorial use of such
experts.358 My concern is not with the specific basis for these decisions;
356. See supra text accompanying notes 308-42.
357. Cases ultimately upholding the assertion of the privilege freely recognize that the privilege
applies to communications with a defense psychiatric expert. Several note that the "complexities of
modem existence" require that the lawyer and client communicate through experts. State v. Pratt,
284 Md. 516, 520-21, 398 A.2d 421, 423-24 (1979); People v. Hilliker, 29 Mich. App. 543, 548, 185
N.W.2d 831, 833 (1971). See generally City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951) (recognizing that attorney-client privilege protects communications from
physicians to attorneys concerning client's physical or mental condition, particularly since
physicians required to interpret conditions for attorney).
Cases finding waiver often assume that an attorney-client privilege applies to this general class
of communications. They either find the privilege waived by the defendant's assertion of the insanity
defense or conclude it is unavailable as a matter of law based on policies of liberal discovery
necessitated by the insanity defense. State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d 668, 677 (Iowa) (if privilege
attaches to such communications, policy of "'full disclosure of facts'" relevant to the insanity
defense requires disclosure), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 57
(Mo. 1982) (en banc) (if privilege attaches, it is waived by assertion of insanity defense), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 932 (1983); State v. Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d 1, 20-22, 653 P.2d 1024, 1035-36 (1982) (privilege
extends to psychiatric examinations but is waived by raising insanity defense), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
831 (1983).
358. While the attorney-client privilege is a creation of the common law and legislation, some
areas covered by the privilege are also protected by the sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel. In Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), the government conceded that the right
to effective assistance of counsel would be violated "if the government places an informant in the
defense camp during a criminal trial and receives from that informant privileged information
pertaining to the defense of the criminal charges." Id. at 554 n.4; see also id. 429 U.S. at 563
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[I]t has long been recognized that 'the essence of the Sixth Amendment
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confined to their facts, they may be justified. Rather, I am concerned
that the courts tend to cast their reasoning in terms of general litigative
fairness, terms potentially applicable outside of the insanity defense con-
text. Fully extended, these developments fundamentally threaten the
protections of the attorney-client privilege.
The issue of prosecutorial use of psychiatrists consulted by the
defense arises when at least one expert finds that the defendant was
"sane" at the time of the crime, and the insanity defense is pursued at
trial through the testimony of others. The government in some fashion
learns of the dissenting defense expert359 and, over defense objection,
calls her either in its case-in-chief3 60 or in rebuttal after presentation of
defense testimony supporting the insanity defense.361
A number of cases hold that the attorney-client privilege forbids
government use of these experts unless the defendant waives the privilege
by calling the expert in question.362 Recent case law, however, tends to
find the privilege waived or otherwise unavailable for psychiatric testi-
mony. These courts conclude that the right to effective assistance of
counsel imposes no constitutional restriction upon disclosures concern-
ing psychiatrists' communication with the defendant.363
right is... privacy of communication with counsel.' ") (quoting United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d
1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974)).
359. The opinions typically fail to make clear how the state obtains this information.
Presumably, in many cases it is a consequence of defense efforts to obtain funds for the examination
of the indigent defendant. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 45 Or. App. 837, 609 P.2d 866 (1980) (defendant
sought order for appointment of defense psychiatrist). In some states, discovery rules permit state
access to defense-generated psychiatric reports regardless of whether the defense intends to call the
expert who prepared the report as a witness at trial. State v. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Minn.
1982) (MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.03 permits prosecutorial use of all medical records that "bear on the
issue of mental illness"); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 58-59 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (Mo. R. CRIM.
P. 25.06 permits court to order disclosure on reasonable request of state if requested information is
material to its case), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
360. See, e.g., State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Iowa 1984) (defendant had given notice of
defenses of insanity and diminished responsibility but had introduced no evidence on defenses prior
to use of his expert in state's case-in-chief), cert denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
361. See, e.g., State v. Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d 1, 19-22, 653 P.2d 1024, 1034-36 (1982) (defense
,expert used at hearing to determine accused's adult status allowed to testify in rebuttal to insanity
defense at trial), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983); State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo. 1982)
(state allowed to call in rebuttal an expert defense chose not to use), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932
(1983).
362. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975); Houston v. State,
602 P.2d 784, 792 (Alaska 1979) (waiver found where expert who testified for defense relied in part
on report of nonwitness expert); State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626, 424 A.2d 293 (1979); Ursury v. State,
428 So. 2d 713, 714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977); State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421 (1979) (also relying on sixth amendment);
People v. Hilliker, 29 Mich. App. 543, 185 N.W.2d 831 (1971); State v. Moore, 45 Or. App. 837, 609
P.2d 866, 869 (1980).
363. At least seven states find that neither the attorney-client privilege nor effective assistance of
counsel prohibits disclosure of the testimony of these experts. The highest courts in Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, and Washington have written opinions on these issues since 1982. Three states
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Some courts have resisted this trend. Courts that have found disclo-
sure improper have held that simply raising the insanity defense or call-
ing other experts is insufficient to waive the privilege. Under this
approach, the expert herself must be called to the stand 364 or her report
otherwise affirmatively used by the defense before waiver will be
found. 65 The Third Circuit, in United States v. Alvarez,366 agreed that
raising the insanity defense did not waive the attorney-client privilege.
The court went even further, ruling that such a broad construction of
waiver principles would violate the sixth amendment. It concluded that
if the government were able to call an unfavorable defense psychiatrist,
that prospect would have the "inevitable effect of depriving defendants of
effective assistance of counsel" because counsel would be inhibited from
consulting several experts out of fear that she might "creat[e] a potential
applied explicit waiver concepts to the issue of attorney-client privilege: WASHINGTON-State v.
Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d 1, 22, 653 P.2d 1024, 1036 (1982); OHIO-State v. Noggle, No. 3-79-2, slip. op.
at 48-50 (Ohio App. Oct. 19, 1978 ) (cited in Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1412 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983)); NEW YORK-People v. Edney, 39 N.Y.2d 620, 350 N.E.2d
400, 385 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1976). Courts in four other states held that there is no privilege applicable to
psychiatric opinions and the statements of a defendant upon which they are based in the context of
the insanity defense: IOWA--State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d 668, 676-77 (1984); MINNESOTA-
State v. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d 233, 240-41 (1982); MISSOURI-State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54, 58-59
(1982); TEXAS-Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 117 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
933 (1977). In each of these states, other than Texas, the courts looked to the liberal disclosure
policies of their discovery rules or waiver principles for guidance in determining the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. All seven states found that disclosure did not violate the constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel.
Of similar interest are state discovery rules that limit the privilege in the context of the insanity
defense. See supra note 359. Following this trend, recent legislative changes in Michigan permit
automatic discovery of defense psychiatric reports where the defendant intends to raise the insanity
defense. People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 351, 357-58, 276 N.W.2d 892, 894-95 (1979). The
legislation marked a shift in the privilege defined in People v. Hilliker, 29 Mich. App. 543, 185
N.W.2d 831 (1977), where the court found that use of the defense expert by the prosecutor violated
the attorney-client privilege. While Hilliker was not explicitly overruled by legislative action, the
discussion in Sorna substantially narrowed the privilege it described. Id.
In addition, four federal circuits have addressed the issue. In United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d
1036 (3d Cir. 1975), the Third Circuit held that the government violated both the attorney-client
privilege and the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by calling the defense
psychiatrist as a witness at trial. See also United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 524-25 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (attorney-client privilege covering statements by defendant to psychiatrist not waived by
raising insanity defense). The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have subsequently reached a
contrary result. See Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1415 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1010 (1983); Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003, 1007
(1982), United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem.,
556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
364. Alvarez 519 F.2d at 1046 (3d Cir. 1975) ("If the expert is later used as a witness on behalf
of the defendant, obviously the cloak of privilege ends."); Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
365. Houston, 602 P.2d at 790-92 (Alaska 1979) (privilege waived for nonwitness expert where
expert who testified for defense relied upon other expert's report in his testimony).
366. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
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government witness., 3 67
The most frequently cited response to Alvarez comes from Judge
Weinstein's opinion in United States ex rel Edney v. Smith.36 8 Judge
Weinstein recognized that basing waiver on simply raising the insanity
defense would go beyond traditional analysis. Nonetheless, he was will-
ing to allow waiver under these circumstances based "on considerations
of fairness and the salutary concept that the trier of fact should have
adequate access to as much of the available psychiatric testimony as pos-
sible where the defendant's mental state is in issue."'369 He then examined
whether a flexible approach to waiver was constitutionally prohibited
under the sixth amendment. He concluded that absent a "more adequate
and less speculative demonstration of the prejudice" to defense efforts
resulting from this practice, use of the expert did not violate the defend-
ant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. He was
unwilling to terminate further state experimentation with the scope of
the privilege absent a more substantial showing that adequate representa-
tion would actually be inhibited.3 70
Judge Weinstein's opinion strongly influenced the recent trend
allowing discovery and use of defense psychiatric evidence. Professor
Saltzburg, too, has provided justification for permitting prosecutorial
access to such evidence.3 7 1 Professor Saltzburg argues that the defense's
psychiatric evidence is likely to be substantially superior to any evidence
that the government could reasonably obtain on its own. First, the
defense expert frequently will examine the defendant closer in time to the
incident than any government expert, an important factor in the value of
the examination. Second, Professor Saltzburg contends, the defendant is
367. 519 F.2d at 1046-47; see also State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 524, 398 A.2d 421, 425 (1979)
("An additional consequence of the State's suggested waiver rule ... is that the defense, in essence,
would be required to assist the prosecution in discharging its burden of proof.").
368. 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 431
U.S. 958 (1977).
369. Id. at 1049.
Judge Scalia's statement in United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc), concerning waiver of the fifth amendment upon introducing expert testimony is apt here.
It seems to us at best a fiction to say that when the defendant introduces his expert's
testimony he "waives" his Fifth Amendment rights. What occurs is surely no waiver in the
ordinary sense of a known and voluntary relinquishment, but rather merely the product of
the court's decree that the act entails the consequence-a decree that remains to be
justified.
"Waiver" is often the term used when a court has decided it just to deny the privilege as a
consequence of the defendant's choice to introduce evidence on insanity. But as the Byers court
observes, the defendant is definitely not voluntarily relinquishing a known right. Indeed, he fre-
quently vigorously objects to the government's use of his witness. See Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d
1408, 1422-23 (6th Cir. 1983) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (defendant did not specifically waive objec-
tion to calling his expert but rather objected vigorously), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983).
370. 425 F. Supp. at 1054-55.
371. Saltzburg, supra note 345, at 597.
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likely to be more cooperative with a defense expert. Third, the defendant
may learn how to distort his responses based on the experience of his first
examination and thereby be able to mislead later government experts. 372
There are substantial reasons to doubt that Professor Saltzburg's
arguments accurately reflect the realities of the psychiatric examination
process. 373  If they were soundly based, they would support finding
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in the limited factual situation he
describes. He presents a special and extreme form of the litigative fair-
ness argument that would support a limited intrusion into the attorney-
client relationship. Professor Saltzburg's premise is that the defendant
should not be able to interject an issue into the case and yet withhold the
only direct evidence on that issue from the prosecution. This argument
builds on the widely accepted justification for requiring the defendant to
submit to a psychiatric examination by a state-chosen expert if he wishes
to raise an insanity defense. While the precise articulations of the policy
differ, they are all based on the concept of litigative fairness in its extreme
form-necessity.374 If the underlying factual justification is both as com-
pelling and as universally applicable to insanity cases as Professor
Saltzburg contends, then litigative fairness in this extreme form exists
vis-a-vis discovery and use of the defendant's experts. The exception to
372. Saltzburg, supra note 345, at 636-39.
While these arguments have logical force, their validity ultimately rests upon empirical evidence
Professor Saltzburg does not provide. He gives no evidence of how often his factual assumptions are
valid or how they weigh against the values threatened by disclosing all unsuccessful examinations.
Furthermore, he does not adequately explain why these arguments should eliminate the privilege for
a whole class of experts, rather than provide a basis for voiding the privilege in individual cases
where the facts support his arguments. While factual, case-by-case analysis will impose litigation
costs and erroneously uphold the privilege in some instances due to lack of proof, there is no
showing that such costs are prohibitive in the context of the important values threatened by broad
application of a waiver doctrine.
373. Prior to Professor Saltzburg's formulation of a general rationale for waiver, courts
occasionally examined some of these concerns specifically. In those cases, when the state was
required to demonstrate actual prejudice rather than rely on general presumptions, it failed to make
the required showing. In Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the state argued
that waiver should be found because the defendant's experts conducted a more timely examination
and therefore were "more qualified" than the state's experts and because protecting the testimony of
the experts would permit the defendant to '-scoop' up all qualified experts in a given field." The
court recognized that possibility but found no support for it in the specific facts of the case. The
defense called only two lay witnesses. The court held that the state's theoretical arguments did not
justify its calling two defense experts in addition to its own two experts. Id. at 642. By contrast in
State v. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1982), the court upheld waiver of the privilege in a similar
factual situation. The court accepted the broad policy arguments. The defendant offered only lay
testimony, but the state was allowed to use not only a court appointed psychiatrist but also the one
consulted by the defendant, id. at 236, prompting the observation that "[t]here is no showing on this
record that a dearth of psychiatric evidence or witnesses available to the prosecution exists." Id. at
243 (Wahl, J., concurring).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55, discussing United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d
1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
1680
DISCOVERY AGAINST THE DEFENSE
the attorney-client privilege, while potentially expansive, would be both
justified and carefully constrained.
The facts of two recent federal cases dealing with discovery involve
circumstances approaching necessity. Both circuit courts upheld waiver
of the attorney-client privilege upon the defendants' raising the insanity
defense. In Granviel v. Estelle3 75 and Noggle v. Marshall,376 the defend-
ants refused to cooperate with any experts for the court or the prosecu-
tion, providing especially strong justification for allowing the prosecution
to use a dissenting defense expert.3 77 Because of their special facts, these
cases are unlikely to be employed in a wholesale assault on the attorney-
client privilege.
In contrast, recent state court opinions have not analyzed this issue
so carefully. Their broad sweep threatens to expand the argument in
favor of disclosure from the logic of necessity to the general concept of
litigative fairness and beyond the specific context of the insanity defense
to all expert investigation.
In State v. Craney, 3 78 for example, the Iowa Supreme Court charac-
terized the Alvarez decision as reflecting "the bygone philosophy that for
an attorney's investigations to be effective they must be shrouded in
secrecy.,379 The opinion then emphasized that a party should not be
able to put a "'matter into issue and then deny access of the opposing
party to relevant information concerning it.' ,3"1 It concluded that the
attorney-client privilege is inapplicable because it would stultify "[flull
disclosure of the facts." 38 1 Conspicuously absent from the court's analy-
sis is any careful limitation of waiver doctrine to the special circum-
stances of insanity defense litigation.382
375. 655 F.2d 673, 683 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1983).
376. 706 F.2d 1408, 1411 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983).
377. Granviel, 655 F.2d at 683 ("We are especially driven to this outcome in this case where
Granviel, at his counsel's urging, refused to cooperate with the experts who were appointed at the
prosecution's request."); Noggle, 706 F.2d at 1411 (defendant examined by three defense experts
appointed by court and retained by state).
378. 347 N.W.2d 668 (Iowa), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 255 (1984).
379. Id. at 677.
380. Id. (quoting State v. Cole, 295 N.W. 2d 29, 35 (Iowa 1980)).
381. Id.
382. Similarly, in State v. Dodis, 314 N.W.2d 233, 239-40 (Minn. 1982), the Supreme Court of
Minnesota observed without limitation to the insanity defense, "The United States Supreme Court
has consistently held that reciprocal rules of discovery and testimony in a criminal setting have no
constitutional infirmities." The court held that since the rule required the defense to turn over all
reports and records relevant to the insanity defense and allowed the prosecution to use them, the
state should be able to call any defense expert on the issue of insanity. It saw "little reason not to
interpret the rules . . . to give the defendant and prosecution as complete use of evidence as is
possible under the constitutional limitations to enhance the search for truth." Id. at 240; see also
People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 351, 358, 276 N.W.2d 892, 895 (1979) (citations omitted):
Defendant stresses a variety of tactical disadvantages which may result if he is required to
furnish the report of "any independent examiner" to the prosecution, including chilling of
19861 1681
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
In State v. Carter,38 3 the Supreme Court of Missouri argued even
more broadly that general principles of fairness provide adequate justifi-
cation for prosecutorial discovery. 3 4 It held the attorney-client privilege
inapplicable on the theory that the defendant waived the privilege by
pleading insanity. Turning to the propriety of ordering discovery under
the rule, it noted first that the report was "[u]nquestionably ... relevant
and material to the State's case."' 385 It then cited the state's duty to pro-
vide exculpatory reports to the defense and stated, "Just as the evidence
would be available to the defendant in that case, so the evidence is avail-
able to the State in this. It is a poor rule that does not work both
ways."
386
The court went on to emphasize both that the "fundamental pur-
pose of a criminal trial is fair ascertainment of the truth" and that not
only the defendant but also the state "has a direct interest in an accurate,
just and informed verdict based upon all available relevant and material
evidence bearing on the question. ' 3  While recognizing that a defend-
ant's interests in effective assistance of counsel may be somewhat com-
promised, the court concluded that the state's discovery request was
reasonable and its right to fairness outweighed the competing defense
interest.388
It would be inaccurate to read the language of these decisions as
completely divorced from the special circumstances of the insanity
defense in which they arose.38 9 Yet the broad language and analysis
invite just such an inaccurate reading. Courts have justified discovery
defendant-psychiatrist communication and discouragement of defense counsel exploration
of the insanity issue by gathering a variety of medical opinions. This position ignores the
fundamental purpose of a criminal trial: the fair ascertainment of the truth. A necessary
concomitant of this goal is a reasonable balancing of advantages and a lessening of a
vehemently adversary climate at trial.
383. 641 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983).
384. Missouri discovery rules permit trial judges, "[s]ubject to constitutional limitations," to
require the defendant to furnish any relevent information when the court finds that the state's
request is reasonable." Mo. Sup. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 25.06. In Carter, the trial court ordered discovery
of a defense psychiatrist's report under Rule 25.06.
385. 641 S.W.2d at 58.
386. Id. In his dissent, Judge Seiler remarked on the inappropriateness of this argument: "Just
because the defendant. . . is entitled to the report of the prosecutor's psychiatrist... does not mean
the state is entitled to [the defense psychiatrist's] report or testimony here, because the state has no
due process or Brady v. Maryland [373 U.S. 83 (1963)] constitutional right against the defendant."
Id. at 66 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 58.
388. Id. at 59.
389. Indeed, in State ex rel. Richardson v. Randall, 660 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1983) (en bane), the
Missouri Supreme Court distinguished Carter and found the state's request to discover the name of a
defense handwriting expert unreasonable under the same rule, Mo. Sup. Cr. R. CRIM. P. 25.06(A),
when the defense did not intend to call the expert. It tied the rdsult in Carter to the insanity defense
and limited the use of a defendant's expert to the situation where evidence concerning insanity is
presented at trial. 660 S.W.2d at 701-02.
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with a general argument of litigative fairness and the state's interest in
accurate resolution of the issues. On this basis, they have required the
production of all relevant evidence. If the defendant presents nothing at
trial to which his communications may be relevant, then it is indeed
unlikely that discovery and use by the state will be permitted.
The stage is now set, however, for an expansion of the "fairness"
doctrine. The next incursion likely will be outside the insanity area,
when the defendant presents evidence to which his confidential commu-
nications may provide relevant rebuttal. Indeed, the Supreme Court of
New Mexico, a state that authorizes very broad prosecutorial discovery,
took that critical next step and though the court subsequently overruled
the result by changing the rule, it did not disavow its earlier analysis. 390
In State v. Harrison,391 the court permitted the state to impeach the
defendant with his confidential communications to a defense polygraph
examiner. The defendant objected under the work product doctrine and
the attorney-client privilege. The court brushed aside both those argu-
ments, citing only Harris v. New York.392 In its broad holding, the court
pronounced that both the defendant's statements to the polygraph opera-
tor and the results of the examination "may be used to impeach a defend-
ant who takes the stand. 3
93
Again, one cannot be certain of how far these developments will
proceed.394 Unfortunately, however, this progression, from authorizing
state use of protected communications in an area of special need, to
authorizing use of such communications to impeach the defendant's tes-
timony if he takes the stand, has a familiar ring. It is much like the well
documented movement from approval of impeachment with illegally
390. See Tofoya v. Baca, 103 N.M. 56, 702 P.2d 1001 (1985).
391. 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977). See supra note 344.
392. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
393. Harrison, 90 N.M. at 443, 564 P.2d at 1325.
394. Cf. State v. Holland, 98 Wash. 2d 507, 656 P.2d 1056 (1983) (en bane). In Holland, the
Supreme Court of Washington accepted the proposition that the fifth amendment applies to court-
appointed mental health professionals but held that they could be called to impeach the defendant.
The court found no evidence that the defendant's statements to the experts had been coerced. It
rested its holding on Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Other courts have found the defendant's statements to agents of his attorney protected by the
attorney-client privilege. State v. Melvins, 155 N.J. Super. 316, 382 A.2d 925 (1978) (order
requiring defendant to provide results of his polygraph test which counsel did not intend to use at
trial violated attorney-client privilege and his right to effective assistance of counsel); People v.
Knippenberg, 66 Ill. 2d 276, 362 N.E.2d 681 (1977) (impeachment of defendant with report by his
counsel's investigator violates both attorney-client privilege and effective assistance of counsel);
People v. Marcy, 91 Mich. App. 399, 283 N.W.2d 754 (1979) (attorney-client privilege bars state
from calling defense polygraph examiner to testify at grand jury concerning statements by suspect
concerning murder of his wife). Except in Knippenberg, however, no court addressed whether such
statements might be used to impeach.
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obtained evidence,3 95 first authorized under similar circumstances of spe-
cial justification in Agnello v. United States396 and Walder v. United
States,397 to almost completely unconstrained authority for the prosecu-
tion to use such evidence under Harris v. New York 39' and United States
v. Havens.
399
Perhaps the attorney-client privilege and the underlying concern for
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel will prove a
stronger restraint on the use of these communications to impeach, but
this is far from certain should litigative fairness become the focus of con-
cern. If waiver of the attorney-client privilege turns on general fairness,
waiver may be predicated on any inconsistent testimony by the defend-
ant. Sixth amendment protections might be similarly waived when the
defendant testifies.4' °
One of two possibilities will follow. Either courts will rule that
waiver occurs only upon a showing of necessity-that the privilege can
only be breached by a state interest in preventing the defendant from
using it to obtain a further advantage where he has a virtual monopoly
on relevant evidence- or a defendant will be able to communicate with
his attorney and agents in true confidence only if he is willing to forego
the right to take the stand. I contend that the state's interests in a fair
resolution of the issues and the search for the truth does not justify a
state right to secure rebuttal evidence any time the defendant takes the
stand or introduces evidence. The adoption of such a principle would
alter our adversarial criminal system in a truly fundamental way. Courts
must recognize that basic principles that undergird our adversarial sys-
tem were designed to prevent discovery of confidential communications
between the defendant and his counsel or counsel's agents, even at the
cost of sacrificing optimal factfinding.
CONCLUSION
Since the Williams decision, courts and legislatures applying con-
cepts of litigative fairness and efficiency to criminal discovery have
greatly diminished protections for defense secrets and confidences. In
395. See I W. LAFAVE & 1. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.6 (1984); 3 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.6 (1978 & Supp. 1985); see also Bradley, supra note 124, at 423-30.
396. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
397. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
398. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
399. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
400. Perhaps the line will be drawn between statements directly to the attorney, which will be
protected, and those to his agents when the agent is performing an arguably nonlegal service and the
central issue in the litigation is within his expertise, which will not be protected. If necessity rather
than general litigative fairness is the standard, it is hard to imagine that the sixth amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel would not be violated by allowing the use of statements made directly
to counsel for legal advice, at least where pejury by the defendant is not involved.
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doing this, they have largely ignored fifth and sixth amendment
restraints, principally because of inadequate or superficial analysis. At
the same time, the attorney-client privilege and the work product doc-
trine have been reduced from positions of special importance in defining
the basic contours of the adversary system to virtually nothing more than
factors to be balanced in the process of reaching an efficient and equitable
result. Nevertheless, the basic guarantees of the fifth and sixth amend-
ments, as well as the policies underlying the work product doctrine and
the attorney-client privilege, remain inconsistent with major elements of
discovery against the defense.
Such developments in criminal discovery have gone far beyond
articulation of new doctrine; the practical consequences have been noth-
ing short of revolutionary. More than half of the states have accepted
the Court's invitation in Wardius to experiment "with systems of broad
discovery." They have expanded criminal discovery generally and in the
process have extended discovery against the defense, often permitting
very extensive prosecutorial discovery. The result has been to change
fundamentally the criminal litigation system, to shift the balance of
advantage in favor of the prosecution, and to violate the Constitution.
With the results clear, it is now time to bring this experiment under con-
trol and to restore the balance mandated by basic constitutional and evi-
dentiary principles.
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